Department of Nuclear Safety and Security Division of Nuclear Installation Safety

1. Department of Nuclear Safety and SecurityDivision of Nuclear Installation Safety IAEA SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME FOR NPPS WORLDWIDE Mamdouh El-Shanawany Head of Safety Assessment Section

2. Hierarchy of the Safety Standards Safety Fundamentals Safety Fundamentals Requirements Requirements Safety Guides Safety Guides Under its mandate the IAEA has developed a logical framework of objectives and principles of nuclear reactor safety. Safety Fundamentals • Set out general principles for protecting people and the environment Safety Requirements • Establish requirements: what has to be done (‘shall’) to apply these principles in meeting objectives Safety Guides • Set out recommended ways (‘should’) of meeting the requirements

3. Examples of Safety Standards • Fundamental Safety Principles SF-1 • The IAEA Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities Requirements GS-R-Part4 • The Safety of Nuclear Power Plant: Design NS-R-1

4. Specific Safety Requirements General Safety Requirements Part 1 Governmental and Regulatory Framework 1. Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations Part 2 Leadership and Management for Safety 2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 2.1 Design and Construction 2.2 Commissioning and Operation B. Design of Nuclear Power Plants Part 3 Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources Part 4 Safety Assessment 3. Safety of Research Reactors Part 5 Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste 4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities 5. Safety of Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities Part 6 Decommissioning and Termination of Activities 6. Safe Transport of Radioactive Material Part 7 Emergency Preparedness and Response

5. IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS • IAEA has statutory obligation to develop international standards of safety Article III.A.6 of Statutes: • To establish or adopt standards of safety for the protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property • To provide for the application of these standards

6. IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS Safety Standards represent international consensus on the best practices to achieve a high level of safety

7. IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS Utilization by Member States • Formally adopted (i.e. China, Netherlands) • Direct use of standards to establish regulation (i.e. Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, India, Korea, Russian Federation) • Used as reference for review of national standards (by all States also by Industry).

8. IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES • Peer reviews performed upon request of Member States. • Assess compliance with Safety Standards and provide recommendations for improvements. • Results publically available (unless formally requested by Member State).

9. IAEASAFETY REVIEW SERVICES • Guidelines based on best international practices and feedback from long experience • Phased approach • Self assessment • Preparatory mission • Main mission • Follow-up mission • Modular approach to meet needs of Member States

10. IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES • Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) • International Probabilistic Safety Assessment Review Team (IPSART) • Review of Accident management Program (RAMP) • Safety Assessment and Design Safety Review Service (SADRS) • Generic Reactor Safety Review (GRSR) • International seismic safety centre Services (ISSC) • Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) • Peer Review of Operational safety Performance Experience (PROSPER) • Safety aspects of Long Term Operation (SALTO) • Safety Culture Assessment Review Team (SCART) • Integrated safety Assessment of Research Reactors (INSARR) • Safety assessment of Fuel Cycle Facilities during operation (SEDO)

11. IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES • “Customers” of safety review services: • 50% Regulators • 50%Industry

12. OSARTobjectives of the OSART programme • to provide the host country (regulatory authority, plant/utility management and governmental authorities) with an objective assessment of the status of the operational safety with respect to international standards of operational safety and performance; • to provide the host plant with recommendations and suggestions for improvement in areas where performance falls short of IAEA Safety Standards and international best practices;

13. Objectives of the OSART programme • to provide key staff at the host plant with an opportunity to discuss their practices with experts who have experience of other practices in the same field; • to provide all Member States with information regarding good practices identified in the course of the review; • to provide experts and observers from Member States and the IAEA staff with opportunities to broaden their experience and knowledge of their own field.

14. Standard OSART review scope: 9 areas • Management, organization and administration (MOA) • Training and qualification (TQ) • Operations (OP) • Maintenance (MA) • Technical support (TS) • Operational experience feedback (OE) • Radiation protection (RP) • Chemistry (CH) • Emergency planning and preparedness (EPP) • (+ Commissioning [COM] for pre-operational OSART)

15. Customized OSART review scope Customized review scope = core areas + selected optional areas New optional areas in development: • Long Term Operation • Transition from Operations to Decommissioning • Probabilistic Safety Assessment Applications • Accident Management

16. OSART missions 2006, 2007 2006 • Lithuania, Ignalina • Slovakia, Mochovce • Ukraine, S. Ukraine 3 • France, St. Laurent 2007 • Finland, Loviisa • Korea, Yongwang • Belgium, Tihange • Germany, Neckarwestheim • Ukraine, Khmelnitsky • France, Chinon

17. OSART missions 2008, 2009 2008 • Sweden, Forsmark • Russia, Balakovo • USA, Arkansas • France, Cruas • Ukraine, Rovno 3,4 2009 • Japan, Mihama • Sweden, Oskarshamn • France, Fessenheim • Spain, Vandellos 2 • Ukraine, S. Ukraine 1,2* • China, Ling Ao 3,4** * Limited scope ** Pre-operational

18. 5 9 3 3 1 0 0 OSART PROGRAMME 2006-2009 21 OSART missions: Western Europe 9 Central Europe 3 Eastern Europe 5 Asia 3 North America 1 South America 0 Africa 0

19. OSART Missions for Russian NPPs A number of OSART missions were requested by Russian NPPs during the period 1989–1993, which are listed below: PlantReactor typeYear Gorky (Pre-operational) district heating NP 1989 Novovoronezh 3/4 VVER 440/179 1991 Kola 1/2 VVER 440/ 230 1991 Smolensk 3 RBMK 1000 1993 All of these missions were combined review of design and operational safety, not the current standard OSART programme.

20. OSART missions for Russian NPPs More recently, the Russian NPPs management requested full OSART and follow up for two more plants: PlantReactor typeOSARTOSART FU Volgodonsk VVER-1000 2005 2007 Balakovo VVER-1000 2008 2010

21. OSART missions for Russian NPPs The following points were noted from overall assessment of the results of OSART missions to Volgodonsk and Balakovo NPPs: • Evidence of significant efforts were spent by the plants to prepare for the OSART; • Relatively low number of areas for improvement; • Most areas for improvements are suggestions, only a few recommendations; • Relatively high number of good practices; • During the OSART Follow-up missions the team observed that: • A high ratio of issues fully resolved, the rest progressing satisfactorily towards completion, with no issues having insufficient progress; • The plants responded with corrective actions not only to recommendations and suggestions but also to encouragements, which is the lowest category of advice; • The corrective actions were applied not only at the plant hosting the OSART but across the fleet of Rosenergoatom.

22. OSART missions for Russian NPPs Future plans for OSART missions in Russia are being considered. There is an agreement with the utility Rosenergoatom to organize an OSART mission to a Russian NPP site every three years: PlantReactor typeYear SmolenskRBMK 2011 Kola VVER 440/213 2014 By completing these reviews the OSART programme will then have cover all major reactor designs operated in Russia.

23. IAEA Generic Reactor Safety Review (GRSR) May 2010

24. Nuclear Installation Safety Generic Reactor Safety Reviews (GRSR) The IAEA is assisting Member States in their new reactor design assessments by carrying out reviews of reactor design safety cases with focus on completeness and comprehensiveness of the safety case using selected and applicable IAEA Safety Fundamentals and Requirements. .

25. Generic Reactor Safety ReviewObjectives • The aims of the review are to: • Determine whether the reactor design safety case follows the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles, • Determine whether the selected safety requirements defined in GS-R-4 and NS-R-1 are being addressed in the design safety case and identify any that have been omitted, • For those requirements that are addressed, form a view on whether they are being addressed in a way that is consistent with the spirit of the IAEA requirements, • For the safety requirements that are not being addressed or are partially addressed, form a view on their relative significance and highlight their importance to safety. • Identify if the supplied documentation includes proper references/evidence as technical supporting information.

26. Generic Reactor Safety ReviewArea and Scope The review focuses on: A. Completeness • Does the documentation provide a complete overview of the safety case or are there gaps? • if so are these made explicit and is there any indication of what is being done to fill them (NB this applies to both the safety of the design and the safety case itself)? • Is evidence provided that substantiates the safety claims and arguments being made? B. Comprehensiveness • Are all modes of operation covered, e.g. outages, refuelling, maintenance, start-up, shutdown? • Are all features of the facility included e.g. fuel stores, spent fuel storage, auxiliary systems, steam turbines? • Are lifetime issues covered e.g. ageing management; provision for maintenance, repair, replacement with respect to radiological risks/doses; decommissioning; radioactive waste minimisation in maintenance, repair and replacement? Assisting Member States to implement the IAEA safety standards

27. Generic Reactor Safety ReviewSafety Fundamentals and Safety Requirements Safety Standards used in IAEA generic evaluation of safety of new reactor designs : Fundamental Safety Principles, SF-1 Safety Standards against which the reviews are conducted Safety Assessment Requirements, GS-R-4 Design Safety Requirements NS-R-1 Supporting guidance documents Design Safety Guidelines Safety Assessment Guidelines

28. IAEA Safety Requirements andGeneric Reactor Safety Review LICENSING FUTURE STATE MS REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA LICENSING IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS REQUIREMENTS REVIEW REVIEW MS REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA HARMONIZING SAFETY ASSESSMENTS GLOBAL NUCLEAR SAFETY REGIME REVIEW FUTURE MDEP CONTRIBUTION MS REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA REVIEW MS REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA LICENSING LICENSING

29. Generic Reactor Safety Review Report Contents The Executive Summary : General Reporting: • Description of the review’s scope, objectives, implementation, and safety requirements selected for the review Review Results: • General comments on the quality and completeness of the documents screened • A review of selected design features with observations and recommendations highlighting specific findings on technical topics (e.g. safety functions, reactor core and associated features, reactor coolant system, containment, I&C, human factors defence in depth, use of PSA and DSA, etc.) Review Sheets for each Safety Requirement : • Detailed screening comments on each requirement and sub-paragraph of GS-R-4 and NS-R-1 reviewed

30. Generic Reactor Safety Review 2006-2009 Activities ACR 1000 - AECL AP1000 - Westinghouse EPR - AREVA ESBWR – GE Hitachi ATMEA 1 – AREVA – MHI APR1400 – KHNP

31. Generic Reactor Safety Review 2006-2009 Activities 2006-2007 - Concept Development and Planning 2007-2009GRSR Reviews Conducted : • UK HSEScreening of Four New Reactor Safety Cases submitted for the consideration of the UK Health and Safety Executive/ NII against DS348: ACR1000, AP1000, ESBWR, EPR (initiatedSeptember 2007 – completed March 2008) • ATMEA1 Screening of Conceptual Design Safety File and its innovative features against DS348 and NS-R-1 of new AREVA-MHI Reactor ATMEA1 (initiated10 December 2007 – completed June 2008) • AP1000 Screening of AP1000 Safety and Environmental Report and its innovative features against DS348 and NS-R-1 (initiated13 February 2008 – completed January 2009) • APR1400 Screening of KHNP APR1400 Safety and Environmental Report against GS-R- Part 4 and NS-R-1 (initiated15 October 2008 – completed August 2009) Projects in the planning stages: • APR1000 Screening of the Korean APR1000 has been requested and initial discussions with KEPCO are ongoing.

32. IAEA INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY CENTRE (INSC)

33. BACKGROUND • There are 436 nuclear power reactors in operation worldwide, and over 50 reactors are under construction. • Large number of countries without any previous nuclear experience considers implementation of nuclear power programmes in the next decade. • Safety assessment capacity is the primary means for decision-making in support of design, licensing and operation activities. Building Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment

34. Safety Assessment provides the foundation for: • SUCCESSFUL DESIGN, • LICENSING, AND • OPERATION • The development of an efficient and competent safety infrastructure in all Member States with nuclear power programmes or planning deployment of nuclear power system for the first time is a must! • A significant element of the safety infrastructure is the safety assessment capability: • there is no safety without safety assessment! Safety cannot be assured without robust safety assessment

35. Hence: comes the need to increase global safety assessment capacity for new nuclear power plant, • and the need to assist Member States in the applications of integrated safety assessment approach in order to reach informed safety decisions based on IAEA safety standards. • The IAEA is establishing the International Nuclear Safety Centre (INSC). Building Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment

36. OBJECTIVES of INSAC 1/2 • Implementing integrated and harmonized methods and approach to safety assessment of nuclear installations and to assist in its applications. • The INSC framework and platforms will be used to: • 1. Support safety standard preparation through providing for technical bases; • 2. Provide comprehensive IAEA advisory and review services; Building Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment

37. OBJECTIVES of INSAC 2/2 • 3. Support Member States in safety capacity building, maintenance and knowledge management; • 4. Provide networking systems and facilitate effective knowledge and information sharing and collaboration. Building Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment

38. Advanced Education and Training Reviews and Advisory Services IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS HARMONIZING SAFETY ASSESSMENTS Advanced Safety Assessment and Engineering Tools International Network COMPETENCY AND CAPACITY BUILDING

39. EXPECTED RESULTS • The INSAC will harmonise safety assessment competency and capacity building efforts. • It will provide leadership and management of safety assessment methodologies based on an integrated structured approach. Building Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment

40. Examples: PERFORMANCE MEASURES • The number of developed Technical Documents and Guides related to the interpretation of safety assessment requirements. Development and application of Generic Reactor Safety Review methodology, • Development and application of methods/guidance documents for;- Integrated Risk Informed Decision Making process,- Safety Performance Indicators and applications, - “Safety Goals” and its applications. Building Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment

41. PERFORMANCE MEASURES • Implementation of integrated safety review services of safety assessment approach developed. Number of advisory service conducted per year • Development of safety assessment knowledge requirement & implementation of capacity building. Number of training courses and workshops prepared and conducted per year • Development and use of e-platform such as CASAT. To foster collaboration and network platform promoting harmonization of nuclear safety assessment concepts and approaches worldwide in operation. Web-bases system setup for collaboration and networking, data base for training and methods validation. Building Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment

42. Concluding Remarks • The IAEA is willing and ready to support safety enhancements through the establishment and application of Safety Standards, Safety Review and Advisory Services and International Instruments. • The IAEA is successfully performing safety assessments of new reactor designs using the current Safety Standards. • Current Safety Standards are a first basis for harmonization. • All IAEA publications are available at: http://www- pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/publications.asp