Seminar Presentation on Conflict

1. Seminar Presentation on Conflict Ayse Kudat Social Assessment 2002

2. Knowledge Management for SSN Web-site search and links Bank-wide web search/links Mining sector conflicts Water sector conflicts Original publications Summaries/Overheads Training seminars Analytical implications for SU SA focus on benefits sharing Social risk analyses for targeting poverty interventions Dynamic analyses of stakeholder groups Re-focus on social mobilization/social capital and social identity SUMMARY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE TEAM EFFORT ON CONFLICT ANALYSES A slide presentation by Ayse Kudat, with support of Bulent Ozbilgin and Cem Gelgin

3. Global Trends in Violent Conflict 1946-1999 Gurr, et al. Peace and Conflict, 2001

4. Trends in Violent Political and Ethnic Conflict 1946-1999 The extend of warfare among and within states lessened by nearly half in the first decade after the Cold War, but intrastate conflict has hugely risen in 50 years

5. Regional Trends in Magnitudes of Violent Societal Conflict Western Democracies and Japan Few Western states had violent societal conflicts during the second half of the 20th century. Socialist Bloc and Successor States Ethnic wars that began in the post-Communist states in the early 1990s were contained by 2000, except in Chechnya.

6. Regional Trends in Magnitudes of Violent Societal Conflict Latin America and the Caribbean Asia has experienced greater magnitudes of societal conflict than any other world region. East, South, and Central Asia The experience of the Middle East and North Africa tracks closely the long-term global trends in societal conflict.

7. Regional Trends in Magnitudes of Violent Societal Conflict North Africa and the Middle East The most serious political conflict in the MNA region is a terrorist war being fought by Islamic militants . Violent ethnic and political rivalries erupted in Africa south of the Sahara while colonial rule was ending in the 1960s. Africa South of the Sahara The global evidence shows that societal warfare has declined for much of the last decade. The end of the Cold War eliminated the superpower rivalry that fueled many societal conflicts. It also opened up opportunities for peacemaking by the UN, regional organizations, and political activists in war-torn societies. But the African experience shows that there have been limits to the effectiveness of post-Cold War policies for managing internal conflict. Relatively little international effort has been given to promoting the solution of African conflicts by comparison to the political and material resources devoted to conflict management in the post-Communist states, the Middle East, and Central America.

8. Poor and non-democratic states are expected to experience serious warfare in the future. Global Warfare by Level of Societal Capacity, 1946-1999

9. Peace and Conflict Western Democracies and Japan Armed Conflict Indicator: The icons are based on information on armed conflicts being fought in 1999-2000. A red icon highlights countries with a medium to high magnitude of armed political or ethnic conflict; a yellow icon identifies countries with either a low level of armed conflict in 1999-2000 or an armed conflict that ended between 1996 and 1999. A green icon flags countries that have had no armed conflict between 1996 and 2000. Peace-Building Capacity : The indicator of peace-building capacity summarizes the six specific indicators which is used to rank countries within each region. Red and yellow icons on the six specific indicators are evidence of problems whereas green icons signal a capacity for managing conflict.

10. Peace and Conflict Latin America and the Caribbean Democracy, Transitional Regimes, and Autocracy. The icons show the nature of a country’s political institutions in 2000. Red icons represent autocratic regimes. Yellow icons are countries with governments in the transitional zone between autocracy and democracy. Green icons are full democracies. Self-Determination: The icons take into account the success or failure of governments in settling conflicts from 1980 through 2000.Red icons signify countries challenged by armed conflicts over self-determination in 2000. Yellow icons flag countries with one of these two patterns: either (a) non-violent self-determination movements in 2000 but no track record of accommodating such movements in the past 20 years; or (b) violent self-determination movements in 2000 and a track record of accommodating other such movements in the past 20 years. Green icons signify countries that have successfully managed one or more self-determination conflicts since 1980.

11. Peace and Conflict East, South, and Central Asia Capacity for Peace-Building: Societal Resources The governments of rich societies are better able to maintain peace and security than are governments of poor societies. An indicator of societal energy consumption per capita (averaged over the last half-century) is used to rank countries on this indicator. Red icons signify countries in the lowest quintile. Yellow icons flag countries in the second and third quintiles, green icons identify countries in the top 40% in energy consumption. Capacity for Peace-Building: The Durability of Political Institutions The icons take into account the maturity of a country’s system of government. Red icons highlight countries whose political institutions in 2000 were established between 1995 and 1999. Yellow icons register countries whose polities were established during the 1985-94 decade. Green icons are used for countries whose polities were established before 1985.

12. Peace and Conflict North Africa and Middle East Good and Bad Neighborhoods: Ten politically relevant “neighborhoods” are defined: West Africa, North Africa, East Africa, South Africa, Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, South America, Central America, and Europe/North America. Countries with green icons are in regions with relatively low armed conflict and mostly democratic governments. Countries with red icons are in “neighborhoods” with high armed conflict and many transitional regimes. Countries with yellow icons are in regions with middling armed conflict and mostly autocratic regimes.

13. Peace and Conflict Socialist Bloc and Successor State Peace and Conflict – 2001 Gurr, Marshall, Khosla.

14. What is conflict? When does it escalate into armed conflict?

15. Definitions of social conflict • Social conflict is a struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources • The aims of the conflict groups are not only to gain the desired values, but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals. • Social conflict encompasses a broad range of social phenomena: class, racial, religious, and communal conflicts; riots, rebellions, revolutions; strikes and civil disorders; marches, demonstrations, protest gatherings. Source:Anthony Oberschall. Theories of Social Conflict. Annual Reviews Sociology, 1978, 4:291-315.

16. Theory of Social Conflict • A comprehensive theory of social conflict encompasses: • The structural sources of social conflict, relying on stratification, social change, and macro-sociological theories. • Conflict-group formation and the mobilization for collective action of challenging groups and their targets. For this topic, theories of collective action, social capital, recruitment, participation, commitment, and internal structure are useful. • The dynamics of conflict: processes of interaction between conflict groups; the forms of conflict; its magnitude, scope, and duration; escalation and de-escalation; conflict regulation and resolution; conflict outcomes.

17. There are numerous causes of conflict at all levels • Communication failure • Leadership Personality • Value differences • Cultural differences • Ethnic differences • Civilization • Goal differences • Technology Differences • Military built-up • Lack of cooperation • External support • Group cohesion • Economic competition • Military competition • Competition over natural resources such as water, forests, oil, gems etc.

18. Periods of rapidly expanding opportunities followed by slowdown (e.g. US civil rights) Ambiguity about relative power (Vietnam war) Status inconsistency or rank dis-equilibrium Weakening normative consensus Zero-sum thinking Close communication Leader perception of deprivation Consensus about norms Lack of information about Others’ attainment Physical and psychological segregation Existence of strict status systems Reality or myth of social mobility Physical and social barriers to communication Removal of actual or potential leadership from the dissident groups Conditions that encourage/discourage conflict

19. Conflict and Change • Conflict inherent/latent • Situations that it turns into armed conflict are rare • Conflict is not always and necessarily destructive: • Rather, it promotes • Change • Unity • Reconciliation,

20. Interpersonal Inter-group Inter-organizational Inter-State Two party Multi-party Contending/Imposing Yielding Problem Solving Combination Levels of Conflict/Strategies for Resolution

21. LESSONS LEARNED FROM SOCIAL SCIENCE LITERATURE • Social and political factors have greater value in predicting inter-state conflict (Huntington 1993) • Social mobilization, social capital, social cohesiveness and collective action are among the most important factors in armed conflict onset and escalation (Benson and Kugler 1998) • It is not static situations or even long lasting poverty that cause conflicts to escalate but rather changes in the distribution systems • Changes in power parity • Changes in access to resources • Changes in internal and external alliances • External interventions (“assistance”) appear to have adverse impacts on escalation (Brecher 1982; superpower involvement -, UN +) • Resource scarcity and benefits stream sharing are key issues

22. LESSONS LEARNED FROM SOCIAL SCIENCE LITERATURE • Strong positive relationship between economic inequality and political conflict is challenged (Lichback 1989) • Extreme inequality of land distribution leads to political instability only under specific extreme conditions (Russett 1989) • Political implications of inequality varies from impoverished to affluent nations (Sigelman and Simpson, 1989) • Inequality and conflict relationship is curvilinear (Zimmerman 1989) • Understanding conflict escalation requires a multi-disciplinary approach (Singer and Small 1994) • Social and cultural variables better predict internal conflicts than economic variables • Group perceptions matter; relative deprivation is an important element of conflict. Such deprivation is felt more acutely with respect to political power and social prestige than income

23. What new activities can the ECA/Social Unit focus on? • Initiation of country watch based on dynamic social risks/conflict propensity analyses • Systematic incorporation of social risk analyses into PRSP; considering conflict reduction strategies (CRS) for countries with high propensity for conflict • Complement/strengthen DEC’s work for ECA countries • Develop special capacity within ECA for conflict escalation and prolongation issues • Provide broader learning opportunities for SU staff to strengthen their analytical capacity for conflict analyses

24. What new activities can the ECA/Social Unit focus on? (cont’d) • Concentrate emphasis on local capacity building for conflict analyses (SSN) and theory of conflict prevention practice • Give CA water conflicts renewed operational focus; help integrate conflict analyses to country water sector strategy work • For guarantee operations dealing with renewable energy, a new emphasis on benefits sharing • Complement analyses of “vulnerable groups” with “opposition” (rebellion groups); introduce less static concepts to social group analyses to include social mobilization of opposition, of cultural,ethnic and other cohesive groups; • Strengthen emphasis on accountability with “effective democracy” building • Better bridge social stability, inter-group trust and locally negotiated outcomes (trust building with user associations, etc.,)

25. What new activities can the ECA/Social Unit focus on? (cont’d) • Re-evaluate social dynamics of “border” issues and ethnicity and follow up on earlier work carried out by the SU for the Balkans and Central Asia • Re-assess role of cultural factors, especially religion, in social realities of ECA/CA countries for PRSP and CAS work • Start a new generation of SAs that better focus on building social capital, trust, social conflict (Follow up on Kosova work, engage in proposed Tadjikistan agr, Azerbaijan water sector)

26. Conflict Prevention • Benefits Stream Sharing • Better analyses of benefits sharing: Who gets the rents, how equitable? How likely to increase conflict? • Better understanding of external interference • Current private sector practice: share benefits from natural resource extraction • Local focus: omni-present government as assumed by WB versus local • Ensure local ownership and trust • World Bank involvement possible through MIGA guarantees • Analyses • Social risk reduction does not mean poverty reduction • Stagnant versus dynamic factors needs analysis • Effective democracies • Social capital and social mobilization • CAS/PRSP: Culture, power, social dynamics, implications of these

31. Modern sociological theory identifies two broad categories of conflict • Endogeneous Conflict: Sources of change are from within a society • Inherent possibilities of change (Sorokin) • Conflict over the distribution of desirables-- wealth, power and prestige within a society (Marx, Mosca, Mills) • Conflict of Values (cumulative effects of innovation, technological revolution, sexual revolution, environmental crisis) • Conflict of authority between order givers and takers (Dahrendorf) • Conflict between the individual and society (Thomas) • Exogeneous Conflict: Sources of change are between systems • Wars (no comprehensive theory of war as a social phenomena) • Cultural invasion (westernization, modernization, media) • Conflict of Ideology (fundamentalism, capitalism)

32. APPROACHES TO CONFLICT ANALYSES • There are two distinct traditions of conflict theory • in the classical works: • The power relations tradition of political philosophy • The tradition of competitive struggle in classical • economics. • Sociological conflict theory is largely a synthesis of • these traditions with primary focus on the unequal • distribution of rewards in society (Marx, Mills, Dahrendorf, • Coser)

33. Major Proposition of Conflict Theories • Society is not a system in equilibrium but a nebulous structure of imperfectly coordinated elements • Change and conflict are continuous and normal; inherent predilections to change vary in scope, nature, intensity and degree • Every society experiences at every moment social conflict • Every element in a society contributes to its change • Every society rests on constrain of some of its members by others • Social universe is the setting within which the conflict of life are acted out

34. VIOLENCE • Direct violence --killing and beating--happens in interpersonal and inter-group situation • The capacity for violence is institutionalized in prison systems, concentration camps, military forces and militia • Structural violence--poverty, hunger,repression and social alienation--is associated with uneven life chances and is built into most society • Oppression and discrimination are symptoms of structural violence • Absence of direct violence is no guarantee for lack of structural violence; not all forms of structural violence leads of direct violence

35. PEACE RESEARCH • Peace research searches for knowledge to end violence and domination. It is trans-disciplinary. • Normative goals of peace research are different from those of national security or war studies. • Scientific approaches may focus on mathematical equations for predicting arms race (Richardson), simulations and cognitive analyses to understand crisis decision making , statistical analyses correlating outbreak of war with other factors. The aim is to establish causal relationships between all factors involved to project future trends. • Interpretive analyses the meaning of peace is investigated in the context of wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes (Avruch, Foucault). Focus also on the meaning of peace from the perspective of the people who are affected by violence.

36. VIOLENCE • Cultural violence can be a source of other types of violence • Symbols and events are used to create barriers among peoples • Certain cultural elements are linked to direct and structural violence through their value justification and legitimization • In the hierarchical social values of “modern” society some people are more valued than others

37. EMPIRICALLYTESTED INDICATORS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT • Power parity of state and the opposition (+) • Level of democracy (tradition and institutions) (-) • Tradition of violent conflict, social mobilization (+) • Ideology differences (+) • Inequity in the distribution of power and authority (+) • Unequal access to renewable and non-renewable differences • Duration of conflict and access to arms (+) • Ethnic nature of disputes (+ likelihood of recurrence)

38. EMPRICALLY TESTED INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL CONFLICT • Cultural/civilization differences • Economic “regionalism” (consolidating “civilization blocks”) • Demographic factors ---population density (-), population growth (+) • Military expenditures (+) • Power parity (+) • Alliances between states (-) • Alliances between opposition and support to opposition from external group (+) • Economic interdependence and terms of trade (-), high debt rate (-) • Effective resource (natural resources, energy) utilization (-) • Multiple border relationships (+)

39. Interstate Conflict Time & Magnitude of War Based on 315 wars that ended between 1820-1952, containing some 780 pairs of opposed belligerents, several key findings emerged. Low probability for most conflicts leading to war All the wars ongoing in any year, 24 percent will end in that year. High death rate tends to shorten wars and accelerate peacemaking. Smaller wars are very much more common than larger ones. Wars appear to arise independently, but to spread contagiously, through alliance structures, to neighbors, and otherwise. David Wilkinson ‘Deadly Quarrels – Lewis F. Richardson and the Statistical Study of War’

40. INTERSTATE CONFLICT • Wars tend to be simple rather than complex • Wars with more participants are less frequent • Wars with more belligerent pairs are less frequent than wars with few belligerent pairs • The least complex war (one to one) is the most common type • There are nonetheless a few wars that involve many fighting pairs which tend to be unusually long and unusually bloody.

41. INTERSTATE CONFLICT • Economic causes of war are frequent but of many types • War today may be the price of the transition to prosperity and peace tomorrow • “Militant ideology” is a cause of war. • ‘Ideological disarmament’ is tied to peacemaking • The propensity of any two groups to fight increases as social differences between them (in language, religion, race, and cultural style) increase

42. Conflict Management: Long and Short Term Issues • Major issue: Should one focus on short term negotiations to end conflict or remove deeper causes (Ross and Rothman 1999) • Short term negotiations= problem-solving exercise to end conflict sooner than later. Assume deeper causes cannot be addressed in the presence of violence (Starr 1999) • “Dialoguists”=building understanding, finding deep-rooted causes and developing paradigmatic shifts (Tidwell 1998; Saunders 1999) • Certain defined patterns of escalation are more supportive of mediation than others (Simon 1999) • Theories of practice of ethnic conflict resolution differ in the link that they conceptualize between an initiative’s specific activities and the settlement of the wider conflict (Bloomfield 1997)

43. Conflict Management: Long and Short Term Issues • Both short term solutions and long term dialogue can fail as was the case in Tadjikistan (Zartman 2001) • “Numberless” efforts in Middle East Peace process also fell victim to inability to transfer official efforts onto the popular level (Saunders 1999) • Dialogue and negotiation success depends on process which is difficult to transfer downward to civil society; the process is an individual experience and not transferable • Continued conflict makes the impact of both negotiation and dialogue more difficult (outside impacts the inside when the expectation is for the inside to affect the outside)

44. “The Clash of Civilizations?” • Huntington argues that “... the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.” • A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. • A civilization is the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. • Civilizations are dynamic; they rise and fall, they divide and merge. In the future, the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among major civilizations: Western, Confucian, Islamic, Japanese, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African. Source:Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993.

45. Reasons why conflict will occur along fault lines separating civilizations • Differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic • Interactions between people of several civilizations are increasing as does awareness of difference among civilizations • The process of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. • The growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among the non-Western civilizations. • Cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. • Economic regionalism is increasing and reinforcing civilization consciousness. Source:Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993.

46. What will happen???????????? • Conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict • International relations, historically a game played out within Western civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become a game in which non-Western civilizations are actors and not simply objects • Successful political, security and economic international institutions are more likely to develop within civilizations than across civilizations • Conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization • Violent conflict between groups in different civilizations are the most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars. Source:Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993.

47. What can be done ???????????? • In the short term it is clearly in the interest of the West to promote greater cooperation and unity within its own civilization, particularly between its European and North American components • To incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the West • To promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and Japan • To prevent escalation of local inter-civilization conflicts into major inter-civilization wars; to limit the expansion of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic states • To moderate the reduction of Western military capabilities and maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia • To exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states and to support other civilizations groups sympathetic to Western values and interests • To strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions. Source:Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993.

48. Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence • Relative parity of resources between the government and the opposition lead to higher levels of violence • Democratic countries with highly competitive and participatory institutions are able to mitigate violent conflict within their borders • With domestic politics, as with international politics, the escalation of conflict to violent conflict is rare • The severity of violence decreases as the level of political efficiency of the government rises. • Faced with violent opposition, an effective government responds in kind • As the capabilities of potential rebels increase compared to those of the government, the severity of violence increases Source:Michelle Benson and Jacek Kugler. Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42 No. 2, April 1998.

49. Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence • External aid is most useful in societies with weak political systems (eg Haiti), where limited interventions are successful, but it will have little effect in conflicts within organized societies (e.g. Vietnam, Afghanistan), where the combatants are fully mobilized • Democracy by itself is not significant in decreasing conflict • Super-democracies can reduce the levels of internal domestic violence • Democracies that are not fully institutionalized fare no better than autocratic regimes

50. Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence • Politically efficient governments are more likely to avert internal challenges • Early, effective interventions is an effective means to avoid internal violence • This option is not available to ineffective governments that can most easily be challenged even by inefficient opponents • Ineffective democracies struggling for reform are only as likely as authoritarian governments of equivalent levels of efficiency to repulse challenges by opponents • Interventions in support of inefficient democratic systems might be a viable option (Haiti) • Interventions to alter political structures that are already efficient (Tienanmen Square) might be counterproductive Source:Michelle Benson and Jacek Kugler. Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42 No. 2, April 1998.