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Dangerous Dyads

Dangerous Dyads. Bargaining in the Shadow of Power. Vs. Positive statements Diplomatic recognition Intercultural exchanges Alliances Trade Aid. Conflict Hostile statements Hostile nonviolent actions Use, threat, display of force War. I. The Puzzle of Dyadic Interaction.

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Dangerous Dyads

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  1. Dangerous Dyads Bargaining in the Shadow of Power

  2. Vs. • Positive statements • Diplomatic recognition • Intercultural exchanges • Alliances • Trade • Aid Conflict Hostile statements Hostile nonviolent actions Use, threat, display of force War I. The Puzzle of Dyadic Interaction A. Why do some pairs of states have dramatically different relationships?

  3. B. Example: Six Dyad-Years • US-Iraq 1987: US forgives Iraqi attack on USS Stark, aids Iraq • US-Iran 1987: US destroys Iranian oil platforms, ships • Iran-Iraq 1987: Bloody war continues

  4. B. Example: Six Dyad-Years • US-Iraq 2003: War • US-Iran 2003: No War • Iran-Iraq 2003: No War • Why the differences? No single state has become more or less warlike….but the dyads have!

  5. C. Forms of Cooperation • Between Cooperation and Conflict: Bargaining • Formal Bargaining: Treaties, etc. • Tacit Bargaining: Reciprocal Action • Arbitration: Third-party resolution • Mediation: Third-party support

  6. 2. Alliances: Only 25% reliable at first glance….

  7. From Leeds, Long, and Mitchell (2000):

  8. …but examining the fine print reveals a different story!

  9. 3. Behavior: Convergence Example: Mutual Tariff Reduction

  10. D. Forms of Conflict • War – Standard definition is 1000 battle-deaths • Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) – use, threat, or display of force

  11. E. Are Conflict and Cooperation Opposites? 1. The Continuum View

  12. 2. High-Conflict Events

  13. 3. High-Cooperation Events • Are these mutually exclusive with the conflict list?

  14. 3. Sometimes Conflict and Cooperation Co-Exist

  15. Conflict- Producing Factors Outcomes Interaction Salience Issues Bargaining Conflict Cooperation Cooperation- Producing Factors II. A Model of Dyadic Interaction

  16. Interaction A. Political Relevance • Interaction • Ability to communicate • Ability to act

  17. Interaction c. Measures of Interaction • Contiguity – Countries that border each other (or narrow body of water) (Countries surrounded by blue are contiguous to Red) 

  18. Interaction ii. Major power status • State-level finding: Major powers do more of everything – conflict and cooperation • Result = Dyadic effect: If at least one dyad member is major power, increased levels of cooperation and conflict

  19. iii. Politically-Relevant International Environments (PRIE), 1816-2001

  20. Interaction Salience Issues A. Political Relevance • Issue Salience • Priority relative to other concerns • Determines amount of power applied • Low salience = inaction

  21. Conflict- Producing Factors B. What leads to dyadic conflict?

  22. Conflict- Producing Factors 1. Opportunity: Contiguity and Proximity

  23. Conflict- Producing Factors Wealthy/Advanced State Poor State Proximity: Loss of Strength Gradient Resources that can be applied to a conflict decay at distance Shift in gradient due to technology or development

  24. Conflict- Producing Factors 2. Dyadic Balance of Power a. Disparity = Peace b. Parity = War Risk

  25. Conflict- Producing Factors c. Transitions: Dangerous?

  26. Conflict- Producing Factors 3. Issue Type: Territory

  27. Conflict- Producing Factors 4. Rivalry: Shadow of the Past • Repeated disputes  Future disputes • Easier for diversionary war

  28. Conflict- Producing Factors c. Question: Is rivalry the cause of conflict? • Rivals fight more wars – or do states likely to fight become rivals? • Repeated crises  Use of more aggressive bargaining strategies • Rivals use more forceful strategies – against non-rivals!

  29. iv. Rivals Learn Over Time

  30. Conflict- Producing Factors 5. Arms Races • Rivalry + Arms Race = Risk of War? • Most arms races difficult to demonstrate:

  31. Can You Pick Out the 3 Arms Races? Canada-Mexico US-USSR Israel-Syria Belgium-Netherlands Australia-NZ India-Pakistan

  32. Cooperation- Producing Factors C. What Leads to Cooperation?

  33. Cooperation- Producing Factors 1. Joint Democracy • Effects of Joint Democracy: • The “Democratic Peace:” Virtually no wars between democracies • Alleged Exceptions: US-UK 1812 (UK not democracy), UK-Germany WW1 (Germany not democracy), Finland-UK WW2 (no real combat), Peru-Ecuador (few casualties), India-Pakistan (civilians left out of the loop) • Fewer MIDs (1/3 to 2/3 reduction) • Shift to covert from overt when force is used • MIDs less likely to escalate to higher levels of violence • Increased reliance on mediation, arbitration • Increased common interests (alliances, UN votes, IOs, etc) • Increased Trade – Why should this be?

  34. Cooperation- Producing Factors v. Formal Agreements

  35. Cooperation- Producing Factors b. Institutional Explanation

  36. Cooperation- Producing Factors c. Norms Explanation

  37. Cooperation- Producing Factors 2. Shared Interests • Power Transition Theory: Mutual Satisfaction = Peace

  38. Cooperation- Producing Factors Evidence for Peace Through Shared Interests • Alliance portfolios: Similarity generally reduces conflict • Better predictor than dyadic alliance! • UN Votes: Similar votes = closer economic ties

  39. Cooperation- Producing Factors 3. Similar Institutions • Even after controlling for democracy / autocracy, similar government mechanisms (executive-legislative relations, etc) increase cooperation / reduce conflict. 4. Advanced Economies • Joint advanced economies trade, cooperate, ally more / fight less with each other than other dyads

  40. Cooperation- Producing Factors 5. Economic Interdependence • Mutual gains from trade • Short explanation: Trade is voluntary • Absolute and Comparative Advantage

  41. Missiles 20 10 100 200 10 Coffee Absolute Advantage Given 100 resources, what can each country produce? • Production possibilities without trade • Trade allows specialization. US buys Coffee at < 10 resources. Colombia buys Missiles at < 20 resources. • Example: Coffee = 1, Missiles = 10. US trades 5 missiles (50 resources) for 50 coffee (50 resources) • Result: Both sides can achieve levels of consumption outside of the original production possibilities!

  42. Wheat 100 50 5 10 Cars Comparative Advantage Given 100 resources, what can each country produce? • US has absolute advantage in both goods – 5 to 1 in wheat, 2 to 1 in cars -- so has comparative advantage (bigger relative advantage) in wheat • UK has comparative advantage (smaller relative disadvantage) in cars (½ as productive rather than 20% as productive) • UK buys wheat at < 5 resources, US buys cars at < 10 resources • Example: Wheat = 1.5, Cars = 9. US sells 24 wheat (36 resources), buys 4 cars (36 resources)

  43. Cooperation- Producing Factors 5. Economic Interdependence • Mutual gains from trade • Short explanation: Trade is voluntary • Absolute and Comparative Advantage • Reinforces democratic peace:

  44. Cooperation- Producing Factors 5. Economic Interdependence • Mutual gains from trade • Short explanation: Trade is voluntary • Absolute and Comparative Advantage • Reinforces democratic peace • Allies trade more than enemies…but sometimes trade continues during war!

  45. Bargaining Conflict Cooperation III. Outcomes: The results of bargaining, conflict, and cooperation • A Theory of Bargaining: Game Theory as a tool to predict behavior and outcomes • Game theory = formal way to represent strategic interaction

  46. Bargaining Conflict Cooperation 2. Assumptions of Game Theory • Rational choice • Connected preferences – Some outcomes better than others • Transitive preferences – If A is better than B, and B is better than C  A is better than C • Choice – Pick the option believed to lead to preferred outcome

  47. Bargaining Conflict Cooperation b. Elements of a game • Players – In IR, this means states • Strategies – The choices players have • Outcomes – The results of the players’ choices • Payoffs – How much each player values each Outcome

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