Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach

1. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Jochem Tolsma (Radboud University) Marcel Lubbers (Radboud University) Marcel Coenders (Radboud University)

2. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Outline • Part 1: Discussion of paper • Part 2: Contact to prejudice reduction or proximity to group threat

3. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Part 1 • In this paper, we set out to explain the views of the ethnic majority group towards ethnic intermarriage. • To shed light on the mechanism by which competition leads to antagonistic views. • To provide new empirical test for Ethnic Competition Theory • Why opposition to ethnic intermarriage? • Indicator for cohesion within society. • Very likely that processes of ethnic exclusionism will show up

4. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach ECT • Ethnic Competition Theory poses that ethnic competition enhances negative sentiments against ethnic out-groups. • Ethnic Competition Theory poses that ethnic competition for economic resources, cultural resources, power, and identity, either at the individual or group level, actual or perceived, enhances negative sentiments against ethnic out-groups such as, exclusionism, ethnocentrism, and prejudice by provoking both threat to one’s own interests and to group interests.

5. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach ECT and opposition to ethnic intermarriage • A marriage between an ethnic migrant and a member of the host country can be considered as the final step of the integration process for the migrant in question. • Mixed marriages are an indicator of cohesion within society. Opposition to ethnic heterogamy indicates a stagnating integration process and undermines cohesion. • Opposition to ethnic intermarriage is a form of ethnic exclusionism. • The choice for a partner is a context in which processes of ethnic in- or exclusion are likely to be salient. • Moreover, to explore whether there are group specific exclusionistic reactions we will investigate opposition to ethnic heterogamy in relation to Turks, Moroccans, and Surinamese, the main ethnic groups in the Netherlands.

6. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach ECT and Research Question 1 • Within the competitive threat research tradition: • groups are most often thought of as the people of a nation. • the nation is considered to be an important economic and cultural unit. • The national ethnic competitive environment explains cross-national variations in antagonistic attitudes and trends in these attitudes within nations. • Less attention to explanations for regional variances in antagonistic attitudes (especially in Europe). • Competitive environment varies across neighborhoods and municipalities. • Moreover, people may develop a local group identity. • Some empirical support for the link between the local competitive environment and antagonistic attitudes. • RQ1: To what extent does the competitive environment of neighborhoods and municipalities affect opposition to ethnic intermarriage next to individual characteristics.

7. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach ECT and Research Question 2 • Most often used indicators for competitive threat: size of the foreign population and economic conditions. • If prejudicial attitudes resulting from the presence of ethnic minorities are a threat response, the dynamics of this threat response should be made explicit. • Assessing the importance of types of ethnic competition remains to be done. • Different forms of competition: economic, cultural, power, physical, identity • RQ2: What is the relative impact of different types of ethnic competition (i.e. economic, cultural, and physical) on opposition to ethnic intermarriage?

8. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Previous research • The effects of relative group sizes and other characteristics of the living environment on antagonistic attitudes are inconsistent across: • the antagonistic view in question, • the unit of measurement of the locale, • the specific out-group in question. • This contribution • Opposition to ethnic intermarriage main focus but explanatory model is compared for other antagonistic views • We adopt a three-level design: individual, neighborhood, municipality • We have information on opposition to ethnic intermarriage regarding Turks, Moroccans, and Surinamese

9. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Theoretical Expectations • Individual level expectations • Age • Sex • Educational attainment • Social status • Religiosity • Social origin

10. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Theoretical Expectations • Contextual level expectations: • Actual or perceived ethnic competition induces ethnic exclusionism. • Opposition to ethnic intermarriage is a form of ethnic exclusionism. •  Actual or perceived ethnic competition induces opposition to ethnic intermarriage.

11. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Hypothesis 1 • Actual or perceived ethnic competition induces opposition to ethnic intermarriage. • Neighborhoods and municipalities are economic and cultural units with distinct competitive characteristics. • Opposition to ethnic intermarriage varies across neighborhoods and municipalities. (1. Regional variance hypothesis)

12. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Hypothesis 2 • Actual or perceived ethnic competition induces opposition to ethnic intermarriage. • (Changes in) relative out-group sizes within neighborhoods and municipalities are related to actual and perceived ethnic competition. • (Changes in) relative out-group sizes within neighborhoods and municipalities induce opposition to ethnic intermarriage. (2. Relative group size hypothesis)

13. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 • (Changes in) the socio-economic status of the neighborhood and municipality are indicators for economic competition at the neighborhood and municipality level. • The presence of mosques and Muslim school within neighborhoods and municipalities are indicators for cultural competition at the neighborhood and municipality level. • Crime rates within neighborhoods and municipalities are indicators for physical threat at the neighborhood and municipality level.

14. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 • The lower the socio-economic status of the locale, the more opposition to ethnic intermarriage at the locale. (3. Economic environment hypothesis). • The more mosques and Muslim school present at the locale, the more opposition to ethnic intermarriage at the locale. (4. Cultural environment hypothesis). • The higher the crime rates in a locale, the higher the opposition to ethnic intermarriage. (5. Physical environment hypothesis).

15. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Hypothesis 6 • Socially disintegrated individuals have a stronger need to attachment to the ethnic in-group than socially integrated individuals and increase their ethnic in-group favorable attitudes and negative views towards ethnic out-groups • Social cohesion will be lower within neighborhoods and municipalities that are characterized by higher moving mobility rates. • Residents in neighborhoods and municipalities which are characterized by high rates of moving mobility will express higher levels of opposition to inter ethnic marriages than residents in neighborhoods and municipalities with lower rates of moving mobility. (6. Cohesive environment hypothesis).

16. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Hypothesis 7 • Proximity to members of ethnic out-groups leads to contact with ethnic out-group members. • Contact with ethnic out-group members leads to prejudice reduction. • The larger the size of the ethnic out-group within neighborhoods and municipalities the lower the opposition to ethnic intermarriage. (7. Contact hypothesis)

17. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Data NKPS (2002/2003) • response rate 38% • Ni=6095, Nnb=2096, Nmp=437 • Dependent variable(s): Would it bother you if one of your children decided to marry someone of [Turkish/Moroccan/Surinamese] descent? (4) bother me a lot (3) bother me a little (2) neutral (1) not bother me (0) not bother me at all

18. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Data • The three items formed a mokken scale, a cumulative measurement scale. • Respondents are most opposed to an ethnic intermarriage with Moroccans followed by an ethnic intermarriage with Turks. • The constituted ‘ethnic intermarriage scale’ runs from 0-12 and higher scores indicate more opposition to ethnic heterogamy. • Mean: 5.9; standard deviation: 3.19; skewness: -0.11. • Approximately 30% of our respondents is bothered if one of their children decides to marry someone from either Turkish, Moroccan, or Surinamese descent.

19. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Data Independent variables (individual level) • Age (years) • Sex • Education (years) • Occupational status (EGP 7 category version, plus student, housewives, unemployed, retired) • Religiosity • Church attendance (times per year) • Denomination (Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed Church and Calvinists (synodal), other Calvinists denominations, other Christian denominations, other denominations, and missing) • Social origin • Parental education (years) • Father’s occupational status (EGP 7 category version) • Mother’s denomination

20. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Data Independent variables (contextual level) • Out-group sizes • Percentage non-western ethnic minorities • Percentage Turks • Percentage Moroccans • Percentage Surinamese • Change in percentage non-western ethnic minorities (2001-1999) • Socio-economic disadvantage (2001), Principal Component Analysis • mean income of income recipients • percentage income recipients with a low income • percentage income recipients between 15 and 64 years of age living on public benefit. • Change in Socio-economic disadvantage (2001-1999)

21. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Data Independent variables (contextual level) • Crime rates • Victims of burglary: Constructed from Dutch Police Population Monitor surveys (1999, 2000, and 2001). A count of burglary victims within the spatial units neighborhoods and municipalities divided by the total PMM respondents who lived within these localities. • Crime statistics: Constructed from the Dutch police registration system (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004). This aggregation leads to 2,688,262 recorded offences for which the location of the crime scene was known. We counted the total offences, with the exception of petty theft and traffic offences. We divided these figures to the total inhabitants of the locale, as reported by the Dutch bureau of Statistics.

22. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Data Independent variables (contextual level) • Number of mosques and Muslim schools within locale: • An initial data file on the location of mosques was kindly provided by N. Landman of the University of Utrecht. Locations of Muslim schools were provided by ISBO (www.deisbo.nl). Students updated the datafile. In total 454 mosques and 39 Muslim schools

23. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Data Independent variables (contextual level) • Relative inwards moving mobility: • the amount of people entering a neighborhood from another neighborhood per 1000 inhabitants of the destination neighborhood • The issue of selective in- and out-migration • Selective in-migration: migrants moving into tolerant neighborhoods and municipalities. • Selective out-migration: natives with high levels of antagonistic views moving out of neighborhoods and municipalities with large out-group sizes; white flight. • Inwards en outwards moving mobility rates have been used to take into account selective in- and out-migration. • Repeat analysis on (non-)movers

24. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Results

25. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Table 1: Bivariate correlations between neighborhood characteristics and mean levels of opposition to ethnic intermarriage

26. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Table 2: Bivariate correlations between municipality characteristics and mean levels of opposition to ethnic intermarriage

27. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Table 3: Variance components of hierarchical random intercept models estimating opposition to ethnic intermarriage

28. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Table 4: hierarchical random intercept models estimating opposition to ethnic intermarriage

29. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Change in out-group size • Different operationalization of change in out-group size. • 2001-1999; 2001-1997; 2001-1995; • 2001-1999/2001 • Curvilinear • threshold • If %minorities in 2001< mean(%minorities in 2001) change in out-group size=0 else change in out-group size= 2001-1999. • Results percentage ethnic minorities (MP) p= -0.017* change in percentage ethnic minorities (MP) p= 0.175*

30. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Robustness • Opposition to an ethnically mixed marriage with a specific ethnic out-group • Group sizes of Turks, Moroccans, and Surinamese at the municipality level do no affect opposition to heterogamy with Turks, Moroccans, and Surinamese (differently). • The issue of selective out-migration • No different results for movers and non-movers • Results compared to different antagonistic views • residence permit for someone whose life is at risk • there are too many migrants • Denomination most important for opposition to ethnic intermarriage • Explanatory model for opposition to ethnic intermarriage and ‘there are too many migrants’ very similar

31. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Conclusions 1 • Individual level characteristics in agreement with ECT • Social origin contributes to explanation of opposition to ethnic intermarriage • Opposition to ethnic intermarriage overlaps with opposition to religious intermarriage • Only minor regional variance in opposition to ethnic intermarriage • Most of this variance is due to composition effects (religion) • Municipality is more important economic and cultural unit than neighborhood • Relative out-group sizes are not (or even negatively) related to opposition to ethnic intermarriage once relevant individual level characteristics are controlled for. • An increase in out-group size only induces opposition to ethnic intermarriage for individuals living in municipalities with already large proportions of ethnic out-groups.

32. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Conclusions 2 • Economic competition sole type of competition that induces opposition to ethnic intermarriage. • High rates of inwards moving mobility at the neighborhood level related to lower levels of opposition to ethnic intermarriage. • Social cohesion within neighborhoods and municipalities not important? • Inwards moving mobility indicator for ‘locale popularity’? • Selective migration?

33. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach End of Part 1

34. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Part 2 • Proximity to contact, contact to prejudice reduction Versus • Proximity to actual and perceived competitive threat, to prejudice induction

35. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Do you (want to) know Abdel and Farid? Do you feel threatened by Abdel and Farid?

36. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach In favour of contact theory • Proximity to contact • E.g. Wagner 2006: bivariate correlation is positive • Contact to prejudice • Pettigrew 2006: average correlation is negative • Proximity in living environment to prejudice reduction • Wagner 2006 (controlled for age, sex, education): partial correlation is negative Problems: • Contact to prejudice • Causality • Proximity to prejudice reduction • Tolsma 2007: • bivariate correlation is negative • controlled for age, sex, education: partial correlation is negative • Controlled for change in socio-economic status: no significant partial correlation • Controlled for change in out-group size: negative correlation (boundary of significance) • Wagner 2006: not controlled for individual contact

37. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach In favour of ECT • Proximity to perceived threat and antagonistic views • Instead of proximity, (increase in) ethnic out-group size • At the national level: Scheepers, Coenders, Semyonov • At smaller geographical regions: Quillian Problems: • Results regarding out-group sizes at the neighborhood level and municipality level inconsistent • Rather change in out-group size than actual out-group size • Tolsma 2007: not change per se but change when out-group is already large • Issue of selective migration • Not controlled for individual contact experiences

38. - prejudice Out-group size + + Δ out-group size ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach The battle • Contact wins at the individual level • ECT wins at the national level • Indecisive at the neighborhood and municipality level • Both mechanisms at the same time? • None of the mechanisms?

39. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Future research • Longitudinal design • Where and when did you meet ethnic out-group members? • When and why did you move into, out of, this neighborhood, municipality?

40. ERCOMER March 2007 Ethnic Competition and Opposition to Ethnic Intermarriage in the Netherlands: a Multi-Level Approach Thank you! • More information at: http://oase.uci.kun.nl/~jochemt/