Navigating The Perfect Storm Perspectives on Prospects for Shipbuilding

1. Navigating The Perfect StormPerspectives onProspects for Shipbuilding Adam B. Siegel Northrop Grumman Analysis Center IDGA, November 2005 The views expressed in this briefing are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Northrop Grumman Corporation.

2. Caveat Briefing does not (necessarily) represent the views of the Northrop Grumman Corporation.

3. Shipbuilding faces a Perfect Storm Steaming a course rocked by • Strategic change • From the Soviet Union to al Qaeda … and beyond • Developing doctrinal concepts • E.g., translating “Sea Basing” to programs • Navy “Riverine” force, “1000 ship fleet” … • Management change • Capability Based planning (for example) • Uncertainty over future U.S. Navy fleet size • E.g., no existing defined Navy force structure • Significant fiscal pressure • Iraq, Deficits, Katrina, Baby Boomers, … • DOD Budget growth peaking

4. Leadership Transition • Chief of Naval Operations • Admiral Clark • Readiness as priority • Warfighting • Savings to procurement – not fully realize • Admiral Mullen • Seeking to establish clear force structure goals • Directives for shipbuilding stability • Striving to identify additional funding • Civilian leadership in transition as well

5. Balancing the “Three Rs” Requirements The3 Rs Resources Risk “Risk is inherent in everything we do. Managing it should be a continuous process that permeates – but does not dominate our daily lives. Every Navy leader should be able to take prudent risks in the conduct of their actions.” CNO Guidance for 2006

6. Balancing the “Three Rs” Requirements: Working to Define The3 Rs Risk: Developing Metrics Resources: Seeking toIncrease

7. “"What I am anxious to do is present some level of stability to the industry, and it's my belief that once we get them to some level of stability they are charged with cost reduction. But if I change my plan year to year, which has happened too often, it's very difficult for them to be able to plan. So getting a number, getting one that they can depend on, developing capabilities we need, doing it consistently will be a significant step forward in my belief to stabilizing the shipbuilding world." Admiral Michael Mullen, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations Quoted in: Geoff Fein, “CNO Wants A Stable Shipbuilding Industrial Base, Rapid ASW Prototyping,”Defense Daily, 17 Oct 05

8. “Alternative Shipbuilding Plans”CNO Tasking Memo, 25 July 05 "several effects desired of this review": A: ""Fencing" a particular amount of TOA on an annual basis to form a steady foundation of funding to stabilize the Industrial Base ..." C: Better management of warship requirements -- and changes to those requirements. D: "Identification of statutory or regulatory barriers that impede efficiencies in our shipbuilding plan along with recommendations for change." E: "... How [to] reduce the overall number of classes of ships and move towards more modular and multi-purpose ship designs." F: "Foundation for re-defining the size of the Naval Force in terms of absolute numbers, as well as annual cash flows to industry and capabilities."

9. CNO Guidance for 2006 • Objective 2 "Determine and delivers on the Navy's future force structure requirements by a) defining an improved force structure and construction plan and, b) contributing to a stable industrial base.” • Desired Effect 2 “Navy's long-range shipbuilding plan is aligned with the results of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and fiscally supported within the program of record and the budget process.”

10. CNO 2006 Guidance (2):Tasks to Support Objectives / Effects • N8 “Craft a detailed plan (based upon cost/capability analysis of shipbuilding programs …) that specifically addresses capability, affordability, stabilization of the Ship Construction Navy (SCN) account, and sustainment of the industrial base.” • N8/CFFC: “Align aircraft acquisition plans, shipbuilding plans, the Sea Basing concept, and Joint Operational concepts.”

11. Statement of Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Posture Statement, 10 Feb 2005

12. Understanding shipbuilding costs • Focus on “Cost Growth” occurs … • Comparing ‘apples to oranges’ • Without full understanding of issues • Without placing into context – first in class … • What is “cost”? • Procurement? • Total Ownership / Life-Cycle? • U.S. Navy ships should cost more than other navies’ ships • Taking Care of Sea Warriors • Mission Requirements • Global Presence

13. A 30% Solution? • Multi-ship buys • Advanced Appropriations • Limit requirements growth / change orders • Open-door government oversight • Full life-cycle contracting

14. Dominance In and From the Maritime Commons A call for a robust 21st Century National Fleet

15. Challenge: Considering Future Fleet Requirements • How to provide these capabilities … • In face of resource constraints? • To control risks? • While creating future opportunities? • Bounding the problem • Capabilities much more than • Counting of specific platforms • Platforms not just ships • But it is necessity to translate capabilities to numbers • First order choices … • Start with “ships” as core element of fleet • Build on others’ work through meta-analysis

16. Analyzing the Maritime Future • Future Fleet Architecture (FFA) Studies • Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) • Office of Force Transformation (OFT) • Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) • Other work including • Congressional Research Service (CRS) • Congressional Budget Office (CBO) • RAND Corporation (e.g., on Deepwater reqts) • Heritage (e.g., on National Fleet) • Government documents including • Navy “Interim” 30-year Shipbuilding Plan • Navy 3/1 Strategy (draft)

17. Risks and Opportunities • Risk • Operational risks • Future challenges risks • Force management risks • Institutional risks1] • Opportunity • “Protection” of current option space • “Creation” of new options for decision-makers [1] As defined in The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Department of Defense, March 2005, page 11.

18. Office of Force Transformation • Proposed radical new Fleet concepts/approaches • Based on network-centric, complexity concepts • Argues for speed and numbers • Suggested multiple new ship classes with new operational concepts • E.g., Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarines carried to theater on another ship • “Numbers” of platforms key • Large option 810 combatants with 1,368 UxVs • Notes • Minimal mention of Coast Guard • No transition plan from “today’s” to transformed Navy • Uncertain metrics re industrial base

19. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments • Study grounded in history • Robust examination of U.S. naval history • Study explicitly “dollar” limited – with $12 billion / year available for Navy shipbuilding • Notional new “national battle fleet” • Suggests new 500 ship battle fleet – explicitly counts / considers Coast Guard assets • Cost drives many issues / conclusions • Construction yard specialization • Modification of existing build programs to meet MPF(F) requirements • Notes • Potentially undervalues PRC / near-peer threat • Industrial base recommendations merit deeper study

20. A “500+ Ship” Naval Platform Architecture for the National Total Force Battle Network • 50 sea-based maneuver platforms, • 8 LHD-1s • 24 LPD-17s • 16 MPF(E)s • 2 upgraded T-AVBs • 68 NFAF ships, including: • 8 T-AOE/T-AOE(X)s • 11 T-AKEs • 17 T-AOs • 8 (?) T-LKAs • 2 T-AHs • 4 JCCXs • 5 Fleet Support Tenders • 4 Salvage Ships • 5 Fleet Tugs • 4 Ocean Surveillance Ships • 35Prepositioning and surge ships • 12 (10?) SSBNs • 60 nuclear-powered submarines, including: • 53 SSNs (dropping slightly over the next 12 years) • 6 (8?) SSGNs • 1 Special Mission Submarine • 15 aviation power projection platforms, - 10 J-CVNs • 4 J-CVEs • 1 J-AFSB • 84 (86?) AEGIS/VLS surface combatants, including: • 22 CG-52s • 34 (36?) DDG-79s • 28 DDG-51s • 84 LCSs • 91+ USCG Deepwater Cutters

21. Center for Naval Analyses • Closely engaged with U.S. Navy analysis • Near surrogate for Navy concepts / plan of 2004 • Heavily reliant on new deployment approaches • Forward basing • Crew Swap • Deploying ships / rotating crews • Provided for a range of fleet sizes • Differentiation principally success of alternative deployment approaches • Low fleet size: 265 hulls • High fleet size: 380 ships • Note • No mention of U.S. Coast Guard • No industrial base discussion of note

22. Admiral Clark’s Plan Statement of Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Posture Statement, 10 Feb 2005

23. Themes related to future fleet architectures • Navy / Maritime forces at a crossroads • New operational concepts developing for • New operational environment amid • Significant fiscal constraints and • Uncertainty over future platforms and platform numbers • Controlling risk is multi-faceted • Fiscal, Operational, Future • Basic questions • What are the maritime missions? • “Warfighting” • Maintaining order in and from the maritime commons • Architecture for what fleet? • OFT / CNA: U.S. Navy • CSBA: U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard

24. Forging the Future Fleet • Realities • Fleets take a long time to build … and change • Rapid rudder orders can create risk and cost • Analysis suggests that the Nation • Exploit – where possible – existing production to meet future capability requirements • Manage America’s maritime forces as a whole • Focus the U.S. Navy on shaping strategic choices • Create an aggressive Maritime research and experimentation program for potential breakthrough technologies and capabilities A Robust, Capable Navy with a trueNational Fleet to achieve Navy-Coast Guard synergies to provide maritime capabilities through the full spectrum of QDR and national security challenges.

25. Outlining the “fleet” • National Fleet • Joint/Interagency force • Navy, Coast Guard, other services’ ships • Issues meriting future examination • Balance in numbers, roles, capabilities between USCG cutters and U.S. Navy littoral combat ships • “Marginal” investments to enable full-spectrum engagement capacities across the entire fleet • Determining “presence” requirements in the coming decades • Presence often drives ship requirements • e.g., One ship can’t be two places at once …

26. Presence requirements • 8+ “Constabulary” hubs Require various levels of constant presence • East / West coasts of Africa • Persian Gulf • South East Asia / Oceania • Caribbean • U.S. Coastal Areas (Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, Pacific, Alaska/Hawaii/Guam) • 2+ “Warfighting” hubs Require some level of presence with tethered responsiveness for crisis / war • East Asia / North East Asia • Arabian Gulf

27. Determining “presence” requirements in GWOT theater

28. Determining Force Structure Requirements -- West Coast of Africa Example • Gulf of Guinea “Hub” • 2.5 constabulary presence • Assume 4 month USCG deployment • 5.25 CG / year for 1.0 presence • Assume 6 month USN deployment • 4.0 USN / year for 1.0 presence • Roughly: 10 USCG / 2.5 USN total reqt • .25 Expeditionary Strike Group presence • Historically based requirement (NEOs) • 4.0 USN / year for 1.0 presence • Minimum: 2 L-ships • Roughly 2 L-ships for total reqt

29. Factors driving force structure • Defining requirements • “Presence” requirements combined with • Major Combat Operations war-fighting capacities with • Reinforcing / swing capacities • Reflecting • Resource constraints • Potential alternative operational concepts • Controlling risk • Suggests a potential 202x National Fleet composition along the following lines …

30. 12 SSBNs 56 SSNs / SSGNs 15 aviation power projection platforms 10 J-CVNs 4 J-CVEs 1 J-AFSB 96 VLS Surface Ships 22 CG-52s ( CG(X)) 62 DDG-51s 12 DD(X) / land-attack 200-240 USN LCS / USCG Deepwater cutters 56 Sea-based Maneuver Platforms 10 LHDs / LHA(R)s 28 LPD-17s 16 MPF(E) 2 T-AVBs 68 Auxiliaries 90+ Prepositioning / Surge / Research ships Including 44 Joint High Speed Vessels (J-HSV) / Theater Support Vessels (TSVs) Including 11 NOAA research ships above 1000 tons The 21st Century 600 Ship National Fleet Note: National Fleet expanding beyond USN / USCG conceptually to include all U.S. Government maritime assets with a global role, including USA/USAF prepositioning ships and NOAA ships. Note: Displayed notional fleet composition is 593 to 633 ships.

31. Conclusion • Shipbuilding facing a perfect storm • Leadership dedicated to charting and navigating a course through this storm • Real options exist to improve the nation’s, the Navy’s, and industry’s ability to navigate the storm

32. BACKUPS

33. The GWOT “Central Theater” Defines an Operational Battlespace Different Than Those Found in Past US Wars Note: the map outline shows the Islamic Caliphate at its height

34. Determining Force Structure Requirements -- Northeast Asia Example • “Warfighting” Dominance Force • 2.0 Ballistic Missile Defense • 3.0 USN / year from Japan to make 1.0 presence • 5.5 from Hawaii / CONUS to make 1.0 presence • 8.5 ship requirement • .75 CSG / .75 ESG based in Japan • 2.0 SSN / SSGN @ 4.5 to make 1.0 = 9.0 requirement • Reinforcing forces <= 14 days • Two CSGs • ESG + MPF(F) • 8 SSNs / SSGNs • Constabulary capabilities @ 1.5 constabulary presence • Assume 4 month USCG deployment @ 6.25 CG / year for 1.0 • USN (LCS) from Japan @ 2.5 USN / year for 1.0 presence • Roughly: 6.25 USCG / 2.5 USN total requirement