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A Perspective From China

A Perspective From China. Colonel Mac Coleman Former Air Attaché, Beijing. Overview. Introduction Fundamental Elements of Durable National Power People Resources Geostrategic Location Instruments of National Power Political Economic Diplomatic Military Summary/Conclusion.

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A Perspective From China

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  1. A Perspective From China Colonel Mac Coleman Former Air Attaché, Beijing

  2. Overview • Introduction • Fundamental Elements of Durable National Power • People • Resources • Geostrategic Location • Instruments of National Power • Political • Economic • Diplomatic • Military • Summary/Conclusion

  3. Introduction • Cheng Yu – “OLD CHINESE SAYING” • Four character idiom universally used to capture an idea, a truism, or a facet of culture. • “ZAI LIN CHUANG HEI” • “Toward the Neighbors, Dark Windows” • “WHY WOULD YOU TELL ANYBODY WHAT YOU’RE REALLY THINKING?” • Describes China in fundamentally important ways

  4. Fundamental Elements of Durable National Power • THE PEOPLE – “REN MIN” • POPULATION • 1,300,000,000 “Ren Kou” in 2006 • 1,454,000,000 by 2040 – then decreases • Gov’t policies to shape society for long-term • One-child policy designed to age poorer China • De facto **Two Chinas** • 1. 350,000,000 with cell phones, education • 2. 950,000,000 “laobaixing” – peasants • Movement from #2 China to #1 China sustains • the growing economy with cheap labor

  5. Population Density

  6. THE PEOPLE – “REN MIN” Fundamental Elements of Durable National Power • EDUCATION • #1China stresses advanced, technical education • #1 China now has large pool of technical workers • Uneven education exacerbates the “Two Chinas” disparities • One Child Policy - Unlucky Seven Syndrome in both Chinas pressures youth to succeed

  7. THE PEOPLE - “REN MIN” Fundamental Elements of Durable National Power • COHESION -- A Civilization, not a Nation State • ZHONG GUO – A Central Kingdom view of world • 5,000 years of history – Stone Age to Modern Age • 92% Han Chinese – minorities around fringe • One written language, diminishing dialects • Strong sense of being ‘Chinese” in both Chinas • Patience to suffer big disasters and bad dynasties • Far more Chinese than Communist

  8. PRIMARY RESOURCES Fundamental Elements of Durable National Power • 4% OF WORLD’S ENERGY • Mercantilist approach to ensure supply of energy and raw materials • High sulfur coal – 16 of 20 dirtiest cities in world • Limited petroleum – low quality diesel fuel • Hydroelectric power is limited, regional • Natural gas burgeoning potential

  9. Fundamental Elements of Durable National Power PRIMARY RESOURCES • WATER: 2nd LOWEST PER CAPITA IN WORLD • Massive pollution • 80% unfit even for agricultural use • Waterborne disease largest killer of infants • Wasteful agricultural practices • Three Gorges Dam may silt up in 15 years • Uneven distribution – Floods or Drought • $One trillion, 30 years to clean it up

  10. U.S. & China River Comparison

  11. Fundamental Elements of Durable National Power PRIMARY RESOURCES • China has 40% of U.S. farmland • Antiquated methods, peasant dominated • Profligate use of water and fertilizer • Decreasing productivity • Betting future on “super rice” hybrids

  12. Farmland Comparison

  13. Fundamental Elements of Durable National Power GEOSTRATEGIC LOCATION • LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION • Neighbors • Coastlines, Harbors • SLOCS • ALOCS

  14. Geostrategic Comparison

  15. Instruments of National Power • POLITICAL • ECONOMIC • DIPLOMATIC • MILITARY

  16. Instruments of National Power • POLITICAL - STRONGEST • Retrenched Communist dictatorship • Party membership #1 factor to success in all aspects of Chinese society • Ultimate masters at information control • Party legitimacy hinged on two promises: • Sustained economic growth • Inclusion of Taiwan into China sovereignty

  17. Instruments of National Power • ECONOMIC - GROWING, BUT VULNERABLE • Burgeoning, but still in transition • Many corrupt, state owned enterprises • Wealth is still concentrated, but now privately • More $200k earners in China than in U.S. • Slow internal, self-sustaining wealth production • Gov’t controlled Mercantilism vs Free Market • Must overcome lack of fundamental resources

  18. Instruments of National Power • DIPLOMATIC - Tied to Long-Held Culture • All nations bow to Middle Kingdom • Tough negotiations a Chinese trait • Patience to endure status quo is strong diplomatic suit • Today’s China is new on the world scene • 1949 civil war did not open up China • 1979 opening after Cultural Revolution

  19. Instruments of National Power • MILITARY - SUSTAINS OTHER INSTRUMENTS • Integral part of society and politics • Prioritized missions: • Loyalty to the Communist Party • Maintain political activity in society • Modernize • Defend country • Not an expeditionary force

  20. PLA Oath of Office • I am a Chinese People’s Liberation Army serviceman, • I swear to obey Chinese Communist Party leadership, • To wholeheartedly serve the people, obey commands, • To strictly observe rules, courageously fight, • To not fear to sacrifice my life, • To be faithful to all assigned responsibilities, • To strive to train ardently to kill the enemy’s strengths, • To quickly fulfill my assigned duties in all circumstances, • To never betray the Motherland, • And to never betray my fellow servicemen.

  21. Communist Party Oath • I volunteer to join the Chinese Communist Party, • To uphold Party principles, • To carry out the obligations of a party member, • To execute Party decisions, • To abide by Party discipline, • To keep Party secrets, • To be loyal to the Party, • To work with all my energy to devote myself to Communism, • To at all times prepare to sacrifice all for the Party and the people, • And to never betray the Party.

  22. People’s Liberation Army • Organization • Capabilities • Training • Education

  23. PLA Organization • COMMUNIST PARTY ARMY • Party controls through Central Military Commission • Chaired by HU Jin Tao • 11 Uniformed Members, including service chiefs • 7 Military Regions • Ground force organized into 18 CAAs • Navy organized into three fleets • Air Force organized into 30+ Divisions • 2D Artillery is strategic missile force

  24. POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE PLAAF PLAN GAD GLD GPD GSD PLA CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION 2D ARTILLERY MILITARY REGIONS PLA Organization

  25. Military Regions

  26. Military Regions and Fleets NSF ESF SSF

  27. PLA Capabilities • PLA still the world’s largest force • Limited regional power projection • 1960s-1970s technology • Weak C2 doctrine, targeting philosophy • Reticence to challenge authority • Centralized Control and Execution • PLA’s prioritized missions

  28. PLA Capabilities • Careful Study of U.S. transformation • Substantial change to PLA force planning considerations since 1991 • Major impact of DESERT STORM, carrier deployments near Taiwan in 1996, US “meddling” in Kosovo • Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM

  29. Exercises and Training • Scripted for success • 1990’s experimental decade • New doctrine/regulations (Gangyao) • Joint exercises still difficult • Conscript army (2 year terms) • Political training paramount

  30. Equipment Trends • More self-propelled artillery, ADA • Heavy foreign acquisition program • Soveremenny Destroyers • Kilo SS Submarines • SU-27/30 Aircraft • AWACS Capability • Indigenous Destroyer and Submarine programs • Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) • Newer Interceptors, Fighter-bombers

  31. Professional Military Education • Officer Accession – Historically Exclusive • Officer Accession – Currently Competitive • Entry-Level Schooling - Academies • Mid-Level Schooling – PME • Senior-Level Schooling – PME, Travel • NCO corps still nascent

  32. PLAN Projection Capability through 2020 Fully capable CHINA Some capability Unlikely First Island Chain SpratlyIslands 500 nm

  33. PLA Ground Force Power Projection • No Power Projection • Logistics is constraining factor • MR vs. Warzone constraints • Training weaknesses • Jointness weaknesses

  34. PLAAF Power Projection

  35. PLAAF Limitations • Mostly Obsolete • Reliance on Foreign Acqs • Highly Centralized Contrl • Minimal Joint Operations • Limited Power Projection • Limited AWACS • Limited air refueling • Minimal heavy airlift • Unrealistic Training F-8II

  36. PLAAF Trends • Aircraft Modernization • SU-27/SU-30s, F-10, BVR • Missile Modernization • PL-12, AA-10, AA-11, AA-12 • Tactics Modernization • Joint Force Development • Airborne C2 • UAVs & Cruise Missiles

  37. 90,000 Personnel 6 Ballistic Missile Div 1 EW Division CMC Chair has Direct Wartime Control GSD has Peacetime Ops Control 2D Artillery Force Organization Mission: PLA’s Force for Nuclear and Conv Ballistic Missiles

  38. 2D Artillery Force Capabilities • Nuclear ICBMs 50+ missiles • Nuclear MRBMs 35+ missiles • Conv/Nuc SRBMs ~ 700 missiles • Nuclear SLBM 12 missiles • LACMs Unk CSS-6 CSS-2 CSS-7

  39. Military-to-Military Engagement Objectives • “Transparency” – “Responsible Stakeholder” • Reduce Uncertainty • Prevent Miscalculation • Promote Trust • Enhance Mutual Understanding • Specific Goals • Dissuade/Deter Cross Taiwan Strait Crisis • Develop Regional Security Environment • Adhere to NDAA Restrictions

  40. Summary • China’s fundamental elements of durable national power cannot sustain peer competition with U.S. • Leadership is critical to all use of instruments of national power – dictatorship will continue • PLA, as instrument of national power, must project enough power to protect Chinese interests beyond littoral

  41. Conclusion • “Change? Just downtown Beijing and some of the suburbs.” – Mao Ze Deng • War in the next 30 years would be the result of mistakes and miscalculation • “But, why would I tell you what I was really thinking?”

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