Crime, Corruption and Failed States [Presentation 09]

1. Crime, Corruption and Failed States[Presentation 09]

2. After terrorism and WMDs….. The third element of the new inter/national security threat is: Images courtesy of http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Army.mil-2007-03-27-114351.jpg and http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Soviet_made_Iraqi_SA-6b_Gainful.JPEG

3. THE FAILED STATE

4. (4) While there are numerous reasons a state may fail (i.e. lack of a government that can actually rule), one of the increasingly clear reasons is that it is rife with crime and corruption….thus what we once thought as a domestic legal issue, crime, takes on massive international dimensions.

5. (5) What we think we used to know: • That there was always a ‘slimy’ side to economics and politics…as long as it did not get out of hand, as might be said in Colombia, that this ‘sideshow’ to understand how the world worked would find its way into our policy, research or action via the news headlines. • We were willing to treat a bit of this crime as invisible patronage, bribery, even a little extortion, a ‘criminal element’ and certainly “ordinary, decent crime” as John Darby would describe it. • Drug dealing, money laundering and gun-running was a bit over the edge…but it did not (or the US did not see it) define the workings of the international political economy (IPE). This was a blind spot, like spying in diplomacy. • So, we have not really sorted out issues of crime, corruption, collusion, cartel, extractive moneyed enterprises, trafficking in human beings, etc. and the links between them.

6. (6) We did have a perspective on “war economies”: 0 • entrepreneurs and other ‘lucky souls’ always made money on wars…but usually from opportunism, not from graft and corruption • industrialists and people that controlled the resources and investments/capital made money from war • there would be sectors which experienced, ‘favorable outcomes’ of war…usually due to product uniqueness and/or volume of sales • we believed there would be a favorable technological impact of mechanized war production to a refined civilian economy • of course territory and treasure might be a ‘spoil of war’ • the issue of post-war economics was the challenge of either rebuilding individual economies or of creating new post-war systems

7. (7) But there has been little analysis of the economics of war, shadow economies, war lords, networks, profiteers, key natural resources, etc. or recognition of their seriousness by relevant international bodies until recently (e.g.: Interpol) So…. entire new systems of economics are to be examined without a framework for doing so….

8. (8) This leads us into the development of new cross/inter-disciplinary analyses, based on disciplines such as geography, anthropology, and international finance and some new research communities, the NGOs (Global Witness, International Crisis Group) and networks, such as Transparency International - the equivalent of Amnesty International (for human rights), this time in terms of reporting on states’ good governance practices, and high level journalism.

9. (9) The growth of the ‘crime’ factor/interest - why do we need to pay attention: • Growth in real terms – in early 90s international drug trade barely at $160 billion, now just over $400 billion; with worldwide consumption of 200 million people, 5% of which are estimated to be 15 years old or younger (World Drug Report) • Growth in kind and ‘what fits under what’ – trafficking has significantly moved beyond drugs now, including humans; computer hacking (cyber crime) means potential link to all levels of crime, terrorism, banking corruption, money laundering and financial front companies/charities • Concern with the links to politics and especially to violent political change: Tamil Tigers (Sri Lanka), FARC (Columbia), KLA (Kosovo), Chechens…. (MIPT: LTTE; FARC; KLA; Chechen) • Of 160 signatories of UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 38 are deemed ‘free of PCN’ (Political-Criminal Nexus – see next slide); some 108 deemed ‘mixed’; and a dozen or so ‘crime dominated’ (Colombia, Chechnya, etc….)

10. (10) Definitional Issues: • Organized Crime: tight, nationally based criminal groups, profit motive, often distrust of political organizations; ethnic, religious or other ties bind them • Transnational or Trans-state crime: the above operating in two or more nations • Disorganized Crime: transnational in character but of small groups, bias toward rather ‘hi-tech’ crime • Political criminal nexus (PCN): partnerships designed to undermine the rule of law because this would work against the aims of two different criminal and political groups • Kleptocracies: systems of corruption which have strong-man rule and permit PCNs and other crimes under their umbrella…Mobutu (DRC), Abacha (Nigeria), Estrada (Philippines)

11. (11) The Key focus for many is – the PCN (political-criminal nexus): • linkage of the underworld and the upperworld…begins in one’s small region; extended or protected by political corruption and then when needed the use of ‘visible’ violence for real and ‘show’ effect • role of brides and ‘krysha’ – i.e. protection and facilitation • government regulated criminal activity (e.g.Taliban) • marriages of convenience • growing concern of trafficking in WMD-related materials • absence of strong civil society and rule of law culture and institutions; fragile links with external agencies for assistance – in such situations, the PCN can end up determining security (Colombia; China)

12. (12) How this links to counter-terrorism: • Safe haven issue is always a great concern • Crime and corruption cannot thrive unless there are loose standards on other key issues – sooner or later those associated with terrorism, especially money & arms • The bottom line of ‘good governance and the rule of law‘ as the goal and the capacity of each nation to control such activities is reinforced