1 / 17

REDD+ as Performance-based A id

REDD+ as Performance-based A id. Arild Angelsen Norwegian University of Life Science. What is REDD+?. Bali Action Plan (COP15, 2007) launches REDD (or REDD+):

drea
Télécharger la présentation

REDD+ as Performance-based A id

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. REDD+ as Performance-based Aid ArildAngelsenNorwegian University of Life Science

  2. What is REDD+? • Bali Action Plan (COP15, 2007) launches REDD (or REDD+): Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries Key characteristics: • Actions aimed to reduce GHG emissions from forests • Payments for environmental services (PES): • incentives & compensation

  3. Why REDD+? • BIG: • 1/6 of GHG emissions • Cannot reach 2 degree without • CHEAP: (Stern report, 2006) • Negative - USD5/ton CO2 • 50 % red: USD 5-15 billion • But problems of implementation • QUICK: • Stroke of pen reforms • No deep restructuring of economy or new technoloigy • WIN-WIN: • Large transfer • Biodiversity • Compenated conservation (poverty reduction)

  4. The core idea of REDD+ (multi-level PES) The core idea of REDD+ (multi-level PES) School of Economics and Business

  5. A modified REDD+ Objectives: CO2 Co-benefits School of Economics and Business Policies: PES Broad PAMs Forest policies Scale: National Local/projects Funding: Rich pay poor Country commitment Funding: Market Public

  6. REDD as performance-basedaid (PBA) • Now: 2/3 of international funding for REDD+ is from aid budgets • «Aidification» of REDD+ • Performancebasedaid (PBA): • Conditional payment a core idea of REDD+ • Pay for policy reforms or results • «No cure, nopay» • Surprisingly little experiences drawn from development aid experience into the REDD+ debate

  7. Good arguments, but … • A contract of conditional payment is made: • “But with results-based payments I cannot see any large risk” (Erik Solheim, ex. Minister of Env. & Dev., Norway) • BUT, mixed experience: • “This is indeed the core of what conditionality is supposedly about – aid buys reform. Unfortunately, it does no such thing” (Collier, 1997) • “Conditionality is not an effective means of improving economic policies in recipient countries” (Killick , 1997) • Svensson (2003): Differences in compliance, but no difference in aid disbursement in World Bank projects • Eldridge and Palmer (2009): much support, little evidence School of Economics and Business

  8. Challenge 1: Donors willing to spend (and recipients unwilling to reform) – The budget pressure • Strong pressure to spend • Seen as a measureofsuccess • If not, risk cuts in futurebudgets • How to change? • Focus on results rather than aid volumes • Disbursement untighten from annual budget processes (multi-year funds) • Competition: aid tournaments • Third parties to handle money Create a positive opp.costofaidfunds: Not spending is good (otherwisethreat not credible)!

  9. .. how to change …. Recipient country: • Weaken domestic resistance to policy reforms needed to implement REDD+: • “Ownership” of the policy reforms • REDD+ aid will provide financial ‘arguments to proponents of policy reforms in the domestic political struggles. • Policy dialogue (or “cheap talk”)

  10. Challenge 2: Performance criteria and measurement Source: Wertz-Kanounnikoffand McNeill (2012)

  11. Move to the right in the table • But several problem with moving to the right • Time lag between the (costs of) actions and the payments. • Measurement is more challenging: • Area • Emission factors • Benchmarks more difficult to define (next) • Allocation and sharing of risk (next)

  12. Challenge 3: Benchmarks (reference levels) • Benchmarks, i.e. the counterfactual in impact assessment, is genuinely difficult! • Even more difficult in REDD+: • How to predict deforestation (and degradation) (BAU baseline) • Who is to pay (crediting baseline)? • Huge implications:

  13. Example on how choice of RL matters! 1. Norway – Brazil agreement • 10 years, updated every 5 years • 100 C/ha, USD5/CO2 2. Alternative: - 5 years, updated every year Annual payment (USD mill) School of Economics and Business

  14. Challenge 4: Uncertainty and risk sharing • Several sources of uncertainty: • The BAU baseline has several inherent uncertainties • The costs of avoided deforestation and degradation are uncertain • The effectiveness of the REDD+ policies implemented is uncertain • Simple result-based contracts puts most risk on the service provider (recipient country)

  15. Challenge 5: Putting money behind the promise • A result based system must have «credibility»: • A realistic expectation that money will be paid for actual results • The “puzzle”: • A result-based system (e.g. USD 5/tCO2) requires big money (tens of billions per year). • But cannot just throw big money into a very imperfect system with high uncertainty about results. • In the Brazil (and eventually Indonesia?) case: • Is the contract really result based, given that there is no way Norway can pay for results?

  16. Lessons to be learned • REDD+ is not unique • we can learn from other forms of PBA • PBA is hard: • don’t be naïve; it’s no panacea • Don’t promise more than you can keep • be credible about payments • Mechanisms to increase opportunity cost of funds • be credible about performance-based • multi-year funds, competition (“aid tournaments”), disbursements handled by third parties • Don’t make all (REDD+) aid performance-based • recipient predictability, policy dialogue, credibility

  17. Weshould do REDD+ (i.e. reduceemissions from forests) becauseit’simportant, not becauseit’seasy

More Related