MH-16: Eastern & Med Fronts

1. MH-16: Eastern & Med Fronts

2. Eastern & Mediterranean Fronts -Strategic Overview: • Nazis running out of gas in Europe by 1942 • Still Germany remains a very capable enemy • Very strong on active defense as newly arrived US troops would learned • Continued to display impressive tactical and Operational skills • Yet => German logistics & re-supplywas over-stretched • Attempt to deal with 2 front War => soon to be three • Furthermore, time was running out for Germany • In contrast: Allied $$$/Logisticsbuilding steadily w/time • Allied forces & industrial capacitysteadily expanding • Also => Intel collection & analysissuperior (ULTRA) • In MED: Montgomery would finally defeat Rommel-where? • 2nd Battle of ?___ ______________

3. Strategic Overview:Southern Front • Allied able to exploit superior Intel, Air/Sea power => • Soon Allies would be landing in North Africa - Impact? • Opens yet another front => • (Where)? • US enters combat in WWII for first time against Germans • Learns some tough lessons • (but does learn from them) • From whom & where does the US learn these hard lessons? • ?_________ at ?____________ Pass

4. Strategic Overview- Eastern Front • Soviets start to get it together in 1942: • More capable military leaders take charge • Stalin even trusts some (Zhukov & Rokossovskii) • Improved equipment also helps • T-34 Tanks & trucks & logistics • Soviets begin to drive Germans west, back toward Germany • Result: Allies take strategic initiative from Germans • It starts on the Eastern Front with German advance on what Soviet southern city?

5. To Stalingrad & Disastrous Defeat– 1942 • German Plan - Order of Battle: • Army Group South=>split into Army Groups A & B • Hitler ignores his generals who advise against this split • 6th Army – General Paulusis tasked to attack the city • Nazi Problems: • Overextension of LOCs & onset of winter • Hitler’s role: interference into tactical & operational situation • Refused all requests by his generals to give up ground when situation dictates • Denied his generals tactical flexibility to withdraw in orderly fashion • Hitler assumes Command of Army Group Southfrom the rear

6. Sacrifice of the Sixth Army • Sixth Army in bitter fighting & hand to hand combat: • Pointless battle of egos between Hitler & Stalin • As winter closes in & supplies dwindle: • Battle conditions become extreme • 6th Army’s position more vulnerable & isolated • Paulus is about to be cut off from his LOC to west • Poor German intelligence misread Soviet OOB & intentions • Time running out for 6th Army to conduct an orderly withdrawal

7. Avoidable Disaster • Hitler makes situation worse: • Orders the 6th Army to stand fast as Soviets close in “regardless of the danger…” • Countermanding informed & more competent tactical decisions of his ground commanders at the scene • C3 breakdown at OKH HQ: • Hitler’s belated reversal is too late • Chuikovisabout to cut off Paulus • Mansteinwould attempt a rescue • Goering’s role? • Sealed 6th Army’s fate: • Outrageous Promises not kept • 5-600 Tons/day of supplies to 6th? • Reality? • ?________ tons per day Paulus Manstein Chuikov

8. Tragic Ending • Indecision onHitler’s part: • Last chance to withdraw6th Army • 6th Army’sflanks protected by Romanian allies – very vulnerable • Army Group Don (FM Manstein)attempted rescue from South: • Ultimately too late to save 6th • Don must fight for its own survival • Soviet Response: Chuikov seizes the opportunity: • Aggressive counter-attacks • Closes in & surrounds 6th Army • “Field Marshal” Paulus forced to fight to bitter end: • 31 Jan 1943: surrenders 90K => (5K make it back after war) • 2 Feb: Strecker’s 11th Corps makes Last Stand at Machinery Factory

9. Germans Recover • Hitler finally allows Army Group A to withdraw: • Withdrawal affords opportunity to recover • Fall back on own LOCs & supply dumps & grow stronger • Reinforcements finally arrive: • Germans gradually start to stabilize their defensive positions • In contrast => what happens to Soviet advance? • Soviets now become overextended the more they advance: • Soviet air support unavailable – bases are too far to East; • Soviet Counter-offensive starts to grind to halt • Manstein is able to convince Hitlerto cut Army GroupA some slack: • Army Group A allowed to consolidate & refit • Prepares for counteroffensive => to be launched 19 Feb: • Decisive CAS provided by Gen Richtofen’s fighter aircraft • By Mar’43 advance to push Soviets back to Donets: • Recaptured Kharkov & then rest & refit until July

10. Battle of Kursk (July 1943) • Operation Citadel: • Series of battles of latest German Offensive • Operational Purpose: • Reduce Soviet reserves + • Improve established Germandefensive positions • Plan (Map): • Tactical Objective: • Pinch off Soviet forces defending Kursk salient • Hitler:strategic victory effect: • “as beacon seen around world”

11. Friction & Change • What major Soviet improvements would the Germans now have to contend with? • Soviet Improvements: • 1. Operational & tactical skills • 2. Intelligence collection & perception management • 3. Outstanding generalship • Rokossoviskii & Zhukov • 4. In-depth defense preparation • Successive re-enforced Defense belts • Status of German intelligence? • Virtually ?______________ & vulnerable to Soviet PM* • Maskarovka (Perception Management) • manipulation of enemy’s Intel

12. Battle of Kursk: Order of Battle • Luftwaffe supports with 2500 combat aircraft • North: 9th Army (Model) • 3 Panzer Corpsw/21 Divs • South: 4th Pz Army (Hoth) • 4 Panzercorps w/22 Divs (1000 tanks) • For the full battle: • USSR: 4000 tanks vs. 3000 German tanks • Largest Tank Battle of war

13. Execution • July 5: Model’s 9th Army attacked on North shoulder w/ltd success • By 7 July 9th Army’s progress stalled 13 miles from its start • Battle soon became “rolling battle of attrition” • Big mistake for Germans – why? • 1. Soviet #s in strategic reserve • 2. Luftwaffe support ?__________________ • (3000 sorties/day still not enough) • Manstein AGS (Hoth’s 4th Pz Army) in South made only a little better progress • Gen Vatutin conducted pre-emptive arty salvo • Soviets fully alerted & prepared for attack • II SS Panzer broke through along 35 mile front • Only to find themselves amidst a deep Soviet defense zone • Thunderstorm floods battlefield & halts II Panzer’s advance

14. Battle of Prokhorovka • II Panzer Corps made 25 mile penetration by 11 July • Soviets forced to use reserves from Steppes Front • III Panzer breaks free & links up with II Panzer for further advance • July 12: Battle of Prokhorovka was the pivotal battle of Citadel • Largest tank battle of the war • 1800 tanks clash: Germans lose 300 & Russian lose 400 • Russians still hold but FM Manstein wants to continue • In the end, what forced Hitler to cancel Citadel? • Operation Husky’s impact & Mussolini’s dim future prospects • Citadel’s assessment: failure • German Reserves & Armor forces: • Severely diminished

15. Soviet Counterattack(7JUL43-30Apr44) • Following Kursk, Soviets launch series of counter-attacks: • Initial attack strike shoulders • Then Soviets take the initiative and advance across broad front • How were Soviets doing in contrast to Germans? • 1. Numbers & logistics • 2. Lessons actually learned • 3. Better Intelligence & PM • 4. Partisan operations • 5. Leadership improvement • More detailed look at comparing & contrasting of two enemies*

16. *Compare & Contrast- the details • 1. 6M Soviet soldiers overwhelm 2.5M Germans • Growing German casualties worsen imbalance • Lack of adequate logistic and re-supply=> impact? • 2. Soviets had learned from previous mistakes => conduct: • massive attacks & multiple assaults w/huge armies => • all combined w/armor, infantry, arty => overwhelm • 3. Superior Soviet Intel collection/analysis combined w/ • perception management to deceive German Intel • 4. Effective employment of partisan force- harass Germans • 5. Finally, Soviet Generals are just getting better: • (& Stalin learning to trust a little more), while=> • Hitler’s tactical interference, rudder orders, etc • Combine with relief of competent Generals replaced by with “Yes” men • So German military declines while Soviets get better: • Both qualitativelyandquantitatively • Significant strategic trend effects operations & tactics

17. 2nd Battle of Alamein (23 Oct – 12 Nov 1942) • 5 major campaigns conducted from Sept’40 – July ’42 • All with various degrees of success & failure (Map) • July’42: Rommel drove 8th Army back to defensive line at El Alamein (Rommel’s Operational & Strategic Objective?) • Both Armies face off along N-S 37 mile front – each flank secure • Mediterranean Sea to its North and Qattara Depression to the South • Churchill, frustrated, assigns Montgomeryas 8th Army • Montgomery refits, re-enforces, & prepares for attack

18. Order of Battle & The Plan • LTG Montgomery: 220K men & 1100 tanks • 1000+ artillery & RAF support with air superiority • FM Rommel: • Panzeramee Afrika- 96K men & 500 tanks • Tactically superior but logistically & OOB inferior • Plan – Concept of Operations: (Map- The Plan): • Monty to mount direct assault on north line near coast • Exploit 2:1 advantage for breakthrough (ala WWI) • Conduct feint to South to fix Rommel’s 21 Pz Div • Initiate attack with massive arty bombardment • XXX corpsto open breach in Rommel’s defense • Sappersto “gap” path for infantry & armor • Plan to be executed in 3 Phased approach: • 1. “Crumble” => 2. “dog fight” => 3. “break-out” • Rommel’s Plan:: • Dig in on defense line w/mines 5 miles deep & wait: • Commit armorat main thrust & counter-attack • Problem – short on gas • (Only has1 shot at where to commit 21 Panzer)

19. Execution- Operation Lightfoot • Assault begins at 2140, 23 Oct • Initial progress eventually slows to crawl- why? • Mineclearing equipment flawed => slow going • Massive arty bombard => disruption & confusion • Germans & Italians recover from initial shock: • Bitter fighting ensues => confusion on all fronts • Darkness & dust clouds obscure vision & direction: • Friction: delays, traffic jams, & misdirection ensue • Mine fields & booby traps raise Brit causalities: • Sensitive mines required tedious clearing by hand • 25Oct: feint attack on south flank meets tough German defense: • Achieved tactical aim: fix 21Panzer & Ariete Divs • Stumme’s death adds to C3 disorder & Rommel rtns • 25 Oct No break out occurs=> Monty cancels attack • The “Dog Fight” (25 Oct – 2 Nov): • 25 Oct: Monty shifts focus to North flank & attacks: • Conducts “crumbling” of enemy at high costs

20. Operation Supercharge (0105 2 Nov – 12 Nov) • Final break-out achieved following heavy fighting: • Modified version of Operation Lightfoot: • High concentration of arty bombardment begins • Very high casualties suffered to achieve break-out: • 9th Armored Brigade sacrificed (75 of 94 tanks) • Despite desperate Axis counterattacks => Brits hold: • Axis defense becomes very thin => time to go: • Rommel orders withdrawal • Who countermands Rommel’s order? • Confusion results in reversing withdrawal order: • Italian infantry to south destroyed or captured • Then FM Kesselringpersonally countermands Hitler’s order: • Rommel finally allowed to retreat: • Tries to save as much of his army as possible

21. Battle Results • Battle Damage Assessment (BDA): • Axis suffer 61K casualties (35K POWs) • Allies suffer 13,560 casualties • Tactical & Operational objectives achieved: • Break-out & pushed Rommel to west • Strategic: major morale boost for allies – why? • “Invincible” Rommel finally ?_________________ • Churchill’s comment: • “Before Alamein we never won; after we never lost.”

22. Operation Torch (Nov-Dec 1942) • Background: • Allies under intense pressure from Stalin: • Why/ to do what? • Establish Western Front in Europe to take pressure off USSR • FDR decides “to do something” • That “something” is Operation Torch(?) • Allied landings on North Africa • Ike named commander • He will learn many L/L • Green US troops would soon learn a very hard lesson- where? • ?___________________ Pass (text: page 495)

23. Operation Torch: Execution • Allies land on North Africa at several landing areas: • Drive East toward Tunisian frontier (while Monty continues to press West) • Americans experience first combat against WWII Axis: • Kasserine Pass debacle: Rommel defeats 3 green US regiments in detail • American tanks & inexperience no match for Rommel’s tactics & Tiger tanks • MG Fredenhall led from rear (from a bunker) with confusing orders • Demonstrated a distinct lack of leadership & tactical competence • Rommel unable to exploit – lack of support => Tactical victory only

24. Operation Husky (July 1943) • Montyfinally arrives from Egypt • Rommel soundly defeated (loss: 1/3 of his tanks) • Forced to abandon North Africa (Ultra played key role in supply interdiction) • Result: Important Operational victory for Allies: • Americans review L/L:Ike firesMG Fredenhall & promotes others • Phase IIof Campaign follows surrender of Axis in Tunis • During Casablanca Conference (Jan 1943): • Tactical & Operational realities drive Allied Strategy • Operations in Med easier from logistic standpoint: • Shipping & forces already in Med Theater • At Trident Conference (May 1943): • USaccepts British strategic aim: • Drive Italy out of war • But the US also secures date from the Brits for the cross Channel invasion

25. Allies: Monty w/8th Army & Patton w/7th Army 169K ground troops & 2600 ships & 3500 A/C Axis: Field Marshall Kesselring (CinC South) 8 Divisions & 435 A/C & part of Italian Fleet Plans & Execution (Map p. 496): 10 July: following days of bombardment ABN operations & sea lift commences Monty (senior ground cmdr) lands SE Sicily: Meets strong resistance => proceeds slowly Patton lands SW Sicily & moves quickly to NW Captures Palermo & continues east to Messina Profession contest of egos Results: Allied operational, strategic & politicalsuccess: Hitler forced to terminate “Citadel” prematurely Mussolini’s regime about to collapse German situation in Italy deteriorating rapidly Allies decide to cross over to Italian boot Order of Battle & Plans & Execution

26. Operation Avalanche (Sept 1943) • Monty finally lands 8th Army on Italian peninsula’s toe • Gen Mark Clark lands Anglo-American force at Salerno • Fails to act aggressively & gets bogged down on beach • Meanwhile the BBC prematurely announces Italy’s surrender: • King & PM Badoglioforced to flee from Nazis toward allied lines • FM Kesselringmanages effective defense throughout rest of war: • When Clark & Monty merge, Germans begin fighting withdrawal • Contest allied advance ridgeline by ridgeline with strong defenses • Tie down allies on Italy for most of war • Destroy much Italy in the process

27. Eastern Front – 1944 • German situation deteriorates while Soviet’s improve • Mansteinattempts strategic withdrawal of Army Group South: • Hitler again countermands • Won’t allow retreat from Dnieper Rvr • Result: Red Army traps 2 German Army Corps • Hitler continues to interfere w/poor tactical & operational decisions: • Operationally sound decisions & opportunities at the scene missed • Until too late for orderly withdrawal • Leading to rout, capture, or destruction • Situation grows worse for German forces • Soviets apply more pressure all along entire Eastern Front

28. Operation Bagration (June-August 1944) • Operational and tactical situation: • For Germans becoming desperate with each passing day • Soviets advance with 4 Fronts (Army Groups) along 683 mile front • Hitler continues to interject unreasonable orders: • Fires competent cmdrs making sound tactical decisions • Replaced by incompetents & unrealistic decisions • Order of Battle: • Soviets: Marshall Rokossovskii and 3 other Front Commanders • 124 divisions, 4K tanks, 24.4K arty, & 5.3K aircraft • (Total: 1.4 M men with 1.3M in reserve) • Germans with total of 1.2M spread thinly across defensive front: • FM Busch commanded Army Group Center (AGC) (to 28 June): • 700K troops with decreasing operational armor

29. Plans & Objectives& Battlefield Prep • Strategic & Operational Objectives: • Overwhelm enemy on east and west (Normandy) • Drive Germans out of Russia to East Prussia • Concept of Operations: • Phase I: Break through defenses & envelope Army Group Center (AGC): • Tactical focus: Vitebsk at Divina river • Phase II: Continue advance & encircle AGCat Minsk • Soviet Battlefield Preparation: • Soviets deceive German Intel of real intent • German Intel buys deception toward Army Group South • AGC cmdr FM Busch slavishly adheres to Hitler’s unrealistic defense objectives: • No imagination or initiative => typical of many German commanders by now • German leadership declines as allies improve • The price for this incompetence will be high

30. Operation Bagration’s Execution • Soviets attack with 4 Fronts (Army Groups) • Attack simultaneously in six separate places along 683 mile front • Soviets attack AGCtwo weeks following Normandy invasion • Trap five German divisions at Vitebsk • Phase II: rapidly unfolds to press AGC forces: • Busch orders 9th Army to hold every foot of ground • Too late => Soviets encircle 2 corps • Situation continues to deteriorate & becomes desperate: • Hitler finally permits Army to withdraw to Minsk • Fires Busch & replaces with Model • Who orders: “Not one step back”

31. Chaos, Interference, & the Result • Chaos reign & confusion rules • Germans flee west in rout • Soviets press west & soon capture Minsk on 3 July 1944 • Hitler continues to interfere with tactical decisions: • Makes bad situation worse with both operational & strategic impact • Soviets continue to advance to Polish border • Finally halt and end operation • Results: Germans routed in East • German forces & logistics badly depleted (strategic)

32. Collapse of Balkans (April – September 1944) • As Soviets encircle 6th Army, Romanians refuse to fight • Soon Romania changes sides • Bulgaria then declares war on Germany 8 Sept44 • Result: German hold on Balkans unravels • Germans just able escape from Greece & Macedonia • Nazis prepare for defense of encircled Budapest • Key Generals of Hungary desert & take whole units with them • Change sides => go over to Soviets • Hitler regarded Budapest as symbol • (AKA: the “second Stalingrad”)

33. Time Running Out • Major siege of Budapest by Soviets soon begins: • No preparations for civilian population made (food) • Horses would provide some food • For Guderian: civilian survival requirements immaterial • Budapest’s civilian population morale plummets • The war now going very badly for Nazis • Complete defeat only a matter of time • And most know it

34. Assessment • Major disasters befall on Germany during 1942-44: • Centered in Med and on Eastern Front • Winter ‘44: Soviets retake Ukraine • Summer ‘44 => most successful Soviet offensives of war conducted • Operation Bagration is impressive Soviet success • Soviets destroy Army Group Center as combat force • By Fall ‘43: Soviets liberate the Balkans: • Stalin now in control – post-WWII implications • In the Med => Brits drove Germans out of North Africa: • By Aug 1943 Allies (Patton & Monty) capture Sicily • Allies soon force Italy out of War entirely • Seize Southern Italy (although still long way to go up)

35. Assessment -2 • Of particular note: • Scale of WWII Battles now massive • Huge amounts of casualties inflicted on both sides • German military suffers most: • Its army declines both in qualityandquantity • In contrast to Germans: • Allies steadily improve their operations & tactics • Especially operational planning & tactical execution • Result: Allies conduct more effective & more refined campaigns against Germans • Allied victory in Europe seen only as a matter of time