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This document discusses critical aspects of multiple signature attributes, focusing on the evaluation of signatures under the threat of downgrade attacks. Key concerns include the removal of superior signatures and the implications of second pre-image attacks on compromised hash algorithms. The structure elements of multiple signatures are outlined, emphasizing processing methods, generation protocols, and evaluation criteria. The ongoing requirements for both intra- and inter-SignedData signature assessments are highlighted, with a focus on drafting a comprehensive policy by month-end. Future discussions are planned post-San Diego.
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Multiple Signature Document Jim Schaad Sean Turner Russ Housley
Topics to be Covered • Multiple Signature Attribute • Policy Issues in evaluating Multiple Signatures
Downgrade Attack • Downgrade attack requires: • Removal of all “better” signatures • 2nd pre-image attack on broken hash algorithm. • Does nothing for self issued downgrade attack.
Structure Elements MultipleSignature ::= SEQUENCE { bodyHashAlg DigestAlgorithIdentifier, signAlg SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier, signAttrsHash SignAttrsHash, cert ESSCertIDV2 OPTIONAL}
Processing • Generation • Algorithms are from the referenced signerInfo • Hash values set to zero for computation of this attribute • Uses multiple attribute values (one per reference and no self reference)
Processing • Evaluation • Text to be written still • Reverse process by setting hash back to zero • Error text based on missing signer infos referenced from the attribute • May not care if algorithms referenced are “weak”
Policy • Text still unwritten • Discuss requirements for intra- and inter-SignedData signature evaluation.
Forward Looking • Should have draft by the end of the month • Look for last call after San Diego.