NNSA’s Radiological Security Program

1. NNSA’s Radiological Security Program NICSTAR 2015

2. Overview • Mission of NNSA’s Office Of Radiological Security • Role of the Nuclear Security Summit in Radiological Security • NNSA’s Virtual Perimeter for High Activity Gamma Sterilization facilities • Security By Design and International Standards • Alternative technologies

3. Office of Radiological Security • The mission of the Office of Radiological Security is to enhance global security by reducing and protecting radiological materials that could be used by terrorists in a radiological dispersal device.

4. Nuclear Security Summit • The first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) took place in April 2010 • There was no mention of radioactive material security • In 2012, the Germans introduced language on Radioactive Source Security • In 2014, Radioactive Source Security played a much bigger role • The U.S. is in the midst of planning for a Nuclear Security Summit in 2016

5. 2014 Nuclear Security Summit: Gift Basket Overview Joint Statement Signatories: Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States • Commitment to secure all IAEA Category 1 sources, within their territory, consistent with the IAEA’s Code of Conduct by the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, including: • Support an independent regulatory body • Establish a comprehensive lifecycle management plan • Develop a comprehensive plan for sources out of regulatory control • Assess domestic threat and develop national response plan • Implement site level security measures • Provide rapid response to unauthorized attempts to access radioactive material • Instituting additional best practices • Multifactor access controls • Active involvement of off-site response including law enforcement • A holistic framework that governs secure transportation, possession and disposition • Monitoring systems with defense in depth • Enhanced delay

6. Virtual Perimeter Virtual perimeter alarms would be treated conceptually like a RFID seal providing tamper detection around the “device”

7. Recommended Security Upgrades • Intrusion detection systems focused on irradiator • Control Room • Duress • Labyrinth door • Sensors on loading plug • Conveyor openings • Motion sensors in labyrinth • Motion sensors around bunker • CCTV • Interior of warehouse focused on irradiator • Exterior if needed • Labyrinth • Barriers/covers for pools • Automated access controls to facility • Two Person Rule • Radiation detectors outside bunker • Siren/strobe • Training • Plans and Procedures • Remote monitoring of alarms • Secure and alarm handling tools • Lock out on bridge cranes • Local law enforcement response awareness • Insider threat measures to detect unauthorized access to the sources in the pool

8. Insider Threat Considerations • Active Insider attempting an abrupt theft per GMS Potential Adversary Capabilities (PAC) • Authorized access to facilities to include bunker • May be in facility alone or with small number of other staff on off shifts • Knowledgeable of security and safety systems • Has alarm system codes to bypass alarms • Knowledgeable of security procedures and plans • Knowledgeable on radiation safety and shielding requirements • Knowledgeable of facility operations and location of sources in modules and racks • On authorized list to call LLEA and offsite monitoring companies

9. Pilot Pool Cover Concept • Protection measures for the pool: • Steel pool covers • Alarms tied to Remote Monitoring System

10. Tamper Indication and Delay TID on Grating Alarmed Steel Grating High Temperature Wiring Mechanical Switch

11. Nuclear Security Summit 2014: Security By Design House Gift: The United States plans to work with international manufacturers of high-activity sealed source devices to perform voluntary assessments of the vulnerability of their machines (to source theft). • Worked to set a standard for in-device delay and detection measures on newly fabricated high activity devices. • Safety Act certification has been approved for in-device delay systems to help promote their inclusion as the security star standard. • If device hardening is performed at manufacturing, it reduces retrofitting costs and immediately improves device security. • Continues to work with manufacturers in the domestic market to strengthen partnerships and support device hardening. • Manufacturers are now marketing their hardened devices internationally. • NNSA is interested in working with international device manufacturers to enhance delay and detection capabilities before devices come to the market.

12. NSS on Alternative Technologies • The US plans to establish an international research effort on the feasibility of replacing high-activity radiological sources with non-isotopic replacement technologies, with the goal of producing a global alternative by 2016. • The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has set up a working group to look at the issue of alternatives for all applications, including Gamma Sterilization • Meetings occur once per month • NNSA’s Office of Radiological Security will continue to work with NNSA’s Research and Development office to develop alternatives where no commercially available alternative exists (e.g., well logging). Also working to develop a strategic roadmap on the maturity of global technology development. • Domestically, NNSA is looking to aid volunteer sites and provide incentives to replace devices that use the most attractive materials (Cs-137 Irradiators) with commercially available replacements (e.g., X-Ray or UV Pathogen Reduction). • NNSA is also engaging with other countries to monitor the momentum on alternative technology.

13. Questions? Kristina Hatcher National Nuclear Security Administration Kristina.Hatcher@nnsa.doe.gov 202-586-7544