Responsibility to protect chapter 7 & 8

1. Responsibility to protect chapter 7 & 8 Ryouken Kojima Madoka Sato

2. Chapter 7 The Operational Dimension 1. Preventive Operations 2. Planning for Military Intervention 3. Carrying out Military Intervention 4. Following up Military Intervention

3. Military Intervention Operations • Different from traditional warfighting and peacekeeping operations • Be able and willing to engage in much more robust action • Should be a last resort

4. 1. Preventive Operations • Two Categories • First – position of troops where there is an emerging threat of conflict with the consent of the government • Second – military resources are deployed without an actual intervention on the territory of the targeted state without the consent

5. 2. Planning for Military Intervention • Build an effective political coalition • Work out agreed objectives • Provide a clear mandate • Devise a common plan of operations • Marshal the necessary resources

6. a) Coalition Building • Cohesion of an intervening coalition is critical for success • Fragility has been the problem of past interventions • Creating and maintaining a common political resolve, and working out a common military approach

7. b) Objectives • Often confronts the problem that coalition partners may have different ideas about the objectives • Harmonizing the views and interests of differing states in each regard is often prolonged and complex undertaking • Discussions over the “exit strategy” meaning the withdrawal with as little loss of people and materials as possible

8. c) Mandate • Clear mandate is one of the first and most important requirements of an operation • Objective of the mandate should be to allow the executing military commander to identify his mission and to propose an operational concept • Should define in clear language

9. d) Resources and Commitment • Any operation needs the resources, and the allocation of sufficient resources is indispensable for success • The level of resources committed sends a clear signal of resolve and intent to all concerned

10. 3. Carrying out Military Interventiona) Command Structure • Best if there is a single chain of integrated command and if nations are prepared to transfer the authority to the force commander • Tight political control of such operations is mandatory

11. b) Civil-Military Relations • Coordination and collaboration between military forces, political civilian authorities, and humanitarian agencies is a significant issue • Even in the most insecure and unstable situations, dedicated humanitarian organizations remain as long as possible • Sometimes workers can become hostages

12. c) Rules of Engagement (ROEs) • Must fit the operational concept and be appropriate for the type of military action • Should reflect the principle of proportionality • Must reflect a stringent observance of international law • No common disciplinary procedure for international troops that violate international norms

13. d) Applying Force • Success of military operations has been observed in the context of an intervention for human protection purposes • The operation is not a war to defeat a state but an operation to protect populations in that state from being harassed, persecuted or killed • The planning stages of an intervention must be especially focused

14. e) Casualties • The proactive use of force have been determined more by military expediency than by any sense of responsibility to protect humanitarian interests • Withdrawal may be the best when force protection becomes the prime concern

15. f) Media Relations • Countries or political leaders can easily be exposed to worldwide criticism due to media • Proper conduct of an appropriate public information campaign is not only critical to maintaining public support for an intervention but also to maintaining the cohesion of the coalition

16. 4. Following up Military Interventiona) Transfer of Authority • The main mission of military forces in post-intervention operations is to provide the safe environment for the restoration of good governance and the rule of law • Need for clear-cut responsibilities and a transition of responsibility from the military authorities to the civilian authorities as soon as possible

17. b) Peacekeeping and Peace Building • Coalitions or nations have to have the will to restore peace and stability • After civil war ends, organized crime, revenge attacks, arms proliferation, looting, theft or other many things may happen • Assist in national law enforcement

18. c) Five Protection Tasks • 1) Protection of minorities • 2) Security sector reform • 3) Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration • 4) Mine action • 5) Pursuit of war criminals

19. Summary • The responsibility to protect will be different from both the traditional operational concepts for waging war and UN peacekeeping operations • Begins with preventive efforts and ends with the responsibility to rebuild, so that respect for human life and the rule of law will be restored

20. Chapter 8The responsibility to protect: the way forward

21. Summary • The responsibility of sovereign states to protect their own people from harm such as • Slaughter • Ethnic cleansing • Starvation • If states are unwilling or unable to do so by themselves, it is international community that has to exercise the responsibility

22. Concerns • The political and operational consequences of reconciling the principle of shared responsibility with that of non-intervention. • Concerns about process • Concerns about priorities • Concerns about delivery

23. Process • When protective action is taken, particularly when there is military intervention for human protection purposes, it is undertaken in a way that reinforces the collective responsibility of the international community to address such issues, rather than allowing opportunities and excuses for unilateral action. →central role and responsibility of the UNSC to take whatever action needed

24. Concern about priorities Responsibility to protect Responsibility to react Responsibility to prevent Responsibility to rebuild IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTION

25. Concern about delivery • Many occasions when the SC failed to respond as it should have with timely authorization and support when conscience-shocking situations occurred. • Events during the 1990’s: decision by SC to authorize international actions to address situation of grave humanitarian concern was no guarantee that any action would be taken, or taken effectively. Identify the principles and rules that should govern military interventions for human protection purposes

26. MOBILIZING DOMESTIC POLITICAL WILL

27. Key to mobilizing international support →to mobilize domestic supportor at least neutralize domestic opposition. • Size and power • Geography • The nature of the political institutions • Culture of the country concerned

28. Key individuals and organizations • Political leaders • NGOs“if everyone is responsible, then no one is actually responsible.”

29. Good arguments • Moral • Financial • National interest • Partisan

30. Moral appeal • Preventing human suffering is inspiring and legitimizing motive in almost any political environment • However political leaders often underestimate electorates’ decency and compassion and public willingness to accept the risk of casualties in well designed military interventions

31. Financial argument • Earlier action is always cheaper than later action(responding after the event through military action, humanitarian relief assistance and post-conflict reconstruction)

32. National interest appeal • Avoiding disintegration of a neighbor • Refugee outflows • Regional security destabilization • Keeping resource supply lines, trade routs • Being/ being seen to be a good international citizen

33. Partisan appeal • Even if majority of a community is not supporting the decision, government often choose to follow it without knowing what is the majority view because of the support from particular support base which is influential in the election etc. • They often have arguments that will appeal to their immediate support base

34. MOBILIZING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL WILL

35. MOBILIZING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL WILL • The same strictures apply internationally as domestically • Morality, resource concerns, institutional interests and political interests

36. Multilateral leadership • UN Secretary-General • Secretariat • Regional and sub-regional organizations • International NGOs • Media

37. UN Secretary-General • Article 99 of the UN Charter • Interaction with the Security Council • International profile with governments and media →unique opportunity to mobilize international support • Construction and maintaining the multinational coalitions

38. The Secretariat • Reports and recommendations to the SC →contribute to shape the deliberations and determine the range of options • That contribution can be negative as well as positivee.g.. Rwanda in 1994

39. The media and international NGOs The media • Good reporting, well-argued opinion pieces and real time transmission of images of suffering generate pressure to act International NGOs • Significant advocates of cross-border human protection action • The goals of policy makers and humanitarian advocates are not so different; protect those facing the worst sort of horrors

40. NEXT STEPS

41. To the General Assembly • That the General Assembly adopt a draft declaratory resolution embodying the basic principles of the responsibility to protect, and containing four basic elements: • an affirmation of the idea of sovereignty as responsibility; • an assertion of the threefold responsibility of the international community of states – to prevent, to react and to rebuild – when faced with human protection claims in states that are either unable or unwilling to discharge their responsibility to protect;

42. a definition of the threshold (large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended) which human protection claims must meet if they are to justify military intervention; and • an articulation of the precautionary principles (right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects) that must be observed when military force is used for human protection purposes.

43. To the Security Council • (1) That the members of the Security Council should consider and seek to reach agreement on a set of guidelines, embracing the “Principles for Military Intervention” summarized in the Synopsis, to govern their responses to claims for military intervention for human protection purposes. • (2) That the Permanent Five members of the Security Council should consider and seek to reach agreement not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support.

44. To the Secretary-General • That the Secretary-General give consideration, and consult as appropriate with the President of the Security Council and the President of the General Assembly, as to how the substance and action recommendations of this report can best be advanced in those two bodies, and by hisown further action.

45. Two objectives • To strengthen, not weaken, the sovereignty of states • To improve the capacity of the international community to react decisively when states are either unable or unwilling to protect their own people We won’t be able to live with ourselves if we are not prepared to act