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17-20 mark descriptor • The question is addressed in a clearly structured and focused essay that indicates a high level of awareness of the demands of the question. Arguments are clear, coherent, relevant and well substantiated. The answer demonstrates an in-depth understanding of the history of the region through the selection and effective use of historical knowledge. Different approaches to, and interpretations of, historical events and topics are explained and placed in their historical context. The causes and effects of historical continuity and change are explained and historical explanations are presented. • At the upper end of this markband the answer will in addition display the following features: a highly developed awareness of historiographical issues: a critical examination of a wide range of historical evidence: a high level of conceptual ability: a successful challenge to the assumptions implied in the question.
When Lenin died in 1924 he left no clear successor to lead the Communist Party; he gave no clear indication what the power-structure should be after him • It seemed that Lenin hoped that there would be “collective leadership” after he died, leadership by a small group of the existing Politburo • If one person was going to succeed him, the one person Lenin did not want to succeed him was Stalin – wanted him removed from his positions of authority (pg. 206-207) • Lenin’s death gave way to a power struggle, from which Stalin would emerge as Leader. What enabled Stalin to Rise to Power?
1. No Clear Process of Succession • The Bolsheviks had no program for governing Russia after take over – their energies were directed to winning the revolution. And after the revolution they had no guide lines on which to work – theirs was the first socialist revolution…they had no system of succession • This created opportunities for individual advancement which, in more stable times, would not have existed. It is arguable that in a traditional system of government, with a clearly defined pattern of promotion, Stalin would have made little progress
Traditional systems of government have clearly defined patterns of promotion; This new system of government did not have one – its decisions and procedures were improvised • It created an opportunity for someone who was not close to Lenin to emerge as Leader • It created an opportunity for someone who was not considered the brightest or smartest of the leaders to come to Power – a fellow communist described him as a “grey blur” and Trotsky described him as “an eminent mediocrity,” who benefited from this vagueness and uncertainty (pg. 211)
2. His Ability and Ambition • In the uncertain atmosphere that followed Lenin’s death, a number of pieces of luck, helped Stalin promote his own claims: it was very much a matter of being in the right place at the right time. (Lynch) • However, it would be wrong to ascribe his success totally to good fortune. The luck had to be used. Stalin may have lacked brilliance but he did not lack ability. His particular qualities of dogged perseverance and willingness to undertake laborious administrative work were ideally suited to the times. (Lynch)
He may not have been a master organizer and planner, but he had outstanding political talents, inc. considerable intelligence, an impressive memory of facts and faces, abundant energy and perseverance, pragmatic decisiveness, and an uncanny ability to identify and use other people’s strengths and to exploit their weaknesses…..He recognized that he had to play a subordinate role in the government as long as Lenin was in power, and so he spent time building a broad base of power and influence. (Lynch/Thompson) • He was also enormously ambitious and concealed a craving for respect and adulation under a mask of self-effacement…. (pg.244)
Desire for Glory motivated him: he played little part in the 1917 revolution (wrote pamphlets, involved with Petrograd Soviet, but favored continuing with war and tolerating Provisional Govt. – though later changing to support Lenin); was a useful but not influential second tier party leader (pg. 240)…now, in the post-revolutionary period, he wanted recognition / glory.. • Played a more important role during the Civil War as Commissar of Nationalities; his travels about Russia permitted him to cultivate political connections and to begin building a cadre of loyal followers….(but still not regarded as an influential party leader..)
Nevertheless he still felt disappointed and resentful at the scant recognition that he received for his wartime efforts: as Tucker concludes, “Whereas Trotsky emerged from the Civil war with much glory and little power, Stalin emerged with little glory and much power. Glory, however, remained his aim.” (pg. 241)
3. Administrative Positions • However much Lenin may have wished to prevent Stalin from succeeding him as leader, the basis of Stalin’s power had been laid even before Lenin’s death. The party had, unintentionally, already provided Stalin with the means of assuming control • His zeal and ability to get things done, his energy and resolve, brought him to Lenin’s attention at first • He held the following positions: • Peoples Commissar (Minister) of Nationalities – 1917 • Liaison Officer between Politburo and Orgburo – 1919 • Head of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate – 1919 • General Secretary of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party - 1922
As Commissar for Nationalities Stalin was in charge of the officials in the many regions and republics that made up the USSR • As the officer responsible for liaison between the Politburo (the Central Committees inner cabinet) and the Orgburo (the Party’s Bureau of Organization) Stalin was in a unique position to monitor both the Party’s policy and its personnel • As head of the Worker’s Inspectorate, he was responsible for overseeing the work of all govt. departments.
As General Secretary, he recorded and conveyed Party policy. One of the aspects of this growing complexity and centralization of the party was the setting up of a Party Secretariat which had the job of organizing the running of the Party, ensuring that decisions of the Central Committee and its inner committee the Politburo were carried out and appointing people to essential jobs • Until 1919 this had been done by a tiny staff of 15 under Jacob Sverdlov – after he died the work was reorganized – as the Party became the most powerful force within the country the Secretariat became more and more important, though few people foresaw how influential it would become (1,000 workers in the Secretariat, and tens of thousands staffed other bodies that answered to it) (pg. 246)
Through his control of the Secretariat and other bodies he was able to control the selection of delegates to higher bodies and to the Party congresses…this was crucial to his success: these were the people who decided major policy and elected the Central Committee (pg. 246) • With all this centralization and accumulation of power in the Party, positions within the party once regarded as unimportant now became important. The various posts which had been considered insignificant in the early days of the Rev – the belief was that the state would “wither away” - would soon begin to provide their holders with the levers of power.
This had not been the intention, but was the unforeseen result of the emerging pattern of Bolshevik (totalitarian) rule. It was in this context that Stalin’s previous appointments to key positions in both government and Party proved vital.
He used these positions to • 1. build up personal files on all the members of the Party. Nothing of note happened that he did know about. Tucker says that “one of Stalin’s devices for aggrandizing his power was the collection of derogatory information on party figures.” He also had his staff tap the phones of high placed persons in order to keep him well informed on their attitudes and actions. • 2. he was in a unique position to confer patronage, to influence job appointments and the Party organization. He used this authority to place his own supporters in key positions. Since they then owed their place to him (he could fire as well as hire), he could count on their support in the voting in the various committees and congresses which made up the USSR
Did he have a plan. Most historians think he did not have a blueprint for arriving at power. Biographers suggest that he did not at first realize the importance of the positions he held. He had a general sense of what he hoped would happen (power, control over party)…but did not have a plan for getting there.. • Writers such as Edward Crankshaw and Norman Stone argued that Stalin was not a planner who carefully plotted his way to the top but an opportunist who, because of his willingness to seize the moment, found power coming within his grasp. Whatever Stalin’s intentions may have been at this stage, it appeared that few of his contemporaries had grasped just how powerful the holding of these positions had made him
Such were the levers in Stalin’s possession during the Party in-fighting over the succession to Lenin. No other contender came anywhere near matching Stalin in his hold on the Party machine. Whatever the ability of the individuals or groups who opposed him or the strength of their arguments, he could always out-vote and out-maneuver them
4. The Lenin Enrollment • Lenin purged the Communist Party – from 750,000 down to 530,000, later to 340,000 • After Lenin’s death a campaign was mounted to increase the size of the Party again – more activists were needed for the task of governing the USSR . • From 1923 to 1925 it increased from 340,000 to 600,000. By 1933 membership reached 1m. This became known as the “Lenin enrolment.”
Stalin managed the rebuilding process (pg. 211-212) • The responsibility for supervising and vetting the Lenin enrolment had fallen largely to the officials in the Secretariat who worked directly under Stalin as Gen. Sec. Many were chosen / hand picked by Stalin himself • The many privileges (apartments, schools, vacations) and jobs that came with Party membership depended on their being loyal to those who had first admitted them into the party ranks. The Lenin Enrolment added to his power of patronage.
New recruits were less ideological and idealistic, and more pragmatic and goal oriented than the revolutionary Bolsheviks…easier to control and bureaucratize…over half had been in the Red Army…disciplined, rigid outlook, accustomed to taking orders and cared little about inner party democracy…Stalin would take advantage of this state of mind (pg.184) • Also, the new members were predominantly young, poorly educated and politically unsophisticated, and therefore more likely to obey instructions from the Party leadership than the older more experienced revolutionaries would. • The new recruits appreciated Stalin’s pragmatism and forcefulness
The enrolment provided the Gen. Sec. with a reliable body of voters in the various Party committees at local and central level. • They were “malleable recruits” (Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union), who were in the words of Allan Bullock (Hitler and Stalin) “ready enough to accept what they were told.” • The Lenin enrolment increased Stalin’s advantages over his rivals..
5. Assistance of his Wife • Married Nadezhda Alliluyeva • Daughter of a well-known Bolshevik…energetic and outgoing, she plunged herself into Party work at the age of 17 after their marriage…acted the part of charming, and well informed hostess for Stalin, entertaining and helping to keep track of Party colleagues (pg. 246) • Complemented him: he could be gruff and blunt
6. No Factionalism Rule • This was another lasting feature of the Lenin period that proved of great value to Stalin. This referred to Lenin’s condemnation of the Party’s squabbling during the Civil War period. • In 1921 a resolution had been passed which banned groups from within the party from putting forward ideas which disagreed with official policy and the party leadership. • Those who did so could be disciplined or expelled from the Party. There would be no “tolerance of factionalism.” What this rejection of “factionalism” effectively did was to frustrate any serious attempt to criticize Party decisions or policies.
Stalin benefited directly from the ban on criticism of the Party line. Stalin, because of his control over so many Party bureaucrats was able to get decisions he favored accepted at Party Congresses, and once they became official party policy, it was difficult to oppose it or change them, because the amount of debate within the Party was limited. • The charge of “factionalism” provided Stalin with a ready weapon for resisting challenges to the authority he had begun to exercise. • During the power struggle of the 1920s Stalin was able to get his ideas accepted by the Party congresses and the Central Committee – which he controlled – and could then accuse his opponents of “factionalism.”
Stalin controlled the process of decision making, and once a decision was made, criticism was banned under this resolution (pg. 183) (pg. 211)
7. The Lenin Legacy • Stalin was the chief architect in creating a “cult of Lenin” (pg. 246)….this was another factor which legitimized Stalin’s position. He became heir to what was described as the “Lenin legacy”. • He encouraged people to see Lenin as a venerated god: Lenin’s words, actions, decisions became unchallengeable, and all arguments and disputes within the Party were settled by reference to his statements and writings. Lenin became the measure of the correctness of Soviet theory and practice.
After 1924, if a party member could assume the mantle of Lenin and appear to carry on Lenin’s work, he would establish a formidable claim to power. • This is what Stalin began to do. He portrayed himself as the heir to “Lenin’s Legacy”, as the unerring interpreter of his doctrine and vision • Frequently elaborated on Lenin’s views rather than contributing ideological views of his own, frequently quoted Lenin, frequently referred to him in speeches and addresses, and in his writings
Stalin gained an advantage by being the one to deliver the oration / eulogy at Lenin’s funeral. Appearances mattered, and the sight of Stalin as leading mourner suggested a continuity between him and Lenin, an impression heightened by the contents of his speech / oration in which, in the name of the party, he humbly dedicated himself to follow in the tradition of the departed leader – (Read Document)… “oath speech” • When the maneuvering for control began between Kamenev, Zinoviev, Trotsky, Bukharin, Tomsky, and Stalin, Stalin had the advantage of appearing to follow Lenin’s legacy more closely / the most
8. Defeated Trotsky • Trotsky was a complex character, often described as his own worst enemy. Despite his many gifts and intellectual brilliance, he had serious weaknesses that undermined his chances of success. • At times he was unreasonably self-assured: at other critical times he suffered from diffidence, uncertainty and poor judgment. • He was very conscious of the danger Stalin represented to himself and to collective leadership, yet he made a series of tactical mistakes.
In 1924 he prophesized to Smirnov, one of his supporters, that Stalin would become “the dictator of the USSR.” When Smirnov expressed surprise, Trotsky gave a strikingly accurate analysis of the basis of Stalin’s power in the Party – read Document
Trotsky’s Mistakes • 1. Didn’t speak out against Stalin’s handling of the Nationalities, Georgia. He and Lenin agreed that Stalin was too severe, too brutal. But he didn’t express his views at Party Congress, or represent Lenin’s views, as Lenin had asked him to do: nor did he indicate to the Party Congress, at any stage, that Lenin had serious misgivings about Stalin (pg. 207)
2. Failed to take advantage of the Lenin Testament (pg. 207) (Read Document): Went along with suppressing it (pg. 247-249) • When he agreed to publish it, it was too late. If it had been published earlier, it would have discredited Stalin ’s claim to have been Lenin’s loyal lieutenant / to follow his legacy. • It also contained criticism of Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev – they kept it secret for that reason but by so doing they allowed Stalin to benefit.
According to Lenin, Stalin was unable to use power with “sufficient caution”, Trotsky was criticized for “excessive self-assurance and excessive absorption in administration” – Bukharin could not be regarded as “fully Marxist”, Zinoviev and Kamenev were criticized for lack of enthusiasm for the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917. • Later, Lenin, unhappy with Stalin’s handling of the Georgia affair, and after Stalin insulted his wife Krupskaya, added a note / “postscript” attacking Stalin as “too rude” and proposing that he should lose his job as Gen Sec. • When the Central Committee was presented with this in May 1924, they felt that it was too damning broadly to be used exclusively against any one individual. They agreed to its being shelved indefinitely.
The Testament damaged everyone. Was probably intended to ensure that no one leader emerged, that control would be collective, by the Central Committee, not any one man, but because it was never published this meant that Lenin’s fears about Stalin were effectively ignored. • Trotsky went along with this decision, but in so doing he was declining yet another opportunity to challenge Stalin’s right to power
3. Missed Lenin’s Funeral (pg. 247) Trotsky was conspicuous by his absence from the funeral. Trotsky later complained that Stalin had not informed him of the date of the funeral – whatever the truth about this, his absence raised doubts about his respect for Lenin’s memory • He should have made a point of finding out when it was and of being there……from newspapers, other leaders….
4. At the 1923 Party Congress Trotsky refused to make the principal speech in Lenin’s place (Lenin was too ill to attend and asked Trotsky to fill in) – didn’t want it to seem that he was making a bid for power – later admitted that he made a mistake, would have given him the edge in defeating Stalin. • As a result Stalin dominated the Congress: this was the Congress at which Stalin gave the impression that he and Lenin had similar views about how to treat the National minorities • Trotsky could have “blown Stalin out of the water” had he been smarter (Shapiro), but did not even attend – missed an opportunity to weaken Stalin.
5. Missed many CP meetings after Lenin’s death; mystery illnesses caused him to miss meetings of the Cent Committee also, this was a recurring pattern and may have resulted from his unwillingness to really seize the initiative – at these meetings he was often criticized but was not there to defend himself. • 6. Personality: flamboyant, intellectual, arrogant, aloof; Among the collective leadership, Trotsky, was the most feared as capable of seeking all power himself. Because Stalin was unspectacular and methodical, colleagues tended to regard the former as dangerously ambitious and the latter self-effacing. Trotsky attracted either admiration or suspicion but seldom loyalty.
This is why he lacked a genuine following. It is true that he was highly regarded by the Red Army, whose creator he had been, but this was never matched by any comparable political support in the Party. This resulted in Trotsky’s invariably appearing to be an outsider • Trotsky’s superiority as a speaker and writer, and his greater intellectual gifts, counted for little when set against Stalin’s grip on the Party machine
7. Until 1917, Trotsky had been a Menshevik. This led to the suspicion that his conversion had been a matter of expediency rather than conviction. Many of the old-guard Bolsheviks regarded Trotsky as a Menshevik turncoat. • Trotsky’s Menshevik past and his divergence from Leninism since 1903 were highlighted in a number of books and pamphlets, notably Kamenev’s “Lenin on Trotsky.”
8. Too conscious of being Jewish: hindered him from being assertive; when offered the post of Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Govt. by Lenin, Trotsky, who was Jewish, rejected it on the grounds that his appointment would be an embarrassment to Lenin and the gov…much anti-semitism in Russia / Europe… (selfless….put party first)….also probably why he didn’t take Lenin’s place and deliver keynote speech at Party Congress in 1923… • “It would” he said “give enemies grounds for claiming that the country was ruled by a Jew” - too conscious, inhibited by the fact that he was Jewish – may have felt like an outsider in a very anti-Semitic society.
9. Out-maneuvered Left (pg. 250-256) • To oust Trotsky, considered Left Wing, Stalin (without a real position of his own) joined forces with: • Kamenev and Zinoviev (really on the Left, but changed positions just to oppose Trotsky) who adopted right wing positions • Right Wing of the CP
Left Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev Economy • Move away from NEP, forward to full Communism, nationalize land, control food supply, coerce peasants to produce more crops / food…..move to full Command Economy • Rapid modernization and industrialization Foreign Policy • Promote international Socialism through the Comintern (International Organization to promote Communism, established by Lenin)
Right (Deviation) Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky Economy • Retain NEP with modifications, continue to use incentives and persuasion to encourage peasants to produce more food • Industrialization and modernization but at a slower pace Foreign Policy • Socialism in One Country – avoid war, avoid foreign intervention, protect and build socialism in the USSR
Stalin argued that he supported NEP because Lenin introduced it and indicated he wanted it to continue (Lenin’s Legacy) • He argued that he supported Socialism in One Country (at least for now) because he believed that Russia was strong enough to succeed alone – Patriotic position – and because Russians did not want to return to war – Pragmatic (differed from Lenin….able to justify it by appealing to Russian nationalism) • Historian Carr comments on Stalin’s ability to rally support and silence opponents at critical moments by taking on the role of the great Russian patriot intent on saving the nation from its internal and external enemies
Trotsky, as well as advocating an end to NEP and a commitment to International Socialism, also found himself alienated by Stalin after he condemned the growth of bureaucracy in the CP and appealed for the return of party democracy (Lessons of October) • Stalin claimed to be protecting the jobs and status of party bureaucrats and that Trotsky was guilty of Factionalism and was therefore anti-Leninist • Trotsky was portrayed as anti-Lenin, a Factionalist, un-Patriotic: Stalin took a back seat and let Kamenev and Zinoviev do most of the attacking • Trotsky was removed from position as Commissar of War, from Politburo, from the CP and later forced into exile (1929);
Having ousted Trotsky, Stalin then turned on Kamenev and Zinoviev and removed them from their positions in the Politburo and CP • They tried to form an anti-Stalin alliance with Trotsky, realizing that they had been manipulated, and reverted back to their true positions on opposing NEP and supporting International Socialism, but Stalin had out-smarted and manipulated them – they had lost all credibility (pg. 256) • Stalin formed an alliance with Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, to oppose them
Got Central Committee increased from 27 to 40 to 63: most of the new members were his followers – got it to vote to remove his enemies from the party (pg. 254)
10. Out-maneuvered Right • By 1927, Stalin was ready to denounce NEP: he presented it as detrimental to the interest of the worker: he knew it was unpopular with the urban workers, esp. after the supposed grain crisis….and it was becoming the position he definitely preferred himself • He changed his position and began to denounce the Right for supporting NEP – portrayed them as pro-Peasant
He also advocated rapid industrialization and modernization….again presenting this as patriotic…it would prevent the USSR from being invaded / overrun • He continued to advocate Socialism in One Country (pragmatic and patriotic) • Took the Left position on NEP and Industry (Economic), and the Right position on Socialism in One Country (Foreign Policy)…..made them his permanent positions • Pragmatic, lacking clear ideology, flexible, opportunist, or did he have ideas, goals, and know what he was doing all along? When did he develop clear ideas that he stuck with (pg. 235-236)
He used his power and influence to drive Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky - the Right - out of the Party, leaving him in sole command by 1928 • Finally, his triumph over Left and Right was complete • The defeat of the Right Opposition was the last stage in the consolidation of Stalin’s authority over the Party and the USSR. The defeat of the Right marks the end of any serious attempt to limit his power. From 1928 until his death in 1953 he would reign supreme over the USSR as a dictator
