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Securing a Nuclear Deterrent for Iran

Securing a Nuclear Deterrent for Iran. Our National Interests Dictate our Objectives. Vital Survival of the Iranian Islamic Republic with our Fundamental Institutions and Values intact Stability of Iran and our Territorial Integrity Prevention of a Military Attack on Iran

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Securing a Nuclear Deterrent for Iran

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  1. Securing a Nuclear Deterrent for Iran

  2. Our National Interests Dictate our Objectives • Vital • SurvivaloftheIranianIslamicRepublicwithour Fundamental Institutionsand Values intact • Stabilityof Iran andour Territorial Integrity • Preventionof a Military Attack on Iran • EnhancementofIran‘s Power withinthe Region andBeyond • VeryImportant • SurvivalofIranianallies (Hezbollah, Syria) • PromotingtheprosperityandvirtueofIran‘spopulation Objective Secure a Nuclear Deterrent for Iran by completing at least three nuclear weapons by 2012 while avoiding an attack

  3. Background Analysis Weaknesses Strengths • Strong optionsfordistractionandchaos (Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shi‘aInsurgents in Iraq) • Domesticenrichmentprocessmeans time isourally • IAEA inspectorsobstructsecretenrichment • Single, concentratedenrichmentfacility in Natanzas large target • Economicsituationinside Iran already fragile Opportunities Threats • IR-2 will speed up enrichment, offers diversification • Reluctant, over-stretched enemy may endure more provocations • Enemies‘ split interests offer chance for division • Enemies‘ fearmaytriggerattack • Economicsanctionsmaystirturmoilinside Iran • Technical difficultieswith IR-2 maydelayenrichment

  4. Assessment of Key Players

  5. Nuclear map Covert site possibility • Along route to Tehran • Provides cover for transport • Sufficiently distant from Natanz (approx 100 miles)

  6. We need to change the enemies‘ perception Problem: Continued enrichment reinforces this perception “Iran doesn’t have the bomb now, but will have it soon, thus we have to act” To prevent an attack we need to change the perception in one of two ways B A “Iran doesn‘twantthe Bomb so wedon‘thaveto stop them“ “Iran wantsthe bomb but itistoocostlyto stop them“

  7. Technological implementation cannot be our only concern Geostrategic End-State Information Policy Technical Implementation Middle EasternBrotherhood Accomodating Concealment Divide and Conquer Ambiguous Diversification Autarky Assertive Fast Forward

  8. Current capabilities and paths for completion by 2012 Optimal Enrichment Scenario: UraniumEnrichment • 3,000 P-1 atNatanz • + 200 IR-2 per month • 1 bomb after 6 months • 3 bombs after 12 months • 6 bombsby 12/2008 Goal: 3 Bombs Project Completion Completion Arak Heavy Water 2012 Impossible • Time-frametoolong Plutonium Option BushehrLightwater Summer 2011 Problematic • Mustexit NPT • Single Target

  9. All threeoptionsgenerateenough material by 12 / 2012 1 “Charming Our Way to the Bomb“ • 3,000 P-1 atNatanz (normal rate) • + 200 IR-2 per month (25% lower rate) • 1 bomb after 6 months • 3 bombs after 13 months • 5 bombsby 12/2009 “Distract and Deter“ 2 • 3,000 P-1 atNatanz (25% lower rate) • + 200 IR-2 per month (25% lower rate, noenrichmentbefore 11/2008) • 1 bomb after 7 months • 3 bombs after 16 months • 4 bombsby 12/2009 “Autarky and Micro-Enrichment“ 3 • 3,000 P-1 atNatanz (50% lower rate) • + 200 IR-2 per month (50% lower rate) 1 bomb after 8 months • 3 bombs after 20 months • 3 bombsby 12/2009

  10. 1 Charming our Way to the Bomb RISK ofattack 60/100 • Mislead the enemy: • Continue P-1 enrichment, but focus on IR-2 • Seektocomplicateanddelay IAEA negotiations, e.g. offer multinational consortium • Pacify the enemy: • Collaborate in Iraq; restrain Hezbollah in Lebanon • Abstain from provocation in the Gulf • Moderate publicdiscourseandfavor moderate Presidentialcandidate • Engage the enemy: • Encourage economic and security collaboration with Arabs • Offeradvantageousenergydealsto EU, China, India IMPACT ofattack 80/100 COST 20/100 • PRO • Minimizes economic sanctions to ensure political stability in Iran • Creates the basis for long-term Iranian hegemony in the Middle East  • CON • Very high risk that our real intentions will be detected • Negotiation over IR-2 enrichment at Natanz will slow production process

  11. 2 Distract and Deter RISK ofattack 30/100 • Distract most likely attacker (Zionists) • Arm, instigateHezbollah, Hamas • Provoke Zionist Aggression againstLebanon, Gaza • Demonstrate credible threat but don’t provoke U.S. • Conduct missile tests • Fake intelligence about possession of bomb • Allude to nuclear retaliation to Zionist attack • Keep Shi‘aMilitias in Iraqgenerallycalm but preparetoinstigateofchaos • Accelerate and spread out enrichment • Make life harder for inspectors, conduct calculated violations of IAEA rules • Push Natanzandsecretenrichmentatothersites IMPACT ofattack 40/100 COST 40/100 • PRO • Fastest way to the bomb • Uncertainty will split international community (especially China, Russia) • CON • Risk of attack if we are caught bluffing • Additional sanctions, but relatively easy to escape in the long run

  12. 3 Autarky and Micro-Enrichment 20/100 RISK ofattack • Undermine success of attack • Immediately diversify to large number of targets • Create capability to quickly reconstitute program • Move most sensitive material to densely populated areas • Distract the enemy • Trigger large conflict between Zionists, Hezbollah, Hamas • Create chaos in Iraq by leveraging Shi‘a militias to tie down U.S. • Cut all links to the outside • Exit Non-Proliferation Treaty • Send inspectors home • Prepare for Economic and Security autarky IMPACT ofattack 20/100 COST 90/100 • PRO • Does not count on deceiving the enemy • Very narrow window for enemy attack • CON • High economic cost, possibly also in the long run • Risk that difficulties of coordinating centrifuges may delay production

  13. Recommendation: “Distract and Deter“Fall back Option: „Autarky“ RISK ofattack IMPACT ofattack COST 60/100 80/100 20/100 1 “Charming Our Way to the Bomb“ 30/100 40/100 40/100 “Distract and Deter“ 2 20/100 20/100 90/100 3 “Autarky and Micro-Enrichment “ Option 2: “Distract and Deter“ balances risk of attack, impact of attack and economic costs most effectively

  14. Implementation requires 2-step strategy: moderation until US elections, escalation thereafter • Until 11 / 2012: Moderation, ambiguityanddiversification • Create ambiguity • Publiclydenyfirstusedoctrine • Conductmissiletests • Fakeintelligenceaboutpossessionof bomb • Continuecurrentgamewith IAEA until US electionsto moderate result • Calculatedviolationsof IAEA rules, obstructionofinspections • Install IR-2 atsecretenrichmentsites but waitwithoperation • Lull theenemy • Moderate Hezbollah, Hamas whilesupplyingwithfunds, arms • Cooperate in Iraqand hold back Shi‘amilitias • 12 / 2012 Chaos and Enrichment Push • InstigatemajorconflictbetweenZionistsandHezbollah / Hamas • Initiatesurge in Iraqiviolenceforinitialdistractionof Great Satan • CondemaggressionbyZionists, great Satan asexcuseforshort-term non-cooperationwith IAEA but continuecooperating after • Usedistractiontowithdraw material fromNatanz

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