1 / 26

‘ State Security’ and ‘Human Security’ in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies Mandy Turner Department of Peace Studies

‘ State Security’ and ‘Human Security’ in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies Mandy Turner Department of Peace Studies University of Bradford. Problematising ‘security’. Not a neutral concept: ‘security’ for whom?

katy
Télécharger la présentation

‘ State Security’ and ‘Human Security’ in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies Mandy Turner Department of Peace Studies

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. ‘State Security’ and ‘HumanSecurity’ in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies Mandy Turner Department of Peace Studies University of Bradford

  2. Problematising ‘security’ • Not a neutral concept: ‘security’ for whom? • Focus on struggles for statehood/recognition: Kosovo, Timor-Leste (East Timor), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Palestine. • Widening of concept of ‘security’ out from merely ‘state security’ to include ‘human security’.

  3. Problematising ‘security’ • State building process split into 3 phases: • Period of non-recognition/armed struggle • Process of recognition/peace process. • Initial period of recognition/peacebuilding Each phase faces different security challenges. We need to ask the same question in all 3 phases: security for whom?

  4. Period of non-recognition/armed struggle • Tension between right to self-determination enshrined in Article 1 of UN Charter & right to state sovereignty enshrined in Article 2 of UN Charter (prohibits challenges to the ‘territorial integrity’ or ‘domestic jurisdiction’ of sovereign states. • Struggle for recognition challenges state sovereignty of the occupier/central state.

  5. Period of non-recognition/armed struggle • ‘Security’ in this phase = security of the occupier/centralstate. • ‘Human security’ of unrecognised people threatened by occupier/central state, particularly in phase of struggle if O/CT uses military force and refuses to negotiate.

  6. Period of non-recognition/armed struggle • Security of unrecognised people in this period dependent upon a peace process and UN (or regional security organisation e.g. NATO) peacekeeping force. • Direct appeals to UN and other security organisations common method: • Arafat speech at UN 1974; • Kosovo Liberation Army/NATO.

  7. Period of non-recognition/armed struggle • Veto power of 5 Permanent Members of UN Security Council (US, UK, France, Russia & China). Security interests of Great Powers centre stage. • ‘Right’ to self-determination not a ‘right’ but dependent on other key factors: • Support of a powerful patron. • Does not challenge political/strategic interests of one of the P5. UN powerless if it does.

  8. Security in the period of recognition • Coherent and legitimate peace process with involvement of all parties: • Problem of ‘spoilers’ i.e. parties who seek to undermine it: • Actors ‘inside’ the peace process? • Actors ‘outside’ the peace process? • International actors (‘custodians of the peace’) need to ensure security of weaker party and balance asymmetry.

  9. Security in the period of recognition • Bosnia-Herzegovina • Dayton Peace Accords/UN SC Resolution 1035 (1995) • Withdrawal of Serbian forces ensured by UNPROFOR (replaced by NATO, then EU forces). • UNMIBH and Office of High Representative (international supervision).

  10. Security in the period of recognition • Kosovo • No UN SC mandate, NATO intervention • UN SC Resolution 1244 (1999) • Serbian forces withdrawal ensured by KFOR (NATO) • UNMIK (transitional administration).

  11. Security in the period of recognition • Timor-Leste • 1999 vote for independence • UN SC Resolution 1264 (1999) • INTERFET (Australian-led) • UNTAET (transitional administration)

  12. Security in the period of recognition • Palestine • Oslo Peace Accords (1993); Oslo II (1995) • Israeli withdrawal not overseen by a UN or regional security force • Creation of Palestinian Authority (interim self-rule). • Oslo about ensuring ‘security’ for Israel?

  13. Security in ‘post’-conflict period ‘Freedom from fear’ • Demilitarisation of society • Nascent state needs monopoly over legitimate use of force. • Pacify other sources of physical force, e.g. militias and freedom fighters. • DDR and security sector reform. • Development of ‘rule of law’

  14. Security in ‘post’-conflict period Freedom from want • Post-conflict reconstruction • Humanitarian assistance & IDP resettlement • Infrastructure repaired/built • Development and state-building • Stimulating the economy & creating jobs • Building state institutions, civil society and political participation.

  15. Comparison of case studies: Bosnia • State security: • borders & independence assured by internationals. • Bonn Powers: OHR. • Human security: • freedom from fear: Demilitarisation, SSR. ICTFY. EU ‘Stability Pact’. Problems: organised crime, Republika Srpska, reform fragmented. Ethnic nationalism strong. • Freedom from want: huge PCR programme; development problematic - high unemployment, low economic growth; state-building - still divided into 2: FBiH/ RS; still under international supervision.

  16. Comparison of case studies: Kosovo • State security: • borders & independence ensured by NATO. • Feb 2008 Declaration of independence. Recognised by 3 out of 5 P5; problem of Serbia. • Human security: • freedom from fear: establishing military, ICTFY, EU Rule of Law Mission, EU Stability Pact. Problems: organised crime, North Kosovo (Serb). Ethnic divisions widened. • freedom from want: one of poorest countries in Europe, 40-50% unemployment despite huge international aid. State-building: weak institutional capacity.

  17. Comparison of case studies: Timor-Leste • State security • Borders and independence: INTERFET now UNMIT. • Independence May 2002. Attempted assassination of Pres. Ramos Horta, Feb 2008. • Human Security • Freedom from fear: SSR & justice weak: April 2006 riots; tension between UN and TL police. • Freedom from want: Initial large sums of money but continuing prob of poverty & unemployment. State-building: corruption & poor financial transparency. Too rapid withdrawal of international assistance?

  18. Comparison of case studies: Palestine • State security • Borders and independence: left out of Oslo. Areas A, B and C. PA a quasi-state: no sovereignty. • Oslo forbids national army; IDF dominant. • Human security • Freedom from fear: SSR. Probs: militia rivalry, IDF. • Freedom from want: huge international aid flows, but poverty and unemployment: closure system. State-building: governance reforms after 2002. Problems: PA split; ban on Hamas.

  19. Timor-Leste: sound familiar? • Annexed by Indonesia in 1975 after Portuguese decolonisation. • Cold War dynamics - resolution impossible: US support for Indonesia. • 24 year armed struggle. 1 umbrella organisation: CNRT; dominated by one party: Fretilin. • End of Cold War: end of US support for Indonesia. • 1999 vote for independence. Violence from Indonesian troops and pro-Indonesia militias.

  20. Timor-Leste: sound familiar? • 1999. 70% of infrastructure destroyed by Indonesian forces and militias. 300,000 displaced. • Challenge = rebuild infrastructure, strengthen administration and create jobs. • Reform of justice sector and institution building key focus of international involvement. • Need to address the ‘youth crisis’. • Agriculture dominates economy, undeveloped private sector, govt spending main source of economic growth.

  21. The differences... • Palestine not post-conflict. Palestine economy under occupation: fragmentation of territory. Demise of 2-state solution? Aid money flowing into bottomless pit. • Le More ‘killing with kindness’. “The US decides, the World Bank leads, the EU pays, the UN feeds.” • Difference: Timor-Leste: oil and gas wealth. How to utilise. Security issues are internal – no powerful domineering neighbour. Israel: the ‘elephant in the corner’.

  22. Israel’s ‘security’ = Palestine’s insecurity • Strong ‘security’ discourse for actions: • military spending is the second highest in the world at US$1737 per capita in 2008. • ‘revolving door’ between IDF and politics. • Human security: cost of occupation financial/social? • State security: protection of borders, territory and Jewish character of state.

  23. Israel’s ‘security’ = Palestine’s insecurity • Actions in West Bank – a ‘resource conflict’ - land and water grab. • Settlements = illegal extra-territorial communities. How to remove?? • De facto implementation of Allon Plan? • Gaza: destroy Hamas, divide Palestinian national movement, make Gaza Egyptian problem. • Security of ‘Eretz Israel’.

  24. Palestine’s insecurity = Israel’s ‘security’ • Preserving Jewish character of state? • Demographic challenges: 20% of Israeli population = Palestinians. Lieberman: expulsion. • Right of return for Jews but not Palestinian refugees. • Demise of 2-state solution? Belligerent occupation over West Bank and Gaza: Palestinians and Israeli populations @ equal.

  25. Common problems in ‘post’-conflict societies • Destroyed infrastructure. Return of displaced peoples. • Weak & ‘war’ economies. Problem of (re)building private sector. Unemployment. • State-building, problems of capacity, corruption, democratisation. • Militias: demobilise?; SSR. Rule of law

  26. A ‘checklist’ for security and stability • Security (freedom from fear) • Wealth and welfare (freedom from want) • Representation + legitimacy (‘social contract’, democracy) • Sovereignty. Right to self-determination/ self-rule.

More Related