Irregular warfare What are the trends ? what is the threat ? Is this war ?

1. Irregular warfare What are the trends ? what is the threat ? Is this war ?

2. Fourth Generation Warfare RPG Islamic Extremists Economic Espionage International Crime Gangs IRAN Ethnic Conflict Improvised Explosives Rogue Regimes Biological Warfare Shoulder Launched Missiles Chemical Weapons Terrorism Crimnal Enterprises NORTH KOREA Dirty Bombs Drug War Computer Hackers

3. Shining Path Al-Qaida 18th Street Gang PETA Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) of Turkey Abu Sayyaf Group PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD (PIJ) Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria Animal Liberation Front Piracy Earth Liberation Front Palestinian Islamic Jihad LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL ELAM Hizbullah of Lebanon Islam Resistance Movement (Hamas) Hells Angeles

4. Irregular warfare : A violent struggle among state and non state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetrical approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary´s power, influence, and will. Also called IW . (JP I-02). War & Warfare Irregular Regular/ Conventional

5. G G P P M M Clausewitz “on War” in irregular conflicts ? Trinity

6. The strategic Center of Gravity is the PEOPLE Figure from NATO AJP 3.4.4.

7. NATO definition IW activities War & Warfare • Irregular activities ; • Consists of three groups of activities; • Insurgency, • 2) Terrorism, • 3) Other irregular activities such as • a) Criminality, • b) Disorder, • c) Piracy • AJP 3.4.4. (p 7) 2008 ? Irregular Regular/ Conventional ?

8. Unconventional warfare — “A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery”. Also calledUW. (JP 1-02). “Operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations”. FM 3-05.201 (S/NF) Special Forces Unconventional Warfare (U) 28 sept 2007 and in FM 3-05.130 30 Sept 2008 War & Warfare Irregular Regular/ Conventional UW

9. Joint operating concept relationships (US) Figure 1-3. Joint operating concept relationships Chapter 1 p.7 U.S. A FM 3-05.130 Unconventional Warfare 30 sept 2008 This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library at (www.train.army.mil).

10. The constituent activities of IW • 􀁺 Insurgency. • 􀁺 COIN. • 􀁺 UW. • 􀁺 Terrorism. • 􀁺 CT. • 􀁺 FID. • 􀁺 Stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. • 􀁺 Strategic communication (SC). • 􀁺 PSYOP. • 􀁺 Civil-military operations (CMO). • 􀁺 Information operations (IO). • 􀁺 Intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) activities. • 􀁺 Transnational criminal activities, including narco-trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial transactions that support or sustain IW. • 􀁺 Law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries.

12. Other conceptions Three Block War 4th Generation Warfare Low Intensity Conflict Unrestricted Warfare

13. Other conceptions Three Block War A peculiar situation in IW 4th Generation Warfare Very much the same as IW Low Intensity Conflict Can also be a stalemate in a regular conflict (Korea?) Unrestricted Warfare Very developed unconventional warfare wich uses all availiable means. Can be interstate.

14. Other problems in IW Combatants ?

15. And another problem Western art of war is since the Greeks and Romans fixed on a decisive military victory Who won the battle ? Who is the winner ? Who admits he lossed ? Triumph !

16. War & Warfare ? Irregular Regular/ Conventional ? Insurgency ; “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict”. (JP I-02) FM 3-24 07. “The actions of a minority group within a state who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change”. (UK COIN Doctrine 07.) “An organized ideologically motivated group or movement that seeks political change in a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population of a region through violence, subversion and propaganda”. (AJP 3.4.4 2008)

17. Insurgency Violent (armed) insurgeny Non violent insurgency Gandhi´s insurgency with non voilence

18. Insurgency OPS in Northern Afghanistan ANA ISAF People Insurgents NGO GOA UN ANP OEF

19. The link between Terrorism and Insurgency ”Just as Guerilla warfare transforms to regular warfare……. …..does terrorism transform into insurgency” (The battle of Algers) If it has that purpose

20. Insurgencies – some exampels Successfull Not successfull Indien Algeriet (1960) Nicaragua Haiti Filipinerna Algeriet (1953-58) Malaysia Nordirland

21. Insurgency and Terrorism Armed insurgency = armed poltical campain Terrorism = armed political communication

22. Terrorism Politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience (US State Dept.)

23. Terrorism Politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience (US State Dept.) The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives. (Nato)

24. Domestic Versus Transnational • Domestic terrorismis homegrown and home directed, with consequences for just the venue country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies. The perpetrators, victims, and audience are all from the host country. For example: IRA, ETA, Shining Path

25. Domestic Versus Transnational • Domestic terrorismis homegrown and home directed, with consequences for just the venue country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies. The perpetrators, victims, and audience are all from the host country. • When a terrorist act has ramifications that transcend a national boundary, it is an instance of transnational terrorism. Examples include 9/11, 3/11, and kidnapping of foreign workers in Iraq. • Examples: AlQaida, RAF, Lashkar-e-Taiba

26. Primitive war Oriental warfare WAR Western ways of war Irregular warfare Regular warfare Terrorism Partisan war Guerilla war Insurgency Stateterrorism

27. Counterinsurgency - COIN

28. War & Warfare ? Irregular Regular/ Conventional ? COIN ? “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency”. (JP I-02) FM 3-24 and in UK COIN doctrine 07 AJP 3.4.4 08 ; “ The set of political, economical, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities required to defeat insurgency”. AJP 3.4.4 uses this definition that is not in AAP 6. AAP 6. “ Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions taken to defeat insurgency”.

29. Stage Proto Large-scale Full-blown with External Support Small-scale Security Force Roles Police Police backed by Local Military Local & Foreign Militaries Local Military ~ 50% Probability of COIN Success > 90% Timefactor in COIN Level of Violence Average duration 12 yrs Time

30. If an insurgency is supported by another state it has a bigger chance in succeeding

31. COIN in Afghanistan ISAF together with coalition forces is conducting a COIN operation in Afghanistan and SWEDEN participate in the Campaign!

32. To succeed in Irregular Warfare

33. It´s hard to coordinate many countries different agencies from outside and some NGO´s refuse DIME+S Land X Land Y Land Z NGO´s Failing state with insurgency

34. Coordination is best through a HN government !It also shows the people it can govern ! DIME+S Land X HN Gov Second effect: Our gov. is able !! Land Y Unified effect Land Z NGO´s Failing state with insurgency

35. Attitude Influence Low High

36. Attitude Co-operate Influence Low High

37. Attitude Inform Co-operate Influence Low High

38. Attitude Inform Co-operate Monitor Influence Low High

39. Attitude Inform Co-operate Monitor Influence Influence Low High

40. Attitude Inform Co-operate (support) (inhance) Monitor Influence (contain) (defeat) Influence Low High

41. Attributes of COIN • Political primacy; a clear political objective • The struggle against insurgency is for the population, • not against the population • Relevance of legitimacy • Intelligence and information are crucial for success • Neutralising insurgency and isolating it from any • support • Long-term planning and preparing for the campaign • Establishing a secured environment and acting within • the law is essential • Transfer leading role to the local forces • Adapting the plan to current conditions. Learn and adapt AJP 3.3.4 p 47

42. Discussion Is it doctrine to make a definition of irregular warfare ? If so – why is it important ? Does Georgia have definitions on irregular warfare ? How are they ?