Emergency Preparedness and Response against Nuclear Disaster in Japan

1. Lec. 4 (Seminar on “Sharing Experience on Nuclear Power for Development” in Vietnam) Emergency Preparedness and Response against Nuclear Disaster in Japan January22, 2013 Kenichi Wada The Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC)

2. Contents 1. Emergency Preparedness/Response System against the Nuclear Disaster in Japan 2. JAPC Action Plan for Preparedness/Response against the Nuclear Disaster 3. Accident Management (AM) Measures at JAPC 4. Enhancing Response Measures against the Severe Accident at JAPC (based on Lesson Learned from Fukushima Dai-ichi Severe Accident )

3. １． Emergency Preparedness/Response System against the Nuclear Disaster in Japan

4. Basic Law concerning Countermeasures against Disasters ・ The Basic Law concerning countermeasures against disasters was enacted in 1961, following an experience of massive damages caused by typhoons, to develop a comprehensive and schematic system for disaster prevention. ・The disaster countermeasure system has since been reinforced and improved based on lessons learned from the Great Hanshin/Awaji Earthquake and other major disasters.

5. Preparedness/Response against Nuclear Disaster Basic Law concerning countermeasures against disasters (enacted in 1961) ○ Disasters in general ◆ Occurrence of a criticality accident at a uranium reconversion plant operated by JCO Co., Ltd. (September 30, 1999) The Special Law on nuclear disaster countermeasures was enacted as a special law under the Basic Law concerning countermeasures against disasters to enable appropriate response by considering the factors peculiar to nuclear accidents (December 17, 1999) Lesson Learned

6. Main Contents of the Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures ① Speeding up of initial action ② Strengthening of cooperation between national and local governments ③ Strengthening of the national government’s emergency preparedness/response system ④ Clarification of the role of the utility

7. ① Speeding up of Initial Action ・The utility is required to report on any abnormal event. ・ (When the event progresses further), the competent minister mobilizes initial action and establishes the Nuclear disaster countermeasures headquarters headed by the Prime Minister. (Local governments also establish respective countermeasures headquarters) ・The national government instructs local governments on measures necessary for evacuation and other responses.

8. ② Strengthening of Cooperation between National and Local Governments ・The national government establishes the Local HQ for nuclear disaster countermeasures (off-site center) in the locality. ・The Joint Council on countermeasures against nuclear accidents is set up inside the off-site center to strengthen cooperation between national and local governments. ・Joint training is conducted with the participation of the national and local governments as well as utilities.

9. ③ Strengthening of the National Government’s Emergency Preparedness/Response System ・Government-appointed nuclear accident prevention officials are stationed full-time at nuclear facility locations. ・Government-appointed chief of headquarters instructs related administrative institutions and local governments on necessary matters, and issues requests on the dispatching of Self-Defense Forces. ・Technical advice is obtained from the Nuclear Regulatory Authority. ・A system of rapid on-site mobilization is established.

10. ④ Clarification of the Role of the Utility ・The utility is required to install radiation measuring equipment inside the site and disclose records. ・Explicitly defines the reporting obligations. ・The nuclear disaster preparedness/response organization is set up in each site to implement emergency action during the disaster. ・The nuclear disaster preparedness/response manager is assigned to each site. ・The utility is required to establish the action plan in each site for preparedness/response against the nuclear disaster.

11. Enhancing Emergency Preparedness/Response System (based on Experiences & Lesson Learned gained from Fukushima Dai-ichi Severe Accident) < in progress > ・ Clearly identification of widespread evacuation areas and radiation protection guidelines in the nuclear emergency ・ Reinforcing the environment monitoring in the nuclear emergency ・ Adequate identification and forecasting the effect of released radioactive materials ・ Establishing a clear division of labor between relevant central and local organizations ・ Enhancing communication relevant to the accident ・ Enhancing training responding to severe accidentsetc.

12. 2. JAPC Action Plan for Preparedness/Response against the Nuclear Disaster

13. Contents of JAPC Action Plan ① Nuclear accident preparedness/response system ② Establishing nuclear accident preparedness/response organization ③ Preparation of a list of parties to be alerted ④ Implementation of education and training for nuclear disaster preparedness/response ⑤ Implementation of emergency action ⑥ Countermeasures after a nuclear disaster ⑦ Cooperation with other utilities

14. Nuclear Disaster Preparedness/Response Organization at JAPC Emergency Countermeasure Center ＊＊ ＊＊ ＊＊ ＊＊ ＊＊ ＊＊ Technical Support Center （TSC） Staff at NPS

15. Main Duties of Each Team (1/5) ● Headquarters: ・Oversee general management of measures and activities against the disaster ・Grasp the condition of accident ・Decide on working policy and issue orders to Working Teams ・Communicate with and notify outside parties ・Collaborate with parties in and out of JAPC ・Decide on the lifting of the state of emergency

16. Main Duties of Each Team (2/5) ● Information Team: ・Gather information on the disaster ・Coordinate communication with parties inside and outside JAPC ・Compile and prepares records ● General affairs Team: ・Acquire personnel, material and equipment and other items ・(Cooperate with evacuation activities, etc.) ・(Conduct firefighting activities)

17. Main Duties of Each Team (3/5) ● Public relations Team: ・Prepare PR-related materials ・Communicate and coordinate with PR-related institutions ・Respond to media organizations ● Engineering Team: ・Grasp the condition of accident and conduct evaluation ・Consider measures to prevent the expansion of the accident

18. Main Duties of Each Team (4/5) ● Radiation control Team: ・Measure radiation and radioactivity ・Estimate the range of the radiation impact and control exposure to radiation ・Eliminate radioactive material ・Conduct action to prevent secondary disaster ● Health and safety Team: ・Conduct action on medical (relief)-related services ・Conduct action to prevent secondary disaster

19. Main Duties of Each Team (5/5) ● Maintenance Team: ・Conduct emergency measures required to prevent the expansion of the disaster ● Operation Team: ・Conduct emergency operational measures required to prevent the expansion of the disaster ・Maintain the security of nuclear reactor and ancillary facilities ・Conduct firefighting activities

20. 3. Accident Management (AM) Measures at JAPC

21. Background of AM Implementation ●1979.3 TMI-2 Accident →Japanese utilities developed the Existing Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP). ●1992.5 The Statement of the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) →NSC strongly encouraged the AM implementation ●1992.7 The Request of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) →MITI requested all the licensees to perform PSA on internal events and improve the AM measures.

22. AM measures in Tokai-2 (BWR) Function AM measures Shutdown (1)Alternative reactivity control (ARI,RPT) Water injection into (2)Alternative water injection methods Reactor and (3)Automatic reactor depressurization Containment Vessel (4)Heat removal methods from containment Heat removal from vessel containment vessel Drywell Cooler, Recovery of failed ( components of RHR, Hard vent) (5)Power supply methods Supply of electric (High or low voltage power supply from power HPCS-DG, Recovery of failed components of emergency DG)

23. Condensate Makeup Water System Condensate Water Storage Tank Pressure Vessel Fire Fighting System Filtered Water Storage Tank Drywell Pedestal Area RHR System Suppression Pool AM measures in Tokai-2 (BWR) ： Example (2)Alternative Water Injection Methods

24. AM measures in Tokai-2 (BWR) ： Example (4) Heat Removal Methods from Containment Vessel－Hard Ventｰ

25. AM measures in Tsuruga-2 (PWR) Function AM measures Shutdown (1)Diversification of core cooling by secondary system (2)Use of the turbine bypass system (3)Alternative recirculation Core cooling (4)Cool down and recirculation (5)Containment cooling by natural convection Confinement of (6)Containment cooling by natural convection radioactive materials (7)Water injection into CV (8)Forced depressurization of the RCS Support of (9)Power supply from adjacent unit Safety function

26. AM measures in Tsuruga-2 (PWR) ： Example Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Containment Spray Pump Containment Vessel Component Cooling Water Steam Generator M M Pressurizer Reactor Vessel RHR Heat Exchanger Component Cooling Water RHR Pump Recirculation Sump (3)Alternative Recirculation

27. Filtered Water Storage Tank Fire Fighting System Fire Fighting Pump Containment Vessel Steam Generator Pressurizer Containment Spray Containment Heat Exchanger Spray Pump Reactor Vessel Component Cooling Water Recirculation Sump AM measures in Tsuruga-2 (PWR) ： Example (7)Water Injection into CV

28. Preparation of Emergency Procedures • AM measures to prevent SA were taken in the existing procedures. • AM measures to mitigate SA were taken in the procedure and guideline established newly. • This mitigative procedure introduced the flow chart form as existing procedures. • The mitigative guideline introduced the form to select proper procedure out of various alternatives.

29. Organization of AM Activity Organization of Accident Management Activity Control Room Operation Team (operators) Supports activity (advice, instructions etc) TSC Room Technical Support Center (TSC) Information Team Head Office Engineering Team The Chief of TSC ( Superintendent) Members of Head Office Radiation control Team Licensed Engineer of Reactor Maintenance Team

30. Decision Making ●Before Core Damage → Shift Manager ●After Core Damage → Plant Manager In case of mitigative AM, the chief of TSC gives advice, instructions, or recognition of operator’s judgement.

31. Education • Phenomena and plant behavior in the Severe Accident (SA) • AM measures • The outline and the direction about Accident Management Guideline (AMG) • Significant sequences of SA events • Practice coping with supposed representative SA events

32. Training with Simulator • Compact simulator in our company → This simulator has the functions to simulate the events both before and after the SA. • Full scope simulator in the training centers → This simulator can simulate some AM measures to operate for the SA . Full scope simulator

33. Integrated Emergency Countermeasure Training Deploying communication devices inside the NPS - Satellite phones - Transceivers -Dry battery driven phones etc.

34. 4. Enhancing Response Measures against the Severe Accident at JAPC (based on Lesson Learned from Fukushima Dai-ichi Severe Accident )

35. Enhancing Measures to the Prevent Hydrogen Explosions (1) ＜Tokai-2 （BWR）＞ ・ Install of the vent valves at the top of the Reactor Building ・ Securing measures to open the blowout panels in the Reactor Building ・ Install of hydrogen detectors in the Reactor Building (under planning) Hydrogen detector (under planning) Reactor Building

36. 電源車 Enhancing Measures to the Prevent Hydrogen Explosions (2) ＜Tsuruga-2（PWR）＞ ・ Securing the electric power supply for the Annulus Exhaust Facility using the alternative electric power supply vehicles in case of the Station Blackout ・ Install of the passive autocatalytic recombiners in the Containment Vessel (under planning) Passive autocatalytic recombiner (under planning) Stack Containment Vessel Annulus air ventilation fan Filter Damper Steam Generator Temporary N2 cylinder (for driving damper ) Emergency Power Center bus Temporary connecting cable Reactor Vessel Alternative electric power supply vehicle Annulus

37. 電源車 Enhancing the Environment for the Accident Response ・ Securing the electric power supply for the emergency closed loop air ventilation system in the Control Room using the alternative electric power supply vehicles in case of the Station Blackout (maintaining the radiation shielding function in the Control Room) etc. Circulation fan Inside Building Outside Building Control Room Alternative electric power supply vehicle Temporary N2 cylinder (for driving damper ) Damper Damper Ventilation units Temporary connecting cable Air conditioning fan Emergency circulation fan Emergency Power Center bus Filter units

38. Enhancing the Radiation Control during the Accident ・Securing tungsten vests, and protective masks, etc. for carrying out work under high radiation dose conditions ・Establishment of the support system for radiation control staff by non radiation control staff in emergency ・Establishment of mutual aid system that enable utilities to share radiation protection supplies among one another when accident response work is being carried out company A company B Sharing of the Dosimeters The tungsten vest

39. Deploying sufficient Response Equipments and Supplies in Emergency ・Alternative electric power supply vehicles in case of the Station Blackout 　・Large capacity pumps for the alternative water injection into the Reactor Core and the Spent Fuel Pool, etc. ・Heavy machineries for the removal of debris, etc. to carry out recovery work promptly etc. Operating the large capacity pumps Removing debris by the heavy machinery (the wheel loader) ←Operating the alternative electric power supply vehicle

40. Never “Fukushima Dai-ichi Severe Accident” Again ! Thank you very much for your attention