Is Experiencing Just Representing?

1. Is Experiencing Just Representing? Ned Block, 1998

2. Representationism & Phenomenalism • Representationism • Position adopted by, e.g., Tye, Lucan • Conscious experience consists of representational content • Phenomenalism • Position adopted by, e.g., Block • Experience consists of phenomenal character • Directly opposing viewpoints

3. Challenges to Represenatationism • Tye wrote Ten Problems of Consciousness as a defense of representationism • Addressed several thought experiments that challenge representationism

4. Experiment 1: Swampman • By cosmic accident, a fully functioning human comes into existence in a swamp somewhere. • He cannot have representational contentbecause he lacks both anevolutionary & personalhistory. • But he still has phenomenalexperiences – how?

5. Swampman: Tye’s Response • So long as Swampman iswell-suited to his environment,the environment can providehim with representational content by which he candevelop phenomenalcharacter. • (What if he isn’t well-suited?)

6. Experiment 2: Inverted Earth • Imagine a Twin Earth, like Putnam’s, where both all colours and all colour words are inverted. Blue “Blue” Green “Green”

7. Experiment 2, Cont’d • Why is this a problem for representation? • Phenomenal character stays the same, but... • The representational content of your experience must change, because the world has • But the phenomenal character must be explainedby representational content for representationism to be true. A gap is impossible.

8. Experiment 2: Tye’s Response • Split representations into ‘conceptual’ and ‘non-conceptual’ • Conceptual: “I know what blue looks like.” • Non-conceptual: “My neurons fire in pattern X when wavelengths ~450 nm hit my retina.” • Conceptual representations change – defined by culture, personal experience, language, etc. • Non-conceptual representations are external to our minds – defined by our evolutionary history

9. Block’s Retort: Swampman In Space • What if we send Swampman (or Swampman’s grandson) to Inverted Earth? • Swampman derives his representational content from being well-suited to his environment • But he is equally well-suited on both planets • Furthermore, he has no evolutionary history

10. Block’s Retort, cont’d • Any choice Swampman makes to define his phenomenal content must be arbitrary • But Swampman will logically select the definitions that match the phenomenal character of the planet he is on • We must conclude that phenomenal character changes independently of representational determiners of content

11. Block’s Conclusion “We can all agree that there are some possible changes in intentional content due solely to changes in its external determiners. But it is another matter to allow that there can be changes in phenomenal character that are due solely to changes in external determiners of content. To claim this is to cut phenomenal character loose from its conceptual moorings...” (pp. 669)

12. Questions?

13. Discussion • Block draws a final conclusion: • “...Lycan and Tye...are committed not only to an ad hoc externalist theory of memory, but also to an ad hoc restriction on noticing phenomenal change.” • Is Block on firm theoretical grounds in this criticism?

14. Discussion • Block frequently discusses the practicality of thought experiments like Swampman or Inverted Earth. • Do you believe these thought experiments have rational worth?