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Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965

Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965. LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007. Outline. Issue / Argument Chapters Rough outline of time periods Political Factors Social Factors Economic Factors Results Conclusion. Issue.

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Nuclear Japan 1945 - 1965

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  1. Nuclear Japan1945 - 1965 LT David A. Backer NS 3041 24 August 2007

  2. Outline • Issue / Argument • Chapters • Rough outline of time periods • Political Factors • Social Factors • Economic Factors • Results • Conclusion

  3. Issue • There have been four instances in Japan’s history where it considered developing nuclear weapons. These four instances were: • 1) Mid 1960’s: Following China’s nuclear test • 2) Mid 1970’s: Ratification of NPT • 3) Mid 1990’s: Signing indefinite extension of NPT • 4) Today

  4. Argument • My thesis argues that Japan will continue to abstain from developing a nuclear weapons program because the incentives to remain a non-nuclear state outweigh the incentives to do otherwise. • To support this argument, my thesis will look at the three previous cases and develop trends based on national, regional, and global factors that fueled the policy debates that had prevented Japan from developing nuclear weapons in the past.

  5. Chapters • Introduction • Chapter Two – Development of Capabilities • Chapter Three – 1945-1965 • China Nuclear Test • Chapter Four – 1968 – 1976 • Signing and Ratification of NPT • Chapter Five – 1991 – 1995 • Indefinite Extension of NPT • Chapter Six – Current Debates • Increasing China/Regional Instability/Faith in security • Conclusion

  6. Post WW II • What happened to Japan in World War II?

  7. Japan - 1965 • How did Japan recover?

  8. How did they recover? • Political • Alliances • Treaties • Documents • Social • Physical and psychological effects of the bombs were still fresh in the Japanese psyche • Strong influence over politicians • Re-focused on a new goal • Economics • Results

  9. Political • Alliances • SCAP • U.S. – Japan security alliance • Treaties • 1951 U.S-Japan Security Treaty • 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security • Documents • Constitution (Article 9) • Atomic Energy Basic Law

  10. Political • Alliances • Supreme Commander Allied Forces • Occupied Japan after war • Intentions were to stand up political structures focused on economic development • Created a new constitution • Japan was forced to renounce its right as a sovereign state • U.S. – Japan alliance

  11. Political • Treaties • 1951 U.S. Security Treaty • Removed SCAP organization • Terminated the “state of war” • Withdrawal of occupational troops w/in 90 days • Restoration of Japan’s sovereignty • Right to self-defense • Access to international markets • 1960 Treaty for Mutual Cooperation • Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

  12. Political • Documents / Laws • Constitution Art. 9 • “The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” Furthermore, “…land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” • Atomic Energy Basic Law • Created in 1955 and stated, “The research, development, and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes.”

  13. Social • Physical and psychological effects of the bombs were still fresh in the Japanese psyche • Strong influence over politicians

  14. Social • Physical and psychological effects of the bombs were still fresh in the Japanese psyche • Physical Destruction • Hugh M. Gloster’s account of Hiroshima in 1953 • Psychological Destruction • Perceived “Japanese faces as Oriental masks which conceal all emotion” and concealing these emotions was something the Japanese was good at.

  15. Social • Perceptions • Public opinion polls conducted by major papers in 1952 • 38% : Favored creation of a SDF • Of that 38%, 60% consisted of post-war youth • Directly attacked • 41% : Would fight back • 11% : Would not fight back • 5% : Would flee • Should nuclear weapons be used in Korean War • 85% : Wanted to end the war early • 73% : Opposed nuclear weapons • 55% : Consider them inhuman • 12% : Did not want a repeat of Hiro/Naga • 9% : Avoid human extermination • 5% : Feared they were a catalyst for World War III • 3% : Feared a retaliatory attack

  16. Social • Strong influence over politicians • The belief was that if Japan possessed nuclear weapons and if it were involved in another war, nuclear weapons would undoubtedly be used. • If Prime Ministers failed to support initiatives that promoted economic development, they were promptly replaced. • PM Kishi (1960 Treaty for Mutual Cooperation and Security) • PM Hayato (Promoted Economic development)

  17. Economic • Results • Compare Pre-War II to Post WWII (1945) to end of studied Period (1965) • Same institutions, theories, and mechanisms in 1965 as Pre-War II?

  18. Comparison of GDP per capita between East-Asian Nations and the U.S. in 1935: Economic: Pre-WWII • Despite the Great Depression, the Japanese economy recovered during the 1930’s • Rearmament • Military controlled drastically focused spending • 31% in 1932-1934 • 47% in 1936-1937 • 10 carriers, 3000 aircraft, 3500 pilots • Technologically advanced weapons • By start of War, had 1,000,000 men and 2,000,000 reservists • Exploitation of captive East Asian Markets

  19. Economic: World War II • Japan continued to concentrate its economy of supplying its war machine.

  20. Economic: World War II • What Japan was able to produce from 1939-1945 as compared to other countries.

  21. Economic: Post World War II (1945) • SCAP replaced the military run government with a democratic government • Disestablished the “thought police” • Break up of landlord holdings • Given to peasant proprietors • Productive capacity channeled into programs that provide peasants with life necessities • Worked w/ Japan to recover from • Near starvation • Soaring inflation • Innumerable strikes • Rampant criminality

  22. Economic: Post World War II (1955) • Post • Occupation • Creation of U.S. alliance • Korean War • Initiated programs that centered on: • High rates of personal savings • Private-sector facilities investment • Strong work ethic • Supply of cheap oil • Innovative technology • Effective intervention in private-sector • Progressive income tax schedules • Social Security Programs

  23. Economic: Up to 1965 • By 1955, production rated matched pre-War levels • 1955-1965 • GDP: +9% / year • Manufacturing/Mining: +13%/ year • Construction: +11%/year • Infrastructure: +14%/year • Sectors employed by: • 41% labor force • 26% remain in agriculture

  24. Conclusion • The political and social focus on economic development was the genesis that prevented Japan from developing nuclear weapons during the period between 1945 – 1965.

  25. Conclusion • Economic development • Politically • Alliances – initial framework and security • Treaties and laws – forced Japan to concentrate on non-military development • Socially • Preserving status within international markets • Society focused on a new goal • Nothing new, just given the mechanisms “If we establish any goal we will proceed to attain it without considering any other factors. For if we are set in motion toward any direction, we have just too much energy and no mechanism to check its direction…” Professor Chie Nakane, University of Tokyo

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