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Device Security in Cognitive Radio

Device Security in Cognitive Radio. Authors:. Date: 2009-01-19. Abstract.

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Device Security in Cognitive Radio

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  1. Device Security in Cognitive Radio Authors: Date: 2009-01-19 Alex Reznik, InterDigital

  2. Abstract • Device security has been identified as a critical area for cognitive radio in general and in particular white space operation. However, it is not clear whether and how device security impacts MAC and PHY. Therefore, it is not clear whether device security is in scope for 802. • We present some concepts which may shed further light on this topic. In particular we explore whether the potential of an “SDR” implementation may necessitate some device security specifications in the MAC and PHY Alex Reznik, InterDigital

  3. Device Security in Cognitive Radio • Compliance attestation should be a key component for cognitive radios • Provides the most effective mechanism for ensuring that a radio is following the required specifications • May be required to demonstrate regulatory compliance • In particular, MAC and PHY (and perhaps even the RF) must be attested to • However, this in itself does not necessitate device radio specification in the MAC and PHY • Any MAC/PHY (and RF) components that need attestation may be treated as “just some code” • The integrity of the code may be verified by some form of trusted entity in the device • Attestation of the integrity of this code may be provided over the air interface, but can be done using essentially existing means and protocols above the MAC (e.g. over the IP-based connection) T C M Certify Compliance Network and above Check MAC Check PHY Check RF Alex Reznik, InterDigital

  4. The Problem of Configurable Radio • The trend, especially in the area of “cognitive radios” is towards implementations which are highly configurable. Some potential examples are • Incumbent “definitions” • Transmission back-off parameters • Sensor sensitivity thresholds • Code attestation is not sufficient to ensure compliance • Compliance must be attested over all possible configurations • Each configuration is defined by one particular setting of parameters • The space of configurations is too large to accomplish this task • A possible solution is the inclusion of a “compliance monitor” in the PHY • Monitors transmissions and makes sure that these comply with required rules • Has the ability to flag and/or gate non-compliant operation • Compliance achieved via attestation of the monitor • The rest of the code base does not require attestation for compliance purpose (may require attestation for other purposes) • Such a monitor is not currently specified by any WGs. T CM Certify Compliance Network and above MAC M O N I T O R PHY RF Alex Reznik, InterDigital

  5. Conclusions • The cognitive radio concept and evolution of radio implementations towards configurability present unique challenges in device security • The proper approach must be carefully considered and the need to augment the lower layers with device security capabilities should not be ignored • The SG should discuss what if any device security related recommendations it should make Alex Reznik, InterDigital

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