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Identity Politics in Zanzibar and Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania

”. Identity Politics in Zanzibar and Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania. Dr. Bernadeta Killian Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow June 28, 2007.

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Identity Politics in Zanzibar and Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania

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  1. Identity Politics in Zanzibar and Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania Dr. Bernadeta Killian Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow June 28, 2007 Please note that the views expressed in this presentation represent the opinions and analysis of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Endowment of Democracy.

  2. United Republic of Tanzania • One unitary republic, two governments • Composed of two formerly sovereign states: Tanganyika and Zanzibar • 1961: Tanganyika gains independence from the British • 1963: Zanzibar gains independence • 1964: Revolution in Zanzibar • April 26, 1964: Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar • Zanzibar enjoys semi-autonomous status, exercises its sovereignty over all domestic and non-union matters • Zanzibar non-union matters: setting up national and budgetary policies on such sectors as agriculture, tourism, health, education, water, communication, industry, etc. • Union Matters: Foreign affairs, defense and security, police, emergency powers, citizenship, external borrowing and trade, mineral oil resources, higher education, court of appeal, registration of political parties, etc.

  3. Basic Data • Tanzania:945,087sq. km • Tanzania: per-capita income: US$340 (2006) • Zanzibar: per-capita US$327 (2005) • Tanzania (total pop.): 34,443,603 • Zanzibar: 981,754 people • Unguja Island (60%) & Pemba Island (40%)

  4. I. Introduction Tanzania: Unity in Diversity • Tanzania is renowned for its long-established civic peace & unity among its diverse ethnic, religion & racial groups • It has been a peace-broker & model of national cohesion in E. Africa • The use of Swahili language has been a binding thread • In the case of Zanzibar, a common religion (Islam) and a high rate of intermarriage have unified the state’s diverse ethno-racial groups

  5. Why is Zanzibar Different? • Struggle for the control of the state has been intense, deadly & zero-sum • Unlike in mainland Tanzania, the struggle for political power in Zanzibar has largely been shaped by the politics of identity on the basis of race. • Racial labels of ‘Africans’ vs. ‘Arabs’ are widely used in the context of political contestation for power. • This presentation seeks to understand why. Why do political elites in Zanzibar politicize racial identities, particularly at election time?

  6. Politicized Racial Identity Explained Control of the State Identity of the State (Arab vs. African) Sovereignty of the State (Zanzibar vs. Union)

  7. II: Historical ContextThe Shaping of Political Identities Over the centuries, Zanzibar attracted several immigrant groups, including: • Mainland Africans (3rd-4th century) • Persians (10th century) • Arabs (11th century) • Europeans (16th century) • Comorians (18th Century) • Indians (19th century) • Intermarriage between Persians & Africans led to the emergence of Shirazi Africans

  8. The Shaping of Political Identities Shirazi Africans • Shirazi Africans = the Hadimu, Tumbatu and Pemba Shirazi • Mainland Africans = Africans of recent arrival from the African hinterland (slaves, freed slaves and their descendants, and migrant laborers) (latecomers) • 1948 census: the Shirazi (55.8%), Mainland African (19.8%), Arabs(16.9%), Indians(6.2%), Comorians (1.1%),Europeans (0.1%),Other (0.1%) Africans Mainland Africans

  9. Colonial Economy and theShaping of Political Identities British Arabs Indians Africans

  10. Shaping of Political Identities (cont’d) • Politics deeply divided along ethno-racial lines • African Association, Shirazi Association, Arab Association, Indian Association • Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP): Arab-led • Formed in 1955 • Support base: Arabs, Pemba & Tumbatu Shirazi • Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP): • Formed 1957 • Support base: Mainland Africans & Unguja Shirazi (Hadimu) • Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party (ZPPP): • Formed in 1959 • Support base: Pemba Shirazi

  11. State Succession & State Identity in Zanzibar ZNP/ZPPP government Dec 10, 1963–Jan 12, 1964 (33 days) Shirazi chieftainships until 16th century Arab Rule 1744-1963 (219 years) Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar Jan 12, 1964–April 26, 1964 (3 ½ months) British Rule 1890-1963 (73 years) E. African Federation? As the state has changed hands, so too has the identity of the state changed.

  12. III: Democratization and& Political Identities • Third wave of democratization brings to the fore suppressed competing diversities • Resurgence of identity politics: Recurrent feature of new democracies in Latin America, Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and former USSR • Group/ethnic identities: determining criterion for inclusion or exclusion in the polity in deeply divided societies. • ‘Who belongs here?’ has become a buzz word in democratic competition in what Horowitz calls ‘severely divided societies’ (Horowitz, 1985)

  13. Democratization & Political Identities • As opposed to cultural and market-based identities, political identities are those that are legally enforced and institutionally reproduced in the process of state formation (Mahmood Mamdani, 2001) • Plural identities emerge from situations of stress, in which identity is threatened, and when consequences of domination by another group are perceived to be enormous (Horowitz,1985,1999; Rothchild,1997) • Political identities: instrumental rather than primordial due to their dynamics, situational and pragmatic nature.

  14. ‘Election-centric conception’ of ‘consolidation’ phase as Harbeson (1999) calls it, is problematic • Even after three consecutive elections, democracy cannot be regarded as having been consolidated in Zanzibar. • Democratic consolidation should go beyond the ‘democratic process,’ which focuses largely on the holding of multi-party competitive elections and focuses on what Dankwart Rustow (1970) calls “habituation” • Guillermo O’Donnell (1996) refers to “a close fit between formal rules and behaviour.”

  15. IV: Multi-Party Democracy & Resurgence of Identity Politics(1992–present) • Old political divisions and memories come to the fore. • Two major political parties emerge—CUF and CCM • CCM (or Chama cha Mapinduzi) • is a merger of ASP and Mainland party Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) • fully represents the interests of the old ASP • Electoral support: the same as in pre-independence elections • CCM stronghold: Unguja and Africans • Civic United Front (CUF) • appears to replicate the previous ZNP-ZPPP alliance • Electoral support: the same as in pre-independence elections • CUF stronghold: Pemba and among non-Africans

  16. CCM versus CUF Votes earned by CCM and CUF presidential candidates in Unguja and Pemba (1995–2005)

  17. Politicization of Racial Identities • The return of multiparty politics has revived unresolved questions concerning control of the state in Zanzibar, its identity, and its sovereignty. • Politicized racial identities during campaigns: ‘Africans’ vs. ‘Arabs’ • For the regime in power, democratization can as well lead to losing control of the state, its African identity, and the possibility of being ruled by what they find as being the remnants of the Sultanate oligarchy. • The state sovereignty is also at stake given the fact that the policy of the major opposition party is to revisit the Union question (form and content).

  18. Politicization of Racial IdentitiesCUF Campaign Speeches • Elections would lead to “the end of a blackman’s rule.”—CUF leader, campaign rally at Kibandamaiti, 21 October, 1995 • “The African-led Revolutionary government has been far more brutal than the Arab aristocracy…and that people’s living standards were better off before the Revolution than it is today.”—CUF presidential candidate, campaign rally at Makunduchi, September 17, 2005

  19. CUF Campaign Issues (cont’d) • Question legitimacy of the 1964 Revolution • Cherish Zanzibar’s 1963 independence • Pay reparations or return confiscated property to pre-revolution owners • Convict those engaged in arbitrary killings and torture during and after the revolution • Advocate for a federal system, 3-government structure • Suspend and review additional Union matters • Promote “equal rights for all,’ including equality in development

  20. Politicization of Racial Identities CCM Campaign Issues • “The Zanzibar population is predominantly black; the colour of indigeneous Africans…There is a need to ensure that the great 1964 Revolution remains for ever and that Zanzibar remains African. That is the only way Africans as the majority Zanzibaris can determine their own fate and the destiny of Zanzibar” • “CUF is a party representing Arab interests and voting for it would lead to the restoration of the Sultanate, and the subsequent break-up of the Union.” • CUF is portrayed to be a Muslim party “with an intent of establishing an Islamic state.” —Omar Mapuri (former CCM deputy chief minister, minister of education in Zanzibar, and former Union minister), Zanzibar Revolution: Achievements and Prospects, 1997

  21. CCM Campaign Issues • Praise & protect the 1964 Revolution ‘Revolution forever’ • Support the Union and two-government structure (formal CCM policy) • Bring about development • Maintain peace and unity

  22. Consequences of the Politicization of Racial Identities • Political conflicts, political stand-offs, violence, lack of social and civic peace. • Three rounds of elections (in 1995, 2000, and 2005) do not deepen democracy, but rather, derail it. • 1995 and 2000 elections deemed not free and fair, due to voter intimidation, voter fraud, rigging and partisanship of the electoral body. • 2005 elections: anomalies in vote counting

  23. Consequences of the Politicization of Racial Identities • Sporadic violence during election season (2000). Mass demonstrations lead to death of at least 30 people • Freedom of speech constrained by the government • Two Reconciliation Accords between CCM and CUF (1999 & 2001) breached • ‘Ethnicization of state apparatus’

  24. V: Implications of Competing Political Identities on Democratic Consolidation I: Elections become an instrument to maintain state power • Voters are excluded based on their appearance, area of origin, party affiliation (‘Wapemba’ versus ‘Wabara’) • Security forces as voters—‘voter importation’

  25. Registration of Security Forces Turnout in Registration Centers in Central District with Military Camps Nearby Source: TEMCO (2006) The 2005 Presidential and General Elections in Zanzibar, p. 216

  26. Implications of Competing Political Identities(cont’d) II: CUF’s status as the leading opposition party in Tanzania is at risk • Unlike other opposition parties in Tanzania, CUF has a strong social base in Zanzibar, owing to a perceived common history and a collective sense of exclusion • However, politicization of CUF as a “Pemba” party, “Islamic” party, and “Arab” party, makes it difficult for CUF to expand its social base to the mainland. • All other opposition parties are in decline in terms of electoral support.

  27. CUF versus Other Parties:Union Parliamentary Seats

  28. CCM versus Opposition Parliamentary Elections in Tanzania (1995–2005)

  29. Implications of Competing Political Identities(cont’d) III: Ambivalent popular support for institutions of democracy • “Unquestionable embrace of democratic procedures” by a significant segment of the citizenry is a crucial element of consolidation (Diamond et al., 1997) • Unlike in mainland Tanzania, citizens’ support for multi-party democracy in Zanzibar is comparatively low.

  30. Popular Support for Democracyin Mainland Tanzania vs. Zanzibar (March 1999)

  31. Popular Support for DemocracyMainland Tanzania vs. Zanzibar Tanzanians’ Support for Party Systems (March 2006)

  32. Implications of Competing Political Identities(cont’d) Racial Tolerance Among Zanzibaris (1999 Survey)

  33. Implications of Competing Political Identities (cont’d) Respondents’ Support for Democratic Institutions & Processes

  34. Implications of Competing Political Identities (cont’d) IV: Rigidity of Zanzibari Voters • As a result of politicized ethno-racial identities, it has been difficult for a third party or mainland-based parties to gain electoral support • Electoral campaigns are avenues largely for enhancing party loyalty among members, rather than recruiting new members, e.g. role of party youth wings is to guard the meetings against ‘intruders’ (non-members) • Community/group pressure to make people attend only those meetings that are organized by their parties

  35. Implications of Competing Political Identities (cont’d) V: The State of the Union • Increased assertiveness on the part of Zanzibar government for more political space and autonomy from the Union government. • As political competition gets tougher, the need for strong control over coercive instruments of the state becomes necessary. • In May 2004, the Revolutionary government of Zanzibar outlined 15 Union matters to be removed from the Union list, including oil and natural gas, international relations, intelligence, police, etc.

  36. VI: Conclusions & Recommendations • Consensus, negotiations, accommodation, and compromise become difficult. • Rule of law and good governance become jeopardized • Recognizing variations and contrasts between these two partner states is critically important • Bring ethno-racial issues and their implications to the negotiation table • Building and nurturing incentive mechanisms of dialogue and reconciliations should be made a high priority.

  37. Sunrise in Zanzibar

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