Institutional structure I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND parliamentarism

1. Institutional structure I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND parliamentarism Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14

2. Guiding Questions • What is the difference between presidential and parliamentary systems? • What is the confidence relationship? • What are the pros and cons of presidentialism? Parliamentarism? • What is the difference between a Westminster system? Consensus system? • How should politics differ between the two? • What is semi-presidentialism/premier presidentialism?

3. Fused vs. Separated Powers • A long history in political theory. • Rooted in part in political revolutions. • Associated with preventing the ability of unchecked executive or legislature rule. • Classic theories predicated on the US (presidential) and the UK (parliamentary) models. • Models posit very different relationships between the executive and the legislature.

4. Separated Powers: Presidentialism • In presidential systems, executive and legislative power are separated. • President and Cabinet constitute the executive branch • President as head of state and head of government. • Executive and legislative branches are elected separately (separate origin). • Both branches are elected for a fixed term. • Members of the executive do not sit in the legislature • Neither branch can remove the other except in extraordinary circumstances (separate survival).

5. Fused Powers: Parliamentarism • In parliamentary systems, executive and legislative powers are fused. • Prime Minister and the Cabinet constitute the executive (collective executive). • Prime Minister as head of government. • Monarch or a figurehead president serves as a head of state • Only the legislature is directly elected. • Prime Minister and the Cabinet come from the legislature (fused power-shared origin). • PM is typically the leader of the largest political party in the governing coalition. • Terms for the executive and the legislature are typically not fixed. • Confidence relationship exists between the executive and legislative branches (shared survival).

6. Confidence Relationship • Concept of responsible government defines parliamentary systems. • Governments stay in officeuntil: • 1) They lose a vote of confidence • 2) The PM dissolves parliament • 3) The upper bound of parliament is reached. • PM and his or her government must have the confidence of the chamber (majority support). • Legislature possesses authority to express no confidence in the executive. • Governments must resign if they lose a vote of confidence. • Executive (PM) has powers of dissolution. • PM can typically dissolve the parliament and call for new elections at any time. • Strong party discipline is critical in parliamentary systems.

7. John Major and Maastricht • Maastricht treaty (EU) split his Conservative party. • Conservatives (Tories) historically Eurosceptic. • Small majority: 18. • 22 rebels. • Labour saw Tory divisions and smelled blood in the water. • A major defeat could trigger new elections. • Government lost the vote: 324-316. • Embarrassing defeat for the government.

8. John Major and Maastricht • Major strongly believed that Maastricht needed to be passed. • But another loss would call his leadership into question. • Polls suggested Labour would win a new election. • Major knew this. • So did Labour. • The next day, Major made the vote on Maastricht a confidence vote. • Had he lost, he would have called new elections. • Vote passed 339-299.

9. Critiques PRESIDENTIALISM PARLIAMENTARISM • Track record outside of the US is spotty. • Fixed terms create inflexibility. • Suffers from immobilism due to divided government. • Unclear who to credit or blame for policy. • Winner take all logic hinders stability. • Direct elections creates opportunities for outsiders or demagogues. • Direct elections provide more choice for voters (increases accountability and identifiability). • Legislators vote on party lines rather than on policy merit. • Parliamentary systems experience divided government in bicameral settings. • Majority governments in some parliamentary systems are often unchecked (winner take all). • Flexibility of parliamentarism problematic when stable governments cannot form.

10. Comparing Institutions • While most European systems are parliamentary systems, they vary in terms of how authority is distributed. • Some vest more authority at the level of the central government (Westminster) while others disperse this authority to both the national and sub-national levels (consensus). • Both have advantages and disadvantages. • Political context critical for determining when power should be consolidated or dispersed. • Institutional “logic” has important ramifications for politics

11. Comparing Institutions WESTMINSTER/MAJORITARIAN CONSENSUS • Executive authority concentrated in one party cabinets. • One party controls the government • Executive dominance high. • Typically…. • Two party systems • Over-represent large parties • Use SMD-FPTP electoral systems • Unitary systems. • Unicameral. • Lack judicial review • Constitutional “flexibility” • Easy to amend. • Executive authority shared within multiparty cabinets. • Lower executive dominance • Typically …. • Multiparty systems. • Represent small parties • Use PR • Federal. • Bicameral. • Have judicial review • Constitutional rigidity. • Tough to amend

12. Case Study: United Kingdom • Westminster • Executive dominance: HIGH • PMs rarely lose a vote of confidence. • Coalition government is rare. • Current Con-Lib Dem coalition is an anomaly • “Two and a half” party system. • Labour, Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats • Electoral system favors large parties. • Unitary government • Devolution to regions can theoretically be rescinded. • Bicameral • House of Lords veto power is limited. • Unwritten constitution. • No judicial review. • New Supreme Court may change role of judiciary.

13. Case Study: Belgium • Consensus • Executive dominance: LOW • Cabinet duration low • Coalition government the norm • Multiparty system. • Multiple parties split along ideological and linguistic dimensions. • Electoral system is fairly proportional. • Federal system. • Current stalemate revolves around giving more authority to the subunits. • Bicameral legislature • Constitutional rigidity • Changes require supermajorities within the legislature as well as within linguistic communities. • Judicial review • Strong role in preserving linguistic communities.

14. Semi-Presidentialism/Premier Presidentialism • Premier-Presidential systems possess a dual executive. • Typically a president and a prime minister • President is directly elected and has significant powers. • That is, separate origin (direct election) and separate survival (no vote of confidence) • Unlike parliamentary systems, the president is not a figurehead • A premier (PM) and cabinet exists subject to parliamentary confidence. • Fused survival; tenure in office depends on avoiding a loss on a vote of confidence. • Unlike presidential systems the government does not serve a fixed term.

15. Case Study: France • Executive dominance: HIGH • Coalition duration is high. • Constitution gives executive a lot of tools to override the legislature. • Multiparty system • Although blocs of left-right organize politics. • Electoral system • Runoff system does allow for smaller parties to gain representation. • Unitary system • Bicameral legislature • But Senate can be overridden. • Constitutional rigidity • Mixed • Judicial review • Weak

16. Divided Government in France • Semi-presidential systems deal with divided government to an extent not usually observed in parliamentary systems. • Referred to as cohabitation • Legislative majority is of a different party then the President. • 1986-1988 and 1993-1995 (under Mitterrand) and 1997-2002 (under Chirac). • Decision to call elections “backfired”. • President takes over foreign/military affairs. • PM takes over government agenda. • PM subordinate when majorities are the same. • PM dominant when majorities are different. • Recent reforms intended to reduce the likelihood of cohabitation.

17. Arguments for Premier-Presidentialism • President’s authority to dissolve the legislature overcomes issues of deadlock/rigidity. • Although in many systems, this authority is constrained. • Coalitions in the assembly reduce winner take all logic, forcing the president to work with diverse interests in the assembly. • Cohabitation can force both the president and the legislation to negotiate. • Where roles are strictly defined, “outsiders” in the presidency will not endanger the system. • Expectation is that only experienced party leaders will run for the presidency. • Lack of veto authority maintains parliamentary party discipline. • No cross pressures for members of parliament to buck their party vis-à-vis the president.

18. Problems with Premier-Presidentialism • Problem: Insulating the presidency from the assembly is problematic. • Giving “residual powers” to the PM can address this issue. • Problem: Electoral calendar may increase or decrease the legitimacy of the president or PM. • Electoral timing is key to undercutting dyarchic conflict. • Problem: Stalemate/duplication of roles as President and PM jockey for influence. • Where executive roles are defined, difficulties under cohabitation are reduced.

19. Conclusions WESTMINSTER CONSENSUS • Efficiency: • Easy to know who to credit/blame • Decisions can be made quickly • Change/reform easily enacted. • Fairness: • “Elected dictatorship” makes it tough to stop a government with a large parliamentary majority. • Disproportionality in electoral system may not be fair. • But if your side wins, you get your turn at bat. • Fairness: • Proportionality in electoral systems gives each societal sector a voice • Decisions, once made, have widespread support. • Efficiency: • But, in some instances, needed reforms are blocked because support cannot be obtained. • Difficult to know who to credit/blame for policies.

20. Next Unit • Institutional Structure II • Federalism and Bicameralism • Readings: Lijphart 185-215 and Russell • Pay particular attention to: • What makes a system federal? • What is the linkage between federalism and bicameralism? • What do second chambers do? • How do we classify their strength?