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Nuclear Safety & Security in the DPRK

Nuclear Safety & Security in the DPRK. Sharon Squassoni Senior Fellow & Director Proliferation Prevention Program Asan Institute “The 2012 US-North Korea Nuclear Deal and A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of North Korea” Seoul, March 22, 2012. Outline.

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Nuclear Safety & Security in the DPRK

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  1. Nuclear Safety & Security in the DPRK Sharon Squassoni Senior Fellow & Director Proliferation Prevention Program Asan Institute “The 2012 US-North Korea Nuclear Deal and A Comprehensive Approach to the Denuclearization of North Korea” Seoul, March 22, 2012

  2. Outline • Status and concerns regarding DPRK nuclear safety & security • Obstacles to and objectives for cooperation • Some specific initiatives

  3. Status • North Korea has a full nuclear fuel cycle • Uranium mining, fuel fabrication, conversion, enrichment, reactors, reprocessing • Is building a light water reactor • Has never come into full compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty • IAEA monitoring conducted under Agreed Framework; initial declaration of nuclear material never verified. • Withdrew from the NPT in 2003 • Has not been a member of the IAEA for decades

  4. Ramifications • Almost a decade in isolation from international norms, cooperation • Not a member of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, ICSANT • No transparency = no opportunities to learn about best practices in nuclear safety & security

  5. Obstacles to Cooperation • Verifying a halt in activities, dismantlement, disarmament & coming into full compliance with the NPT could take years. • Expansion of commitments (e.g., to missile testing) makes full compliance even more difficult. • Sanctions under UNSCR 1718 limit what can be provided • Bar assistance to DPRK nuclear program

  6. Is there room for assistance on safety & security? • Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines prohibit exports to countries that are not NPT members • But IAEA engages in technical cooperation projects with states that are not NPT members but are IAEA members – India, Pakistan, Israel • Some countries have made exceptions for limited assistance on safety and security • U.S. assisted India before 2008 (NRC visits) • U.S. assisted Pakistan in a limited fashion on nuclear security • If done at all, needs to be done carefully and incrementally

  7. Objectives of Cooperation • Improve transparency • Improve nuclear safety and security without assisting DPRK military capabilities • Facilitate negotiation process by encouraging two-sided cooperation in limited areas that benefit all

  8. Some possible steps on nuclear safety

  9. Some possible steps on nuclear security

  10. Potential initiatives • Nuclear Safety • Materials – radiological source safety • Facilities – e.g., peer reviews • Workers, safety culture – WANO membership? • Nuclear Security • Materials – removal of HEU spent fuel from IRT-2000; conversion of fuel to LEU • Facilities/sites • Security culture

  11. Nuclear Safety • Plugging into IAEA Nuclear Safety Action Plan – kinds of things DPRK could request • Assessments of safety (e.g., “stress tests”) • Peer reviews • Emergency Preparedness Review Missions • National regulations – Integrated Regulatory Review Service of IAEA • OSART missions • Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (for states new to nuclear power)

  12. Nuclear Security • Removal of HEU spent fuel and eventual conversion to LEU fuel of IRT-2000 • No technical barriers; several precedents (Libya, US, Russia, Vietnam, Uzbekistan) • Enhance nuclear security and safety by removal of spent fuel first • Political plus – could be announced around 2014 Nuclear Security Summit; would take about 2-3 years to complete and at least $2M. • Conversion assumes • Progress toward disarmament • Return to NPT, full-scope safeguards

  13. IRT-2000 • Longer term projects – LEU conversion, instrumentation & control upgrade, SNF disposition • Potential activities • Participation in RERTR, Research Reactor Fuel Management conferences, IAEA symposia • Training, fellowships at similar reactors that have converted or upgraded I&C • Potential applications (1-4 years after LEU in place) • Isotope production (e.g. Mo-99) • Education & training • Neutron Activation Analysis • Silicon Transmutation Doping • Neutron Radiography • Neutron Scattering

  14. Contact information • Proliferation Prevention Program @ www.csis.org • ssquassoni@csis.org • 202 775-3293

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