Department Make-up

1. One Career Fire Fighter/Paramedic Dies and a Part-time FireFighter/Paramedic is Injured When Caught in a ResidentialStructure Flashover – Illinois

2. Department Make-up • Career Department • 15 full-time • 17 part-time • 20,000 population in 4 sq miles • 3 engines, 1 aerial, 2 ALS ambulances, 1 squad • Typically 4 – 6 personnel per shift with Lt in command vehicle

3. Department Make-up • Minimum manning 5 • 3 for engine • 2 for ambulance • Depending on call crew took engine, ladder or squad • Rely heavily on mutual aid (regionalization)

4. The Structure • One-story wood-frame built in 1951 • 950 sq feet of living space • Built on concrete slab • 2 car garage on D-side connected by a family room addition.

6. http://maps.google.com/maps?hq=http://maps.google.com/help/maps/tour/mapleft.kml#1/maps?&hl=en&z=2&utm_campaign=en&utm_medium=ha&utm_source=en-ha-na-us-bk-gmhttp://maps.google.com/maps?hq=http://maps.google.com/help/maps/tour/mapleft.kml#1/maps?&hl=en&z=2&utm_campaign=en&utm_medium=ha&utm_source=en-ha-na-us-bk-gm Wednesday, March 31, 2010 17616 Lincoln Avenue in Homewood, Illinois

9. 17622 Lincoln Avenue in Homewood 17622 Lincoln Avenue in Homewood 17622 Lincoln Avenue in Homewood

11. B/C CORNER

13. Incident Information • March 30, 2010 • Approximately 9pm 53o • 5 people on duty • Typical dispatch for structure assignment • Lt and 2 FF on Engine • 2 FF/PM on ambulance

14. Timeline • 2055: 911 Call received • 2057: Units dispatched • E534 – Lt and 2 FF • A564 – 2 FF/Medics • T1220 – Lt and 3 FF • E1340 – Lt and 4 FF • T1145 – Lt and 3 FF • S440 – Lt 3 FF • 2101: E534/T1220/A564 On Scene

16. Timeline • 2103: E1340 On Scene • 2106: T1145/S440 On Scene • 2109: Flashover and FF down

17. Illinois - LODD

18. Illinois - LODD

19. Scene conditions after crews advanced inside.

29. Contributing Factors • Well involved fire with entrapped civilian upon arrival • Incomplete 360 degree situational size-up • Inadequate risk-versus-gain analysis • Ineffective fire control tactics • Failure to recognize, understand, and react to deteriorating conditions

30. Contributing Factors • Uncoordinated ventilation and its effect on fire behavior • Removal of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece • Inadequate command, control, and accountability • Insufficient staffing.

31. Key Recommendations • Ensure that a complete 360 degree situational size-up is conducted on dwelling fires and others where it is physically possible and ensure that a risk-versus-gain analysis and a survivability profile for trapped occupants is conducted prior to committing to interior fire fighting operations • Ensure that interior fire suppression crews attack the fire effectively to include appropriate fire flow for the given fire load and structure, use of fire streams, appropriate hose and nozzle selection, and adequate personnel to operate the hoseline

32. Key Recommendations • Ensure that fire fighters maintain crew integrity when operating on the fireground, especially when performing interior fire suppression activities • Ensure that fire fighters and officers have a sound understanding of fire behavior and the ability to recognize indicators of fire development and the potential for extreme fire behavior

33. Key Recommendations • Ensure that incident commanders and fire fighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively coordinate ventilation with suppression techniques to release smoke and heat • Ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.

34. The victim, FF1, and injured fire fighter/paramedic areoperating the 2 ½ inch hoseline inside the structure

35. View of flashover.

36. Ensure that a complete 360 degree situational size-up is conducted on dwelling fires and others where it is physically possible and ensure that a risk-versus-gain analysis and a survivability profile for trapped occupants is conducted prior to committing to interior fire fighting operations

37. Ensure that interior fire suppression crews attack the fire effectivelyto include appropriate fire flow for the given fire load and structure, use of fire streams, appropriate hose and nozzle selection, and adequate personnel to operate the hoseline

38. Ensure that fire fighters maintain crew integrity when operating on the fireground, especially when performing interior fire suppression activities

39. Ensure that fire fighters and officers have a sound understanding of fire behavior and the ability to recognize indicators of fire development and the potential for extreme fire behavior

40. Ensure that incident commanders and fire fighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively coordinate ventilation with suppression techniques to release smoke and heat

41. Ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.

42. Fire departments should ensure that adequate staffing is available to respond to emergency incidents.

43. Fire departments should ensure that staff for emergency medical services is available at all times during fireground operations. • Fire departments and dispatch centers should ensure they are capable of communicating with each other without having to monitor multiple channels/frequencies on more than one radio. • Fire departments should ensure that the incident commander, or designee, maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground.

44. Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters wear a full array of turnout clothing and personal protective equipment appropriate for the assigned task while participating in fire suppression. • Fire departments should ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire. • Fire departments should ensure that all fire fighters are equipped with a means to communicate with fireground personnel before entering a structure fire.