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Rail future High-Speed Rail Conference

Rail future High-Speed Rail Conference. Jonathan Tyler Passenger Transport Networks, YORK Bletchley Park 9 July 2011. Why I’ve been sitting on the fence [1]. as a long-time environmentalist I hold to a radical critique of

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Rail future High-Speed Rail Conference

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  1. RailfutureHigh-Speed Rail Conference Jonathan Tyler Passenger Transport Networks, YORK Bletchley Park 9 July 2011

  2. Why I’ve been sitting on the fence [1] • as a long-time environmentalist I hold to a radical critique of the concept of eternal growth / high capitalism / globalisation / hyper-mobility • transition to a less mobile society essential but will take time • and we need excellent public transport

  3. why I’ve been sitting on the fence [2] • demand for rail travel growing strongly and rail’s mode share rising • some difficult capacity issues • significant sections of the infrastructure are of poor quality • the pattern of services requires overhaul >> high-speed rail could be part of the solution [just as it was in the1970s]

  4. But I have been on a journey … • invited by Greengauge 21 to design an integrated WCML + HS2 timetable : accepted, given longstanding campaign on need for strategic timetabling • not previously involved in HSR debate • objective view based on HS2 assumptions • delivered a detailed and credible proposal

  5. Proposed integrated WCML + HS2 timetable at opening of HS2 phase 1 designed by PTN for Greengauge 21 prepared using the Viriato software developed by SMA of Zürich

  6. Pathing schemes : Crewe … London, up / southbound, HS2 + inter-city + regional services Viriato SMA of Zürich

  7. Pathing schemes : solutions for specific problems the Birmingham … Rugby corridor Viriato SMA of Zürich

  8. Capacity challenges : Colwich Junction Viriato SMA of Zürich

  9. The beginning of doubt [1] • simplistic assumptions about growth trends, sheer scale of expected demand, arguable economic evaluations • peculiar timescale, no carbon-reduction • no previous study of timetabling, only broad statements by HS2 – my conviction about its importance derived from Switzerland (Taktfahrplan stages) • problems passed elsewhere, eg. Stafford

  10. the beginning of doubt [2] • realisation that apparent anomalies reflect HS2 thinking (focussed on large conurbations, compare no Stoke stops) • dismissal of places not served by HS2, eg. one ‘residual’ train/hour for Coventry • confusion about links with regional and local services, eg. in Birmingham • uncertain role of Birmingham Interchange

  11. Then serious worries – and few answers [1] • field observations inconsistent with rhetoric and with data about capacity (WCML RUS, sources) • capacity – the problem of reconciling all the aspirations with the number of paths • no analysis of portion-working (nb. both operational and infrastructural implications)

  12. then serious worries – and few answers [2] • study of eastern arm of Y: # no clear strategy for connectivity with ‘classic’ railway # ex-urban railheads – unacceptable ? # maximum HS2 capacity limits benefits of relief for MML, ECML # confusion over cross-country services # politics of Wichnor Curve

  13. then serious worries – and few answers [3] • more superficial assumptions, eg. # OOC interchange, GWML capacity # workability of HS1 connection • no study of cost saving against disbenefits of British rather than European gauge • regulatory regime – in whose interests will HSR be operated ?

  14. So what has gone wrong ? • absence of a national strategy for public transport as context for planning • failure to consider alternative scenarios • predilection for grand projets • HS2 propensity toward ‘perfect railway’ • dispersal of responsibilities [DfT / HS2 Ltd / Network Rail / TOCs]

  15. 1) a national strategy for public transport • accessibility objectives, standards of provision, optimised connectivity • modal-split targets, eg. narrow huge disparity between high and low rail shares(compare environmental gain with promotion of new trips) • a national integrated timetable plan to frame investment priorities (Swiss model) • in its absence # limited assessment of alternative programmes # a technology in search of an application ?

  16. toward an excellent system of public transport timetabling, planning, marketing modal-split targets national standards of service-quality and connectivity modelling of route-specific demand data, scenarios infrastructure plan organisations, budgets

  17. 2) alternative scenarios • continuous growth • comprehensive socio-economic collapse • large reductions in mobility (esp. air ?) • moderate reductions in mobility • changes in composition of rail demand, eg. less long-distance commuting, many (non-London) trips transferred from car • much rail freight not environmentally sustainable ?

  18. 3) the grand projet • engineers propose, politicians are tempted • a problem (apparent capacity shortfalls), a political hot potato (Heathrow), a longstanding economic imbalance (n / s), a shiny technology (HSR) loved by campaigners, and envy of foreigners (Tokaido, TGV, …) >> long-term, ‘transformational’ ‘solution’ • excludes short-term, incremental measures

  19. 4) the perfect railway • separation from ‘classic’ railway : # understandable, visionary, BUT # relevance in multi-centric Britain ? # optimal specification not tested against lesser options (esp. speed) # connectivity disbenefits # two-tier quality of service

  20. 5) dispersal of responsibilities • fragmented planning: # WCML RUS passed buck to HS2 # no detail on WCML benefits until Greengauge study [TOCs indifferent] # limited study of interfaces [HS2 / NR] # unachievable aspirations [DfT] • timetabling culture discourages visions

  21. Capacity confusion • trains / hour - Tokaido : 14 - RFF / SNCF : 13, rising to 15 - study for Greengauge : 16.6 - under ERTMS 3, in theory : 18 • eddy-current brakes, calculated risk : 19.2 • HS2 Ltd : 10 / 14 / 18

  22. distribution of paths [peak hour]

  23. “Further work is being done to determine which of the above services might serve Heathrow and which might run on to mainland Europe”Department for Transport / HS2 Ltd, February 2011

  24. capacity confusion – the problems • planning must not assume a techno-fix • complicates capacity release on classic lines • somehow we have to decide priorities • no credible basis for HS1, Heathrow links • infrastructure design, eg. E.Mids, portions • also affects Lichfield Y Junction … Water Orton East Junction

  25. So what should now happen ? • devise a national strategic (timetable) plan • for routes with capacity constraints identify step-wise solutions, eg. timetable recasts, fares, train-reconfiguration, minor works, then larger works for specific problems • for routes with long-run capacity constraint or sub-standard speeds consider new (but classic-compatible) alignments

  26. so you might reasonably conclude that I’m falling off the fence onto the ‘no’ side

  27. can we put the pieces together again ?

  28. Jonathan Tyler Passenger Transport Networks 49 Stonegate, YORK YO1 8AW 01904 611187 ptn@btconnect.com

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