Theory of War

1. Theory of War Daniel W. Blackmon IB HL History Coral Gables Sr. High

2. Source • Most sections in this lesson are taken from articles published in Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

3. Source • Authors and titles of specific articles are given in the headings. Page references within the outline, unless specifically indicated, all come from this work.

4. Dynastic to National War • Source: "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow,: From Dynastic to National War," R. R. Palmer

5. Dynastic to National War • Dynastic states stood by a balance between monarch and aristocracy

6. Dynastic to National War • Populations felt little feeling for the monarch • Armies reflected this, being divided internally by class consciousness

7. Dynastic to National War • Officer corps motivated by honor and class • Long-term enlisted soldiers’ purpose was to make a living, not fight or die.

8. Dynastic to National War • Armies held together by increasingly good care (food, clothing, etc.) plus ferocious discipline • Soldiers represented an important investment and could not easily be replaced

9. Dynastic to National War • Wars tended to be limited: both in aims and means • Maneuver stressed • Battles avoided as much as possible

10. Dynastic to National War • Frederick II inherited Prussia, a state which owed its existence and identity to the Army. • Must balance economic production and military power

11. Dynastic to National War • Preserved nobility by forbidding sale of land to peasants or townsmen • .Bourgeois barred from the officer corps

12. Dynastic to National War • Protected peasant lands as a source of agriculture and for recruit • .Frederick's discipline intended to turn the army into the instrument of his mind and will

13. Dynastic to National War • Count de Guibert, Essai général de tactique 1772

14. Dynastic to National War • Distinguished limited from unlimited war • distinguishes war between professional armies and destructive wars of peoples

15. Dynastic to National War • French Revolution overthrows the absolutist system and fused the government with the people • Political revolution leads to a military revolution

16. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Source: "Napoleon and the Revolution in War," Peter Paret

17. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Napoleon • Profited from fusion of social, political, and military changes due to overthrow of the ancien regime • Expanded citizen armies: the levée en masse

18. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Supply system abandoned; soldiers live off the land (devastating any terrain they cross) • Increase in speed and flexibility • Increase of size

19. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Changes of tactics, especially in the use of skirmishers

20. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Armies moved in separate, self-contained units (corps d'armée), to provide greater speed and operational flexibility

21. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Napoleon sought to be as strong as possible at the point of battle: "God is on the side of the big battalions."

22. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • As head of state, Napoleon integrated state policy with the conduct of war • Greatest campaigns advanced his armies deeply to force a major battle

23. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Campaigns did not have geographic objectives, but aimed at the destruction of the enemy's army

24. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Battle tactics • With a superior opponent, wage a frontal battle with natural barriers to restrict opponent's lateral moves

25. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Battle tactics • Force the commitment of opponent's reserves, then rupture a weak point with his own reserves (Austerlitz)

26. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Battle tactics • With an inferior or equal opponent, attempt to extend the front or attack in flank with a corps, thus taking opponent by two sides

27. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Classification of battle types (in reverse order of his preference)

28. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Battle of strategic penetration: to rupture a long defended line and create confusion which can be exploited. Example is the invasion of Russia in 1812. Strategic penetration by itself does not lead to a decision, but sets up future operations.

29. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Battle of Central Position, when he is numerically inferior. • Best known example is Waterloo/Ligny (which, however, he lost. • Another example is Jena/Auerstadt).

30. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • This requires great skill and nerve on the part of general and soldiers. Napoleon would seize a position between attacking forces.

31. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • One wing of his army would strike and pin one enemy (at Waterloo-Ligny, it was Wellington at Quatre Bras).

32. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Then Napoleon would turn the rest of his army against the isolated opponent and destroy him (At Waterloo-Ligny, Blücher at Ligny).

33. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Having destroyed half of his opponents, he could now redirect his entire army against the remaining enemy (at Waterloo-Ligny, Wellington at Waterloo).

34. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • (Napoleon lost Waterloo-Ligny because, having defeated Blücher, his pursuit did not see to it that Blücher was unable to regroup and rejoin the battle and because the axis of retreat Blücher took allowed him to reestablish contact with Wellington.

35. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Histories of Waterloo focus--not unnaturally--on the struggle of the British and the French, but it was the arrival of the Prussians on Napoleon's flank and rear which doomed Napoleon.)

36. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Soldiers today still study these battles. An example from U.S. history is Chancellorsville.

37. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • manoeuvre sur les derriere: a strategic penetration around a flank to surround and annihilate the enemy. (Example Ulm, Marengo)

38. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Without question, this is Napoleon's preferred attack; he uses it over 30 times in his career. (Chandler 162-178)

39. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Classic blitzkrieg is a manoevre sur les derriere with the application of the internal combustion engine and caterpillar treads

40. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Panzer divisions, corps and groups, like Napoleonic divisions and corps d'armees, are all arms formations capable of independent action.

41. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Napoleon's opponents understood tactics as well as he did; the difference is psychological attitude • Master exploiter of time and of human emotions

42. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • After 1807, Napoleon's focus on decisive battles plus his own psychological need for domination leads him to reject limited wars for circumscribed goals

43. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Command system broke down under continental strains, especially in Russia and Spain

44. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Napoleon loses a rational, political purpose for his operations in Russia (1812), Germany (1813) and France (1814)

45. Napoleon and the Revolution in War • Military legacy • Massive accumulation and use of force • Insistence on absolute victory • Rejection of limited wars for limited goals

46. Clausewitz, • "Clausewitz," Peter Paret

47. Clausewitz, • Carl von Clausewitz is the author of On War, 1830 • Professional soldier • Saw combat at age 12

48. Clausewitz, • Accompanied Scharnhorst in Wars of Liberation • Few Napoleonic officers had as wide ranging an experience Carl von Clausewit • Involved in army reforms, which he saw as a means of social reform

49. Clausewitz, • Clausewitz believes that theory must meet the test of reality • Thought processes are dialectical: ideas are defined with one-sided clarity, and then balanced by an counter-idea

50. Clausewitz, • War is a mere continuation of policy by other, means [On War, Bk I, Ch. 1:24]