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Dive into RFC 2574

Dive into RFC 2574. User-based Security Model (USM) for the SNMP-v3. SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi. Threats Limited protection provided for:. Modification of Information Masquerade - False pretend of unauthorized users

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Dive into RFC 2574

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  1. Dive into RFC 2574 User-based Security Model (USM) for the SNMP-v3 SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  2. ThreatsLimited protection provided for: • Modification of Information • Masquerade - False pretend of unauthorized users • Disclosure - Eavesdropping on the exchange between managed agents and managed station. • Message Stream Modification – Danger of the message being re-ordered, delayed, or replayed by unauthorized management stations SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  3. Threats Cont.No protection against: • Denial of Service • Traffic Analysis SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  4. SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi Goals • Verify that each received SNMP message has not been modified during its transmission through the network. • Verify the identity of the user on whose behalf a received SNMP message claims to have been generated. • Detect the received SNMP messages, which request or contain management information, whose time of generation was not recent. • Provide, when necessary, that the contents of each received SNMP message are protected from disclosure.

  5. Constraints • When the requirements of effective management in times of network stress are inconsistent with those of security, the design should prefer the former • Neither the security protocol nor its underlying security mechanisms should depend upon the ready availability of other network services (e.g., Network Time Protocol (NTP) or key management protocols) • A security mechanism should entail no changes to the basic SNMP network management philosophy SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  6. Security Services • Data Integrity • Data Origin Authentication • Data Confidentiality • Message timeliness and limited replay protection SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  7. SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi Why Use SNMP-v3 • Authentication • HMAC-MD5-96, or SHA authentication • Password must be greater than 8 characters including spaces • Privacy • Packet data may now be DES encrypted (additional encryptions) • CBC-DES Symmetric Encryption Protocol • Allows for unique Privacy password • Inform Traps • Old style trap was "throw-n-pray" over UDP • v2 Inform trap is over TCP and requires a response • Traps may also have Authentication and Privacy passwords • Security Structures • User / Scope / ACL all may have independent AuthPriv structures

  8. Authoritative and Non-authoritative Engines • In any message one of the transmitter/receiver SNMP entities is designated as the Authoritative SNMP engine • When a message expects a response, the receiver of such messages is authoritative • When no response is expected the sender is authoritative • This serves two purposes • Timeliness of message determined with clock of authoritative engine • Key localization process SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  9. SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi Protocol context of SNMP

  10. SNMPv3 Architecture • SNMPv3 architecture (RFC 2571) consists of a distributed collection of SNMP entities communicating together • Each SNMP entity may act as manager, agent, or combination • SNMP Engine - Implements functions for: • sending and receiving messages • Authenticating and encrypting/decrypting messages • Controlling access to managed objects SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  11. SNMP Engine Modules • Modular nature means that upgrades to individual modules can be made without redoing the architecture • Modules: • Dispatcher - • Message Processing Subsystem • Security Subsystem • Access Control Subsystem SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  12. SNMP Manager SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  13. SNMP Agent SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  14. SNMP Engine Modules: Dispatcher • Dispatcher is a simple traffic manager • On incoming messages • It accepts incoming messages from the transport layer • Routes each message to the appropriate message processing module • When the message processing completes the Dispatcher sends the PDU to the appropriate application • On outgoing messages • It accepts PDUs from Application layer • Sends to Message processing subsystem • Sends to Transport layer SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  15. SNMP Engine Modules: Dispatcher • Dispatcher Submodules • PDU Dispatcher – sends/accepts Protocol Data Units (PDUs) to/from SNMP applications • Message Dispatcher – transmits to/from message processing subsystem • Transport Mapping – sends/receives transport layer packets SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  16. Message Processing Module • Accepts outgoing PDUs from dispatcher • Passes message to the security subsytem • Wraps the result with the appropriate header • Sends back to the dispatcher • On incoming PDUs • Accepts messages from the dispatcher • Processes the headers • Possibly sending to Security Subsystem for authenitication and decryption and • Returns the enclosed PDU to the dispatcher SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  17. Security and Access Control Modules • Security modules • User-based Security Model (USM) • Other security models allowed for but not yet. • Access Control Modules • View-based access control model (VACM) • Others allowed SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  18. SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi SNMPv3 Terminology • snmpEngineId – unique ID to engine (Octet string) • contextEngineId – unique ID to SNMP entity • contextName – identifies particular context within SNMP Engine • scopedPDU – block including: contextEngineId, contextName and an SNMP PDU • snmpMessageProcessingModel – unique identifier • snmpSecurityModel – integer indicating whether authentication and/or encryption are required • principal – the entity for “Whom the Bell Tolls” • securityName – string representation of the principal

  19. SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi SNMPv3 Applications • Command generator applications • Makes use of sendPdu primitive • Dispatcher  Message Processing  Security subsytem • Finally  UDP • and later the processResponse dispatcher primitive handles the response • Notification originator/receiver applications • Operates similarly sending a notification • Command Responder applications use primitives • RegisterContextEngineID – here is my ID (unregister also) • processPDU • returnRespnsePDU • isAccessAllowed (Access Control Subsystem primitive) • Proxy forwarder application

  20. Message Processing Model • RFC 2572 defines the message processing model • The model on outgoing messages • Accepts PDUs from the dispatcher • Encapsulates them in messages • Invokes the user Security Model (USM) to insert security related parameters in the headers • On incoming • Invokes the user Security Model (USM) process the security related parameters in the header • Delivers encapsulated PDU back to dispatcher • SNMP message first five fields SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  21. SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi SNMP3 Message Format with USM

  22. USM Timeliness Mechanisms • Non authoritative engine maintains copies of • snmpEngineBoots = number of times rebooted since originally configured 0 to 231 • snmpEngineTime • latestReceived EngineTime • USM update conditions • USM update rule • Message judged to be outside window … SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  23. Key Localization Process SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  24. SNMPv3 RFCs SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  25. SNMP-v3 Strength • Widespread Support • SNMP agents available for many network deviced (hosts, routers, switches, bridges, modems, printers, etc.) • Flexible and Extensible • SNMP agents can be extended to cover device-specific data • Clear mechanism for upgrading • Additional interoperability via proxies SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  26. SNMP-v3 Weaknesses • SNMP is not really “simple” • Complicated protocol to implement • Complex encoding rules • SNMP is not an efficient protocol • Bandwidth wasted with useless information • Inefficiencies of ASN.1 with respect to compactness • SNMP lacking in security • Lack of privacy or strong authentication • Offered in SNMP-v3, but SNMP-v1 still widely used • Limits utility for monitoring remote networks SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  27. SNMP Weaknesses Cont. • Latency can be high in SNMP • Request-response protocol, leading to a delay between time of request and time of response • Typically small in a LAN, but potentially a problem in a WAN SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

  28. THANK YOU SNMP-v3 Sasan Adibi

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