Stalin’s Foreign Policy

Stalin’s Foreign Policy

Lenin’s Foreign Policy • Hoped at first to spark and then expand / spread Communism to Europe • After failure of attempted Communist Revolutions in 1918 in Germany and Austria, he realized that this would be difficult….Comintern • Decided on a policy of promoting Revolution while accepting reality also and trying to forge a good relationship with Western Europe • Called it a policy of Peaceful Coexistence

Russia and Germany found themselves isolated (outcasts) after WWI – excluded from Versailles Conference: both signed the Treaty of Rapallo, 1922, normalized relations between them • Singed a trade agreement with Britain, which became the first country to recognize the new Soviet Regime • Singed commercial and non-aggression pacts with the Baltic states in 1923 • By 1924, the USSR had regular relations with the chief Western powers - except for the USA, which refused to recognize the USSR

But he hadn’t quiet given up on his dream of international socialism • He quietly promoted international communism through the Comintern / Third International (1919) – with its headquarters in Moscow, which funded and supported international Revolutionary propaganda and activity • Lenin combined Peaceful Coexistence with the quiet / mild.. promotion of International Socialism

Stalin’s Foreign Policy; Peaceful Coexistence • He eventually adopted the Foreign Policy of the right against the left – Socialism in One Country: it was pragmatic, and he defined it as patriotic / nationalistic (the great USSR could do it alone) • Thompson says that he took a cautious and conservative approach to foreign policy: conciliatory diplomacy helped to guarantee the short term security of the Soviet Union

He felt that promoting international communism was counter productive; would interfere with his plans for rapid Industrialization and Modernization; would only encourage European countries to retaliate with trade embargoes, at a time when the USSR needed them to buy its grain and sell her machinery • He didn’t quite disband the Comintern, though, he just ensured it was less assertive or inactive, instructing it to do nothing drastic, to not give the West an excuse to invade the USSR – treated it as a branch of Soviet foreign office • Tucker reminds us that Socialism in One Country does not involve the abandoning of International Socialism, just shelving it

Hoped for Peaceful Coexistence, like Lenin • But he was preparing for an eventual showdown? – one of his major goals was militarization through industrialization and collectivization…. he preached that survival long term depended on militarization • He continued to build on the relationship with Germany from the Rapallo Pact (trade, German army trained in USSR) • FP…not all that different from Lenin’s

He continued the normalization of the relationship with other countries, started by Lenin – except USA • Temporary setback when Britain broke off diplomatic relations in 1927 (Baldwin’s Conservative govt.) after the so-called “Zinoviev Letter” (encouraging British Communists to infiltrate Labor Unions and promote Communism during the General Strike of 1927) – but relationship restored by McDonald’s Labor administration in 1929 • Tucker calls Stalin’s focus on Conciliatory Policy in the 20s as “Hypercaution” – says he showed “an anxious concern for the maintenance of international peace.”

USSR also collaborated with League of Nations efforts to promote cooperation and peace • Nov 1927 the USSR deputy commissar for foreign affairs, Litvinov, presented Soviet proposals for immediate and complete disarmament among all nations to a League sponsored international conference in Geneva • Tucker says that it was a utopian idea (and probably not a genuine proposal), with no chance of adoption – turned down • But Tucker says it benefited the USSR in two ways:

1. advancing the concept put the USSR in a favorable light before world public opinion, demonstrating the peace loving nature of socialism. • 2. When West rejected the proposal the USSR could label the Western arm control talks as hypocritical • Slight set-back to Stalin’s perception was the Treaty of Locarno – between France and Germany, respecting each others borders, and promising not to attack each other – and the acceptance of Germany into the League of Nations in 1925 • Feeling isolated, he signed agreements with France and the Czechs promising mutual assistance if one of them was attacked

In 1928 the USSR ratified the Kellogg Briand pact “outlawing war as an instrument of national policy” - and took the lead in putting the treaty into effect among its neighbors, signing non-aggression pacts with the Baltic states, Poland and Finland • 1930 USSR signed non-aggression pacts with the Baltic states of Poland, Finland • Ultimate in Peaceful Cooperation for Stalin was recognition from the USA in 1933 and admission to the League of Nations in 1934

USSR and USA • USA / USSR recognition agreement of 1933: USSR to repay pre-1917 debts to USA, to cease seditious propaganda against the USA, not to seek damages by US involvement with Whites in Russian Civil War • FDR hoped for trade agreements (any trade partner was a good one – Depression) and protect Open Door in China by co-operation with USSR against Japanese expansion • Stalin also hoped to counterbalance increasingly aggressive Japanese policies in East Asia (invasion of Manchuria), and maybe US loans

USSR and China (also a topic for Section 5, Exam Paper 2) • Stalin discouraged Communist Revolution in China. • Civil War in China between the Nationalists / Kuomintang / Chiang or Jiang vs Communists / Mao • Nationalists and Communists had co-operated to defeat war lords, Lenin had encouraged this and sent military assistance – he hoped they would combine to form a left wing govt. but Jiang turned on Communists after defeat of war lords in 1927

His new Nationalist govt. terrorized his former Communist allies: the Shanghai Massacre almost wiped them out, with just a small number of Communists, inc. Mao, escaping into hiding in the countryside • Under Mao the Communist regrouped and rebuilt and basically from 1927 to 1949 Nationalists and Communists engaged in a Civil War….except for alliance against Japan • Jiang’s govt. – betrayed its promises to establish Democracy, re-distribute land – undemocratic and corrupt • Mao / Communists expanded as peasants became disillusioned with Jiang’s govt. Mao divided land in areas of Communist control, attracting more peasant support

Mao began to develop his own brand of Communism in these years; flexible, adapting Marx’s idea, like Lenin incorporating peasants as a revolutionary group, then focusing exclusively on them • Civil War: Mao used guerrilla warfare tactics: • Jiang launched an all out attack on the key Communist base in the South, in 1933, with army of 700,000 • Forced Communists to undertake the Long March, over a journey of 6,000 miles, with 100,000 of his followers – approx. 10,000 survived

Mao builds a base in North West and expands his Red Army and movement again • Civil War suspended during Japanese invasion; first Manchuria, then East Coast of China…Asian Holocaust / Rape of Nanjing • Fought Japanese together, with $1.5 b in aid from the USA: Nationalists actually fought few battles against the Japanese, saving themselves for the war with the Communists after WWII ended. • Communists emerged as the real heroes of victory over Japan

Civil War resumes in 1945: US tried to mediate, gave $2b more in aid to KMT, encouraged co-operation with CCP • Mao triumphed in 1949 over increasingly unpopular govt. Jiang fled to Taiwan – Mao set up People’s Republic of China – Jiang set up Republic of China, with US assistance • Mao proceeded to introduce Communism – Great Leap Forward…nationalized land, formed huge collectives….little industrialization, modernization, little improvement in lives of peasants, crop failures, famine, death of 20m from famine….

Later Cultural Revolution, 1966 -1976, renewed effort to established Communism, purify nation of anti-Communists…likes Stalin’s Purges….

Stalin’s attitude to Communism in China • From 1927 Stalin urged the Chinese Communists, through the Comintern, to continue to collaborate with Nationalists , even in spite of the Shanghai Massacre – did so again after Japanese invasion, and again after Japanese were expelled, during the renewed Civil War. • Judge and Langdon “Moscow, having invested its hopes in the KMT, insisted that the CCP should maintain the alliance in spite of Chiang’s persecution. This callous Soviet pragmatism, which would manifest itself repeatedly in the course of the next several decades, created a legacy of resentment and distrust on the part of the Chinese Communists towards their Soviet mentors.”

Stalin gave little or no assistance to the CCP in the Civil War, even signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Nationalists govt. of Jiang. • Even when Mao triumphed, Stalin choose not to recognize Mao’s regime at first, sending the Soviet ambassador to follow the Nationalist govt. after it moved to Canton. • Deutscher describes Stalin’s attitude towards the Chinese Revolution as evidence of his willingness to “sacrifice the Chinese Revolution in what he believed to be the interest of the consolidation of the Soviet Union.” • Pragmatic. Soviet interests would be best served by a CCP-KMT alliance….ironically, the same goal / hope for China that the USA had

Why so little encouragement, so little help from Stalin to the Communists in China? • 1. feared it might arouse fears of the West if there were two major Communist countries • 2. might have supported it if he felt he could control Mao – but Mao was too independent minded. Mao represented a potential rival and Stalin was not comfortable with any communist leader who was independent of Moscow’s control (Judge and Langdon p.98) • 3. Communism in China was somewhat different from Communism in the USSR – less industrialized and more rural, more emphasis on Peasant Culture and Society.

In China, “The Communists to be sure, spoke the language of Marxism-Leninism and professed allegiance to the principles of Soviet style socialism. But they were by no means Soviet puppets. They had come to power on their own, with little support and even less encouragement from Stalin and his cronies. And theirs was a peasant revolution, rural and anti-urban in tone, which did not entirely resemble either the proletarian dictatorship envisioned by Marx and Lenin or the industrialized behemoth created by Stalin,” Judge and Langdon…(page 98)

Stalin was not thrilled with the outcome of the Civil War, he had already established a solid working relationship with the Nationalists and had received important concessions in Manchuria from Jiang’s govt • Only after the Peoples Republic of China was formally declared, did Stalin officially recognize the new Chinese regime – probably only after Stalin realized that the US was not going to rescue Jiang and that China’s future was in the hands of Mao • Mao visited Moscow in Dec 1949 to negotiate a Treaty, he was welcomed with something less than open arms, greeted on arrival by Foreign min Molotov not Stalin himself, was referred to in the newspapers as Mr. Mao not Comrade Mao and was treated “more as a supplicant than a heroic partner” - Judge and Langdon p. 98

The negotiations were difficult and it was not until Feb of 1950 that an agreement was reached, Mutual Assistance Treaty - thanks largely to the efforts of China’s new prime minister, Zhou Enlai. • The Soviets agreed to provide limited credits and aid to their allies and eventually to return the railway and seaport concessions that had been granted them in Manchuria by the Nationalists • Aid to Mao / China from the USSR was in reality very little. And the aid would last only until 1960 when the Soviets cut it off because of border / territorial disputes

USSR and Germany / Hitler • Most of Stalin’s foreign policy decisions strengthened the security of the USSR – but in the case of Germany, his policy backfired. • In Germany, Stalin, through the Comintern, ordered the German Communist Party, not to enter into any anti-Nazi alliance with the German Social Democratic Party. • German Communists attacked Social Democracy and cooperated with the Nazi party against it.

At first Stalin’s policy may have made sense since the Nazis were weak • But then they grew in strength due to the Depression: won one third of seats in the Reichstag in 1932… Chancellor of coalition govt. in a “legal revolution” • Communists suffered from a wave of Nazi terror, and after the Nazis success (now majority party) in the 1933 elections (after the Reichstag fire of 28 Feb), with the dictatorial powers given him by the Enabling Act, Hitler campaign of repression of Communists intensified

The German SD’s had called on the German Communists to ally with them against the rise of Hitler, but Stalin would not allow it. • “A united left – SD’s and Communists -might have stopped the rise of the Nazis, but the policy foisted by Stalin on the German Communists eased the Nazis seizure of power in early 1933. Hitler soon turned on the German Communists arresting many and breaking up the movement.” (Thompson p. 277)

Tucker – the Nazi party rose to power because of the weaknesses of the center in the Weimar Republic, the absence of political leadership in the new govt. and “not least, the tactics pursued by the German Communists on orders from Moscow – from Stalin.” Tucker p.228. • Tucker: In Germany, the parties of the Left - Social Democrats and Communists - combined, had about 40% of the Reichstag seats in Nov. 1932. Together could have been a powerful force….whether they could have prevented the Nazi victory is an unanswerable question….

What is certain is that the absence of such cooperation, indeed the strife between the two parties during that critical time, facilitated the downfall of the constitutional order….by forcing the German Communist Party to adopt a policy of uncompromising belligerence against Social Democracy, he abetted the Nazi victory.” Tucker • A former German Communist wrote that the saying current in antifascist German circles at the time was “Without Stalin, no Hitler.” • Zinoviev is supposed to have said “Apart from the German Social Democrats, Stalin bears the main responsibility to history for Hitler’s victory.”

Stalin’s reasoning may have been • 1. He may have seen the Social Democrats as the chief rival of German Communist Party – its competition on the left. • 2. He may have believed the SD’s were too moderate, if they succeeded then it would be impossible to engineer a Communist Revolution in Germany later when the USSR was ready to encourage international revolution • 3. A Communist Germany would not be good for the USSR (like China) – would attract too much attention: Soviet interests came first

Nazi success in Germany would be helpful to the USSR – Nazism was hostile to the West, West to Nazism; it would bring tension, if not a new war between Germany and the West. The West would be so preoccupied with Germany that the USSR could build up socialism in peace. 5. As the Nazi party rose to power, Stalin believed that Fascism represented the last gasp effort of capitalism – he concluded that a brief bout of Fascism would drive the European peoples in flocks to Communism. “He clung to this grave misconception into 1934.” Thompson p.275.

Stalin underestimated Hitler. Never envisaged Nazis becoming as strong as they did. 7. Appears to have been misled by their title - National Socialism - into thinking that they might perform a useful function in preparing ground for a workers revolution in Germany.

Relationship Between Stalin and Hitler After Nazi Take Over • Soon after taking over power, Hitler and Stalin both sought cooperation and a good relationship between Germany and the USSR • Hitler met with the USSR ambassador to Germany and spoke of the common interests of the USSR and Germany – they both had economic difficulties and common enemies, and could be of assistance to each other.

In early May 1933 Hitler agreed to ratify a proposal to extend the 1922 Rapallo Treaty – agreed in 1931 but left unsigned since then: Stalin welcomed this • But Stalin became anxious and concerned as Hitler solidified his power in Germany, re-armed, signed alliances with Italy, Japan, Spain, and began to expand into the Rhineland, Austria, Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia • Hitler also ordered attacks on German Communists and issued anti-Soviet propaganda

Stalin began to feel that the USSR was surrounded by enemies and vulnerable • Tucker: “If the victory of fascism in Germany had a place in Stalin’s policy design, further spread of fascist power did not. A tidal wave of fascism would not give Stalin the division of Europe into rival camps that he wanted, but could also expose Soviet Russia to a deadly danger of attack by a fascist phalanx of states. He had therefore to do everything possible to keep the remaining European democracies and above all France from going Fascist, and to encourage them to take a stand against German aggression”.

Hitler therefore introduced a switch or an addition / new aspect to his existing foreign policy : Added Collective Security to Peaceful Coexistence (more activist) • Faced in the mid-30s with an emerging powerful Germany, Stalin began to pursue a policy of Collective Security with the Western Powers • Stalin ordered the Comintern to shift positions; told Communist parties of Europe to cooperate with other left wing Socialist parties against Fascist parties, in an anti Fascist alliances, esp. in France, and in Spain, in Popular Front governments – success in both countries in 1936 elections

Policy of Collective Security Diplomacy continued with the USSR signing mutual assistance pacts with France and with Czechoslovakia in May 1935. • Also engaged in talks with Britain – encouraged all these countries to militarize in preparation for Hitler’s attack. • Really hoped for conflict in the future between Western Europe and Nazi Germany (which USSR would not be part of)

Tucker: “It would suit him if Germany and these Western powers that he was encouraging to arm would at some stage engage in a protracted inconclusive struggle that would weaken both sides while turning Germany against the democracies in what Stalin envisaged as a replay of WW1. • For the war to be protracted he wanted Br and Fr to be militarily strong enough to withstand the onslaught that Germany under Hitler would unleash against them – this is why he encouraged them to arm, and urged French communist to support the French military build-up.”

Tucker: “Stalin’s collective security diplomacy was a calculated effort of coalition building in Europe. He earnestly sought to bring about the formation of a strong politico-military anti-German grouping based on Fr and Br. But, it was not a coalition in which he wanted the Soviet Union to participate when war came. He was using anti-fascism for his own political purposes.” • Double Standard / Two Faced Nature of his Foreign Policy (like the internal power struggle with Left and Right, used both sided)

While building this coalition with Fr, Br, etc. Stalin still engaged in talks with Germany, pursuing diplomacy with Germany concurrently with the coalition building diplomacy of collective security • Stalin sought a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1935 but Hitler was not yet interested: needed to promote anti-Communism to help strengthen Germany – needed this to get West to allow him to keep Rhineland and Czechoslovakia – so he didn’t want an Alliance with the USSR at this stage

Tucker; “ Hitler appealed to the anti-Communism of the West when he began to militarize. He was practicing divisive diplomacy of his own, at Russia’s expense, by playing the card of anti-Bolshevism in seeking Western acquiescence in his moves to restore German power. • To the British he defended his militarization by denouncing the USSR, insisting that he had no claims on Fr or Br • But the USSR and Germany were only doing what everyone else was doing, Western powers included; they were all engaged in double standards – maneuvering, scheming, positioning for the future

Stalin hoped to play Germany and West against each other; • Hitler hoped to play USSR and West against each other • West hoped to play Germany and USSR against each other. The West had a vision of Stalin and Hitler neutralizing each other. • Stalin was concerned about the inaction of the West after Hitler began to rearm and then invaded the demilitarized Rhineland

The Western powers, as was Stalin, as was Hitler, “were working both sides of the diplomatic street.” • Stalin felt he had an advantage in this chess match, and that was Hitler’s inclination towards a war with France first – Stalin held a card of great value in the current diplomatic game: the capacity to assure Germany of Soviet neutrality in the event of war in the West.

Spanish Civil War • Provided an opportunity for the West and the USSR to display their Collective Security and to see how effective it was against the forces of Nazism. • In Spain, the Popular Front govt. / Republic, legally elected, was under pressure from the right wing, from a Nationalists / fascist military coup led by General Franco • But Collective Security proved to be a failure. Hitler and Mussolini sent considerable assistance to the Right, but only Stalin sent any significant help to the Popular Front or Left. Br, Fr, US sent minimal and ineffective levels of help……

Lack of help from the Western Powers led Stalin to doubt their commitment to opposing Fascism. • Stalin helped because; • The addition of another Fascist country would seriously weaken France as the anchor state of what remained of non-fascist Europe • Hitler’s respect for Russia as a power house would hardly be enhanced if she stood passively by while Germany and Italy were seeing to the destruction of republican Spain.

Lynch argues that the lack of support from the West was Stalin’s own fault, he turned the West away from helping in Spain because he insisted on controlling the Popular Front efforts in the war. • He insisted that the Spanish Republic had to transfer its gold reserves to the USSR ($518m, shipped to the USSR to finance the Soviet aid effort) and all the Republican contingents were required to put themselves under the control of the USSR – the Spanish left resented this

The end result was a victory for Franco / Republicans, creating another Fascist / Right Wing military dictatorship in Europe, presenting another threat to the USSR. • Stalin was disillusioned with the West and with Collective Security • Principle of Collect Security was shattered even more for Stalin by the events at Munich – Hitler took Austria without being stopped, without sanctions, then the Sudetenland, while Mussolini took Ethiopia.

Munich Agreement, 1938, between Br, Fr, Ger – gave Hitler the Sudetenland, in return for a promise to not expand any further – to Stalin this was the ultimate in appeasement • And the USSR was not invited to the Munich talks • The Munich Conference, the Anglo-French sacrifice of part of Czechoslovakia to Hitler, in Sept. 1938, marked a turning point in Stalin’s thinking. Stalin now saw no reason to ally with Fr and Br. Decided to strike a deal with Hitler – “perhaps the Soviet dictator deemed it safer to bargain with a fellow realist than to count on the ideologically unreliable democracies.” (Thompson)

After the failure of a final attempt to form an anti Fascist alliance with Br and Fr, Stalin began pursuing a pact with Hitler in the fall of 1938. • This took enemies and friends of the USSR by surprise • But Stalin, given the threat from Germany and the indifference of Br and Fr to his offers of a defense alliance, felt he had no alternative left – he was attempting to nullify the threat of Germany by the only move open to him

Began to downplay propaganda attacks on Nazism / Fascism • Fired Litvinov and replaced him with Molotov. Litvinov had strongly advocated collective security with Western powers – and he was Jewish. • Hitler responded, advised by his generals to neutralize either the Allies or the USSR before launching major military operations

Stalin’s Foreign Policy