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SAFEGUARDS CASE STUDIES OF THE 1990’s

SAFEGUARDS CASE STUDIES OF THE 1990’s. R. Hooper Monterey, June 2012. IRAQ. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION IN IRAQ PRIOR TO THE GULF WAR. Iraq was an original signatory of the NPT (July 1968) and became a party prior to NPT entry-into-force

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SAFEGUARDS CASE STUDIES OF THE 1990’s

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  1. SAFEGUARDS CASE STUDIES OF THE 1990’s R. Hooper Monterey, June 2012

  2. IRAQ

  3. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION IN IRAQ PRIOR TO THE GULF WAR • Iraq was an original signatory of the NPT (July 1968) and became a party prior to NPT entry-into-force • Their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement entered-into-force February 1972 • Israeli 1981 destruction of the 40 MW Tamuz I research reactor being constructed by the French at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center • Iraqi response – the Tuwaitha “berm” and other measures against low altitude attacks

  4. Ikonos satellite image of Tuwaitha

  5. HISTORY CONTINUED • In the years prior to the Gulf War, safeguards were implemented in four installations designated to be facilities at Tuwaitha • IRT 5000 research reactor • 0 power Tamus II research reactor • an away from reactor fresh fuel store • a pilot fuel fabrication facility inspector access was limited to “strategic points” at each of those four locations as specified in facility attachments

  6. THE GULF WAR AND THE UNSCR 687 INSPECTIONS • The Gulf War ended in March 1991 with Iraqi acceptance of UNSCR 687 – cease fire and disarmament of Iraq • UNSCR called for the “destruction, removal and rendering harmless” of Iraqi WMD and associated infrastructure • IAEA was given a qualified mandate re nuclear disarmament. The remainder – missiles, chemical and biological – was the responsibility of the newly created UNSCOM

  7. UNSCR 687 INSPECTIONS CONTINUED • First IAEA UNSCR 687 on-site inspection occurred mid-May 1991 • Mapping the Iraqi clandestine program • “chase the disc”, IAEA 2 • “the parking lot”, IAEA 6 • the Haider Chicken Farm documents • Destruction, removal, rendering harmless

  8. The nuclear- related sites in Iraq

  9. SOUTHAFRICA --A CASE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT-

  10. SOUTH AFRICA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM • The program existed for at least 20 years (1969-1989) • The white South Africa government was motivated by a deep fear of a black uprising and of communism • South Africa possessed sufficient indigenous technical capabilities and materials • The key was the capability to enrich uranium; the facility was located at a nuclear research installation at Pelindaba near Pretoria • The South Africa AEC produced sufficient highly enriched uranium for 7 gun-type nuclear weapons

  11. SOUTH AFRICA AND THE NPT • South Africa began discussions pursuant to signing the NPT in 1987 • With the collapse of the Soviet Union, amid heavy international pressure and an imminent change of government, South Africa signed the NPT on 10 July 1991 • South Africa’s comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency entered-into-force on 16 September 1991

  12. SOUTH AFRICA AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS • At the 1991 General Conference, a group of African States pushed through a C resolution requesting the Board to instruct the DG to verify the completeness of South Africa’s initial report -This was a first- • The DG’s “completeness team” began its work in South Africa a couple of months later

  13. IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS (CONT.) • The focus, of course, was the uranium enrichment activities • the pilot plant (Y plant), and • the semi-commercial plant (Z plant) • a unique enrichment process and the availability of extensive operating records covering the Y Plant operating history • in March 1993, South Africa formally acknowledged the former existence of a nuclear weapons program and the completeness exercise took on a disarmament dimension

  14. IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS (CONT.) • in 1994, the Agency concluded that the HEU declared and presented – largely material recovered from dismantled weapons – was consistent with what reasonably could have been produced, and • that there was no indication that all nuclear weapon components, designs and related infrastructure had not been destroyed or otherwise rendered harmless

  15. DPRK

  16. DPRK’s NUCLEAR PROGRAMME AND IN’TL SAFEGUARDS (1) • The programme dates to a 1959 nuclear cooperation agreement with the USSR • The USSR supplied an IRT 5000 Research Reactor and an isotope production laboratory that became operational in 1965 • Safeguards were first implemented at the RR under an INFCIRC/66 type of agreement

  17. DPRK AND IMPLEMENTATION OF IN’TL SAFEGUARDS (2) • Across the 1980’s, DPRK constructed and operated • a 5 MWe natural uranium fueled, graphite moderated, gas cooled reactor • conversion/fuel fabrication facility • reprocessing facility • DPRK acceded to the NPT in 1985, but did not meet its Article III obligation to conclude a CSA until 1992

  18. DPRK AND IMPLEMENTATION OF IN’TL SAFEGUARDS (3) • Entry-into-force of DPRK’s CSA occurred 10 April 1992, the submission of their initial report followed quickly (4 May 1992) • Ad hoc inspections to verify the correctness and assess the completeness of the initial report began immediately • The DPRK pledged a high level of cooperation with “anytime, any place access”

  19. THE AD HOC INSPECTIONS • There were 6 ad hoc inspections during the remainder of 1992, inconsistencies between inspection data and DPRK declarations regarding the operational histories of the 5 MWe reactor and the reprocessing facility soon developed • In broad terms, the DPRK declared that the core of the 5 MWe reactor was the original core and that there had been one “hot” reprocessing campaign involving a mixture of damaged, lightly irradiated fuel and fresh fuel

  20. PRINCIPAL INCONSISTENCIES • The waste declared and presented as having resulted from the single reprocessing campaign was not compatible with inputs and the Pu product • Environmental samples taken in the Pu finishing area contained • Puisotopically different from the declared Pu product • The ingrowth of Am in Pu particle indicated three points in time when Pu separations were done, not one

  21. SATELLITE IMAGERY leading to a request for a special inspection, which has never happened

  22. DPRK AND STRENGTHENED SAFEGUARDS • Provided added impetus to efforts to strengthen safeguards • Provided additional evidence of the power of environmental sampling • Tacit acceptance by the Board that the Agency would accept and make use of third party information

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