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Relações Internacionais e Globalização DAESHR014- 13SB (4-0-4)

Explore the origins and consolidation of US hegemony, its decline, and the impact of globalization on global power dynamics.

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Relações Internacionais e Globalização DAESHR014- 13SB (4-0-4)

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  1. Relações Internacionais e GlobalizaçãoDAESHR014- 13SB(4-0-4) Professor Dr. Demétrio G. C. de Toledo – BRI demetrio.toledo@ufabc.edu.br UFABC – 2017.I (Ano 2 do Golpe) Aula 6 6ª-feira, 24 de fevereiro

  2. Hegemonia estadunidense: consolidação ou canto do cisne?

  3. Módulo I: Origens de nosso tempo presente Aula 6 (6a-feira, 24 de fevereiro): Hegemonia estadunidense: consolidação ou canto do cisne? Texto base I: WALLERSTEIN, I, (2004) “Declínio dos Estados Unidos: a aterrissagem forçada da águia”, p. 21-36. Texto base II: KAGAN, Robert (2012) “Not fade away”. Texto complementar: ARRIGHI, Giovani (2000) “A dinâmica da crise global”, p. 309-335.

  4. Para falar com o professor: • São Bernardo, sala 322, Bloco Delta, 2as-feiras e 6as-feiras, das 13-15h (é só chegar). • Atendimentos fora desses horários, combinar por email com o professor: demetrio.toledo@ufabc.edu.br

  5. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • Na disciplina Formação do Sistema Internacional, acompanhamos Arrighi (2000) em sua interpretação do processo de formação do capitalismo histórico e do moderno sistema interestatal como uma sucessão de ciclos hegemônicos: cidades-Estado italianas, Províncias Unidas, Grã-Bretanha e EUA. • A ascensão estadunidense começa com o declínio da hegemonia britânica no final do século XIX, mas a hegemonia dos EUA só se consolida ao final da II GM (1945).

  6. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “O conceito de ‘hegemonia mundial’ (...) refere-se especificamente à capacidade de um Estado exercer funções de liderança e governo sobre um sistema de nações soberanas. (...) O governo de um sistema de Estados soberanos sempre implicou algum tipo de ação transformadora, que alterou fundamentalmente o modo de funcionamento do sistema. (...) Esse poder é algo maior e diferente da ‘dominação’ pura e simples. É o poder associado à dominação, ampliada pelo exercício da ‘liderança intelectual e moral’.” (Arrighi 2000: 27-28)

  7. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “Um Estado dominante exerce uma função hegemônica quando lidera o sistema de Estados numa direção desejada e, com isso, é percebido como buscando o interesse geral.” (Arrighi 2000: 29) • A hegemonia estadunidense reorganizou o capitalismo histórico e o sistema interestatal de acordo com seus interesses. • O período que vai de 1945-1970 pode ser considerado a idade dourada da hegemonia estadunidense. A partir da década de 1970, a hegemonia estadunidense já não é um fato indisputado.

  8. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • Sistema de Bretton Woods: • Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI); • Banco Mundial (BM); • Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). • Acordo Geral de Tarifas e Comércio (GATT – General AgreementonTariffsand Trade, 1947) • Guerra Fria. • Arsenal nuclear. • Globalização neoliberal.

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  19. Fukuyama e o fim da história • “The century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an "end of ideology" or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.” (Fukuyama 1989: 1) • “The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism.” (Fukuyama 1989: 1)

  20. Fukuyama e o fim da história • “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of Foreign Affair's yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world. But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run.” (Fukuyama 1989: 1)

  21. Globalização: origens e expansão global • “(...) The basic principles of the liberal democratic state could not be improved upon. The two world wars in this century and their attendant revolutions and upheavals simply had the effect of extending those principles spatially, such that the various provinces of human civilization were brought up to the level of its most advanced outposts, and of forcing those societies in Europe and North America at the vanguard of civilization to implement their liberalism more fully.” (Fukuyama 1989: 3)

  22. Globalização: origens e expansão global • “To say that history ended in 1806 meant that mankind's ideological evolution ended in the ideals of the French or American Revolutions: while particular regimes in the real world might not implement these ideals fully, their theoretical truth is absolute and could not be improved upon. “ (Fukuyama 19189: 6).

  23. Globalização: origens e expansão global • “Butthatstateofconsciousness that permits the growth of liberalism seems to stabilize in the way one would expect at the end of history if it is underwritten by the abundance of a modern free market economy. We might summarize the content of the universal homogenous state as liberal democracy in the political sphere combined with easy access to VCRs and stereos in the economic.” (Fukuyama 1989: 7)

  24. Globalização: origens e expansão global • “But at the end of history it is not necessary that all societies become successful liberal societies, merely that they end their ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society.” (Fukuyama 1989: 12)

  25. Globalização: origens e expansão global • “I can feel in myself, and see in others around me, a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed. Such nostalgia, in fact, will continue to fuel competition and conflict even in the post-historical world for some time to come. Even though I recognize its inevitability, I have the most ambivalent feelings for the civilization that has been created in Europe since 1945, with its north Atlantic and Asian offshoots. Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again.” (Fukuyama 1989: 18)

  26. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “A crença de que o fim da hegemonia americana já chegou não se segue da vulnerabilidade que se tornou aparente para todos após o 11 de setembro, em 2001. De fato, os Estados Unidos têm perdido o brilho como um poder global desde os anos 70, e a resposta dada aos ataques terroristas meramente acelerou esse declínio. Para entender porque a assim chamada Pax Americana está se esvaecendo requer um exame da geopolítica do século XX, particularmente das três décadas do final do século. Este esforço vai chegar a uma conclusão simples e inescapável: os fatores econômicos, políticos e militares que contribuíram para a hegemonia dos Estados Unidos são os mesmos que produzirão inexoravelmente seu processo de declínio”. (Wallerstein 2004: 1).

  27. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “O sucesso dos Estados Unidos como potência hegemônica no período do pós-guerra criou as condições para a sua demissão como nação hegemônica. Este processo pode ser apreendido por quatro símbolos: a guerra do Vietnã, as revoluções de 1968, a queda do Muro de Berlim em 1989, e os ataques terroristas em setembro de 2001. Cada símbolo construiu-se sobre o anterior, culminando numa situação em que os Estados Unidos correntemente se encontram – ou seja, uma situação de um superpoder solitário ao qual falta poder real, um líder mundial que ninguém segue e poucos respeitam, e uma nação empurrada para cá e para lá em meio a uma crise caótica global que não pode controlar”. (Wallerstein 2004: 3, grifos meus).

  28. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “(...) Há pouca dúvida de que os Estados Unidos continuarão a declinar como uma força decisiva no mundo na próxima década. A verdadeira questão não é saber se a hegemonia dos Estados Unidos está se consumindo, mas se os Estados Unidos serão capazes de delinear uma estratégia suave de declínio, com o mínimo dano para o mundo e para si mesmo.”. (Wallerstein 2004: 8).

  29. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “The present world order—characterized by an unprecedented number of democratic nations; a greater global prosperity, even with the current crisis, than the world has ever known; and a long peace among great powers—reflects American principles and preferences, and was built and preserved by American power in all its political, economic, and military dimensions. If American power declines, this world order will decline with it. It will be replaced by some other kind of order, reflecting the desires and the qualities of other world powers. Or perhaps it will simply collapse, as the European world order collapsed in the first half of the twentieth century. The belief, held by many, that even with diminished American power “the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive,” as the political scientist G. John Ikenberry has argued, is a pleasant illusion. American decline, if it is real, will mean a different world for everyone.”. (Kagan 2012: 1).

  30. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “Powerful as this sense of decline may be, however, it deserves a more rigorous examination. Measuring changes in a nation’s relative power is a tricky business, but there are some basic indicators: the size and the influence of its economy relative to that of other powers; the magnitude of military power compared with that of potential adversaries; the degree of political influence it wields in the international system—all of which make up what the Chinese call “comprehensive national power.” And there is the matter of time. Judgments based on only a few years’ evidence are problematic. A great power’s decline is the product of fundamental changes in the international distribution of various forms of power that usually occur over longer stretches of time. Great powers rarely decline suddenly. A war may bring them down, but even that is usually a symptom, and a culmination, of a longer process.” (Kagan 2012: 2-3).

  31. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “If the United States is not suffering decline in these basic measures of power, isn’t it true that its influence has diminished, that it is having a harder time getting its way in the world? The almost universal assumption is that the United States has indeed lost influence.” (Kagan 2012: 6).

  32. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “If we are to gauge America’s relative position today, it is important to recognize that this image of the past is an illusion. There never was such a time. We tend to think back on the early years of the Cold War as a moment of complete American global dominance. They were nothing of the sort.” (Kagan 2012: 6).

  33. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “From World War II onward, the United States was indeed the predominant power in the world. It wielded enormous influence, more than any great power since Rome, and it accomplished much. But it was not omnipotent—far from it. If we are to gauge accurately whether the United States is currently in decline, we need to have a reasonable baseline from which to measure. To compare American influence today with a mythical past of overwhelming dominance can only mislead us.” (Kagan 2012: 12).

  34. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “So the record is mixed, but it has always been mixed. There have been moments when the United States was more influential than today and moments when it was less influential. The exertion of influence has always been a struggle, which may explain why, in every single decade since the end of World War II, Americans have worried about their declining influence and looked nervously as other powers seemed to be rising at their expense. The difficulties in shaping the international environment in any era are immense. Few powers even attempt it, and even the strongest rarely achieve all or even most of their goals. Foreign policy is like hitting a baseball: if you fail 70 percent of the time, you go to the Hall of Fame.” (Kagan 2012: 13).

  35. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “The challenges today are great, and the rise of China is the most obvious of them. But they are not greater than the challenges the United States faced during the Cold War. Only in retrospect can the Cold War seem easy. Americans at the end of World War II faced a major strategic crisis. The Soviet Union, if only by virtue of its size and location, seemed to threaten vital strategic centers in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. In all these regions, it confronted nations devastated and prostrate from the war. To meet this challenge, the United States had to project its own power, which was great but limited, into each of those regions.” (Kagan 2012: 13).

  36. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “Today, in the case of China, the situation is reversed. Although China is and will be much richer, and will wield greater economic influence in the world than the Soviet Union ever did, its geostrategic position is more difficult. (…) es. It will have a hard time becoming a regional hegemon (…). Altogether, China’s task as a rising great power, which is to push the United States out of its present position, is much harder than America’s task, which is only to hold on to what it has.” (Kagan 2012: 14).

  37. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “Perhaps the greatest concern underlying the declinist mood at large in the country today is not really whether the United States can afford to continue playing its role in the world. It is whether the Americans are capable of solving any of their most pressing economic and social problems. As many statesmen and commentators have asked, can Americans do what needs to be done to compete effectively in the twenty-first-century world? (…) The only honest answer is, who knows? If American history is any guide, however, there is at least some reason to be hopeful. ” (Kagan 2012: 16).

  38. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “But there is a danger. (…) Americans may convince themselves that decline is indeed inevitable, or that the United States can take a time-out from its global responsibilities while it gets its own house in order. (…) The underlying assumption of such a course is that the present world order will more or less persist without American power, or at least with much less of it; or that others can pick up the slack; or simply that the benefits of the world order are permanent and require no special exertion by anyone. Unfortunately, the present world order (…) is as fragile as it is unique. Preserving it has been a struggle in every decade, and will remain a struggle in the decades to come. Preserving the present world order requires constant American leadership and constant American commitment.” (Kagan 2012: 17-18).

  39. A hegemonia estadunidense: origens • “In the end, the decision is in the hands of Americans. Decline, as Charles Krauthammer has observed, is a choice. It is not an inevitable fate—at least not yet. Empires and great powers rise and fall, and the only question is when. But the when does matter. Whether the United States begins to decline over the next two decades or not for another two centuries will matter a great deal, both to Americans and to the nature of the world they live in.” (Kagan 2012: 18).

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