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Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment

Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment. Oriana Bandiera, Andrea Prat, and Tommaso Valletti 尹燕飞. Puzzled thing: High price? Inefficiency or bribe? Active Waste ---direct benefit for decision maker （ bribe ） Passive Waste

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Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment

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  1. Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending:Evidence from a Policy Experiment Oriana Bandiera, Andrea Prat, and Tommaso Valletti 尹燕飞

  2. Puzzled thing: High price? Inefficiency or bribe? Active Waste ---direct benefit for decision maker（ bribe ） Passive Waste ---not benefit for decision maker（ Inefficiency ） Aim： This paper proposes a distinction between active waste and passive waste in determining the cost of public services.

  3. Identifying the behavior: • two channels • Market: Consip: fixed catalog and price Non-consip: P is a function of : (1)the propensity of active waste; (2)the ability to avoid passive waste.

  4. Facing high price: through Consip passive waste through market active waste

  5. II. The Model Manager pays： Object function： F.O.C.

  6. Proposition 1: If there is no Consip deal, the price paid by public body i is an increasing function of both the passive waste parameter i and the active waste parameter

  7. Not from Consip From consip Consip exists

  8. Proposition 2: If a Consip deal is active, the probability that public body i buys from Consip is an increasing function of the passive waste parameter i and a decreasing function of the active waste parameter βi.

  9. Prove

  10. Proposition 3

  11. Figure 1. Model Prediction

  12. 因此，关键在于P与S的相互关系： • 若P与S正相关，PW其主导作用； • 若P与S负相关，AW其主导作用

  13. Main findings 1. The average prices paid by different Italian public bodies vary substantially. 2. Differences across public bodies are correlated with institutional characteristics. 3. Pay higher prices when buying from Consip is not feasible are more likely to buy from Consip passive waste

  14. 4.At least 82 percent of estimated waste is passive in Italy. 5. low active waste high passive waste not trade-off

  15. Institutional Background and the Policy Experiment • A. Types of Public Bodies(PB) Napoleonic bodies US-style local bodies Semi-autonomous bodies B. Consip

  16. Alternative Theories 1.Validity of Proposition 2 ? Bribee reverse to Consip No reports of judicial use of Consip information 2.Active waste through Consip?

  17. IV Data Description21 goods by 208 PBs over the 00-05 period

  18. v. Empirical Analysis A. Price Differences Different PBs buy the same goods, is there any price differences?

  19. B. Reduced-Form Estimates: differences in Active Waste and Passive Waste • u>> Pro1 P • S Pro3 • Pro2 P与S正向关系 • >> u Pro1 P • S Pro3 P与S负向关系 • Pro2

  20. C.Model Estimate

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