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Offense: Brute Force

Offense: Brute Force. A Multifaceted Approach to Understanding the Botnet Phenomenon (Rajab/Zarfoss/Monrose/Terzis). Enough Data?. Research paper states: 800,000 DNS domains examined 85,000 servers botnet-infected 65 IRC server domain names Is above data statistically significant?

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Offense: Brute Force

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  1. Offense: Brute Force A Multifaceted Approach to Understanding the Botnet Phenomenon(Rajab/Zarfoss/Monrose/Terzis)

  2. Enough Data? • Research paper states: • 800,000 DNS domains examined • 85,000 servers botnet-infected • 65 IRC server domain names • Is above data statistically significant? • 450,000,000 hosts via DNS (isc.org) • Over 150,000,000 domain names exist • 47,700,000 .com domains (1% probed)

  3. Realtime Tracking Source: Shadowserver.org

  4. Longitudinal Tracking • Research paper states: • 65 IRC server domain names • 85,000 servers infected by bots • Type-II botnets only • Shadowserver.org tracking (2+ years): • 1800 active botnets daily • 3,000,000 active bots daily • Updates every 15 minutes

  5. Where’s the 40%? • Research paper exclusively WinTel • Easier to obtain bot binaries? • Most internet servers are Linux-based • Hard to ignore the majority • Worm or Trojan backdoors exploited • Defenses are already weakened

  6. Botnet size • Footprint vs. effective size • The paper complains that the footprint is much larger than the effective size. • So? Bots are trying to stay off DNSBL (black lists) and be more stealthy. • Sections of footprint may be rented out

  7. Botmaster concerns Source: swatit.org

  8. C&C Stealth • Botmasters want to remain hidden • IRC-based isn’t the only way • Peer-to-peer systems hide IP source addr • Virtualization of C&C • Dynamic web servers • Network creation/reconfiguration • Come and go quickly • Difficult to trace • Works for honeypots, why not botnets?

  9. Gray-box testing • Only binary bot behavior studied • Results limited by mimicing IRC state • Research emphasized automation over thoroughness • Source code or disassembly reveals more • Behavior may be different in honeynet

  10. Agobot C&C

  11. Botnet evolution • Polymorphic bot code • Gmail as control protocol • SSL usage • Invisible to network inspection • XML/RSS messages • Exploit IPv6 flaws

  12. ? ? ?

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