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Enhancing Internet Safety Through Inspection-Enforced Strategies

The Internet today operates as an unregulated environment, where negligence can lead to risks affecting innocent users. Drawing parallels with traditional risk management in automobiles and aviation, this research proposes an innovative model for Internet safety through inspection enforcement. By leveraging advancements in virtualization, trusted hardware, and distributed storage, the approach aims to establish regular, trustworthy inspections of Internet-connected devices. This collaborative endeavor seeks to demonstrate the effectiveness of these technologies in ensuring safer online environments, paving the way for sensible regulations and foster public confidence in digital systems.

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Enhancing Internet Safety Through Inspection-Enforced Strategies

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  1. Inspection-EnforcedInternet Safety M. Satyanarayanan School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon University

  2. The Wild West in 2005 • The Internet is an unregulated free-for-all today • no constraint on what you can connect • no requirement of minimal safety • no social imperative to obey security directives/upgrades • Consequence • individual virtue (compliance) is not good enough • innocent bystanders (i.e., all of us) can be hurt by negligence of others • my OS or app vulnerabilities can help attacks on others • a form of the “tragedy of the commons” • Just passing laws would not help • no means of enforcement • no provable way of establishing machine state after the fact

  3. Coping with Older Forms of Risk • Automobiles • negligence in maintaining my car can hurt you • states define minimal safety standards • regime of regular inspections by trusted entities • enforceable laws and penalties for non-compliance • Similar approach for risks of other technologies • aircraft (FAA inspectors) • elevators (state/local inspectors) • Society does not expect/demand total elimination of risk • recently-inspected car/plane/elevator could fail • managing risk to tolerable levels is the key • threat of after-the-fact discovery/punishment works • simple tuning parameters to balance tradeoff: risk vs. social cost • frequency of inspection, thoroughness of inspection, competence of inspectors, …

  4. Can This Work for the Internet? • At least two major obstacles • Time scale • virus/worm attacks happen in seconds/minutes/hours • not months/years! • frequency of inspection will have to be at this time scale • Physical transport • completely infeasible to transport hardware to inspectors • equally infeasible to transport inspectors to hardware • scale of problem is very large (embedded systems)

  5. New Opportunity • Combine 3 technologies developed over the last decade • 1. Cheap, efficient virtualization of hardware • e.g. VMware, Xen, Intel VT platform • encapsulate and capture entire machine state • 2. Trusted hardware agents • e.g. TPM from IBM, le Grande from Intel, TCG • encrypt and digitally sign captured state (attestation) • confidence that captured state matches reality • 3. Cheap, efficient distributed storage • content-addressable storage, DHTs, server-based systems • transport and archive captured state for long term • produce in a court room many years hence, if needed

  6. Basic Idea • 1. Require every Internet-connected piece of hardware to support • virtualization • tamper-proof trusted agent • 2. Periodically capture entire state, encrypt and sign • 3. Ship asynchronously to inspection sites

  7. Grand Challenge • Can we show that Inspection-Enforced Internet Safety really works? • not just demos in the lab • research community lives in this world • “eat your own dog food” • Convincing live demonstration & integration of our research • provide basis for sane regulation/legislation of Internet • demonstrate value of research investment to society • Large, multi-year, multi-institution R&D effort • produce open-source software • showcase CS research to the world • inherently a collaborative, society-wide effort

  8. Some Research Problems - I • Secure state capture • how exactly to use TPM, TCG hardware? • what additional hardware, OS support needed? • Scalability • huge volume of captured state • efficient transport, duplicate elimination, archival policies • Inspection frequency and completeness • how often, adaptation to threat levels, • eager vs. lazy, complete vs. probabilistic, game-theoretic analyses

  9. Some Research Problems - II • Poorly-connected sites • connectivity may be enough for attacks but not full state transport • proxy-based trust, delegation? • Impact on usability • how to minimize impact on users • how to do all of this in the background • small-footprint implementation • … many, many others …

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