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The spatial analysis of Congress

The spatial analysis of Congress. PS 426 – Legislative Process January 29, 2009. Positive theory – rational choice. Evolution of the study of Congress. Progressivism, sociology, economics.

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The spatial analysis of Congress

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  1. The spatial analysis of Congress PS 426 – Legislative Process January 29, 2009

  2. Positive theory – rational choice • Evolution of the study of Congress. Progressivism, sociology, economics. • Need to provide the “basic building blocks.” Bridging the gap between how scholars study Congress and how we teach about it. “New institutionalist” approach: interplay between rational individuals and rules of Congress and elections.

  3. Basic underpinnings • Actor assumption • Intentions assumption • Aggregation assumption • Deductive versus inductive approach to theorizing. • Conditions under which rational choice theory is likely to be most applicable: readily available information about the situation, rewards for consistent, rational behavior and penalties for inconsistent behavior.

  4. Spatial model– voting in one dimension • Examples: Supreme Court or three people buying a car. • Four aspects: choice under majority rule, choices can be arrayed on a “more or less” dimension, there is a median voter (or voters), the median voter decides the outcome.

  5. First days of spatial voting theory • Harold Hotelling’s “grocery store problem

  6. Downsian model of party competition L R

  7. Components of the spatial model • Preferences: dimensionality (1,2,many) • Location and characteristics of preferences • Ideal points • Utility curves • Alternatives: motions, amendments, etc. Current debate over the stimulus package. • Expressed in same coordinate system as preferences • Heresthetics: trying to alter the dimensionality of a policy debate. Examples: 9/11-related detainees (civil liberties vs. security); Estate taxes (progressive redistribution vs. the “death tax”).

  8. Components, cont. • Rules – crucial for the legislative process and for the decision making process. • Majority requirement • Simple • Supermajority • Agenda-setting process: which alternatives get considered in which order (e.g., House versus the Senate on the amending process).

  9. Median voter theorem • The median voter will win (in the legislature, on the committee, on the Supreme Court, etc.) if: • Actors vote on the basis of preferences • Preferences are single-peaked • There is a single issue dimension • And voting is by majority rule

  10. Multi-dimensional spatial model • Indifference curves and win sets. Two issue dimensions: guns and butter. • The cycling problem–Arrow’s paradox and the “chaos result.” Any alternative can win, depending on the order in which they are considered. Shows the importance of agenda setting. • Examples: the Powell Amendment and taxes (income, property, and sales). • Salience and sophistication: Pliny the Younger.

  11. The cycling problem • Preferences for the policies, A,B,C: • person 1: A > B > C • person 2: B > C > A • person 3: C > A > B • So A beats B (1+3 v. 2) • and C beats A (2+3 v. 1) • and B beats C (1+2 v. 3), so we are back to the beginning because A beats B.

  12. Pliny and Roman Senate (100 AD) • Alternatives:A = Acquit the freedmen (Status Quo)B = Banish the freedmenC = Condemn (execute) the freedmenApproximately 3 blocs in the Senate with the following preferences: Acquit (45% of the Senate): A > B > CBanish (35% of the Senate): B > A > CCondemn (25% of the Senate): C > B > A

  13. Critiques of the rational choice approach • Collective Action: free rider problem. Why do groups ever form? • Norms and Obligation: nobody has ever washed a rental car before returning it. Cutting across the grass? Picking up trash? Altruistic behavior. • Social Structure – family, church, friendships provide alternative frameworks for understanding behavior. • Forgetting about politics? “Irrational exuberance” article in the packet.

  14. Member goals (Smith text) • Reelection – David Mayhew Congress: The Electoral Connection, 1974. • Good policy • Influence and power within the institution • Higher office • Also serving constituents and legislating, but I see these as related to the first two goals rather than being distinct goals.

  15. Mayhew: goals influence behavior • Advertising (getting the member’s name out in a positive way with little or no issue content). • Credit claiming (any piece of legislation for which the member can credibly claim credit). Pork barrel spending, earmarks, casework (constituency service). • Position taking (roll call votes, but also other forums).

  16. Member Resources • Office and personal staff (Washington D.C. and in the district) • Travel and recesses • Congressional mail (the franking privilege) • Party organizations • Support agencies (CBO, CRS) • Committee staff

  17. Influences on members • Constituency -- Fenno’s concentric circles (geographic, reelection, primary, and intimate) • Interest groups and lobbyists • Party and committee leaders • President (especially if the Pres. is from the member’s party). • Staff

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