Epistemological Methods

1. Epistemological Methods Kareem Khalifa Department of Philosophy Middlebury College

2. Overview • Concepts • Conceptual Analysis (CA) • Thought Experiments • Challenges to CA

3. I. Concepts Epistemology seeks to identify conceptual truths about knowledge. • Crash course in semantics • Application conditions • Conceptual Truths

4. I.A Crash Course in Semantics • Sentences are strings of symbols governed by grammar. • We indicate that something is a sentence by quoting it. • Propositions (thoughts) are the meanings of those symbols. • We indicate that something is a proposition by italicizing it.

5. Examples Sentence “Snow is white” is true in English iffsnow is white. Proposition “La neigeest blanche” is true in French iffsnow is white.

6. I.A. Crash Course, Continued • Words are to sentences as concepts are to propositions. • Concepts are the meanings of individual words. • Propositions & concepts are abstract entities. • Sentences express propositions; words express concepts. • This is very intuitive if you remember that propositions and concepts are kinds of meanings.

7. A Useful Diagram

8. B. Application Conditions • Concepts can be used correctly or incorrectly. • The conditions that describe the correct use of a concept are its application conditions. • x falls under the concept of F if and only if x has the property of being F. • Snow falls under the concept white because snow has the property of being white.

9. I.C. Conceptual Truths Conceptual truths are propositions that are true entirely in terms of the meaning of the concepts that constitute them. Examples? Non-conceptual truths?

10. How do we know when something is a conceptual truth? • If a person S denies a conceptual truth p, then S does not understand the concepts that constitute p. • Ex. All bachelors are unmarried.

11. II. Conceptual Analysis • Reductive Analysis (Narrow) • Elucidative Analysis (Broad) • General Requirements

12. A. Reductive Analysis • Reductive analysis specifies informative necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept. • Ex. S knows that p iff(a) S believes that p, (b) p is true, (c) S’s true belief isn’t merely lucky.

13. B. Elucidative Analysis Elucidative analysis traces constitutive connections between different concepts, propositions, and experiences

14. C. General constraints on analysis • The statements comprising the analysis must be conceptual truths. • The source-concepts must be prior to the target-concept. • Example of failed priority: S knows that piffS knows that p.

15. III. Thought Experiments A. Their Role • Used to confirm that CA’s are actually describing conceptual truths

16. III.B. Potential problems with thought experiments • Design • Execution • Presupposition

17. IV. Problems with Epistemological Methods • Cultural differences • Non-conceptual truths

18. A. Ludwig’s Response to the Cultural Differences Objection • If a thought experiment is well-designed, executed, and has correct presuppositions, then subjects respond solely on the basis of our understanding the scenario and the relevant questions. • Understanding the scenario and questions cultural background. • So, if subjects respond on the basis of cultural background, then the thought experiment is either poorly designed, poorly executed, or has incorrect presuppositions.

19. B. The Non-Conceptual Objection • Many (most?) truths aren’t conceptual in nature. • I have two hands. • Some dogs are shy. • You are a Middlebury student. • What if the only informative things we can say about knowledge are non-conceptual?

20. What’s up with Ludwig & natural kinds? • Ludwig is considering the objection that: • We ought to be analyzing knowledge itself, not our concept of knowledge. • Because “knowledge” is a natural kind term, most of its truths are non-conceptual.

21. More on natural kinds • A natural kind is a property that explains a why a wide class of objects have the same properties. • A natural kind term(NKT) is a term embedded in a practice of ‘picking out’ a natural kind in way that involves: • Some basis of applying the term to objects or phenomena, • Being able to use the kind to explain why that basis of application effectively identifies the objects in question.

22. Ludwig vs. “Knowledge” as NKT • Suppose that we have two worlds—ours and a Matrix-world—in which: • Everything is the same (including our basis of application for ‘knowledge’) EXCEPT • There is a different natural kind which explains why that basis of application works. • In our world, make this as plausible as you can imagine; • In the Matrix world, it’s the super-computer’s neurological interventions on our brains and bodies. • Are our doubles in the Matrix applying ‘knowledge’ correctly but differently?

23. According to Ludwig… • The answer is ‘no.’ [This seems correct to me. You?] • If ‘knowledge’ were a natural kind term, then the answer should be ‘yes.’ [Agree?] • So, ‘knowledge’ is not a natural kind term.

24. Recap • The traditional aim of epistemology is to provide a conceptualanalysisof knowledge. • Such an analysis identifies informative conceptual truths about knowledge. • Thought experiments (based on conceptual competence) are one means of discovering these conceptual truths. • There are potential worries with this package of methods.