1 / 20

Conference on ‘Measuring Competition’

Conference on ‘Measuring Competition’. Competition in the Netherlands: What should policy know? Harold Creusen, Bert Minne and Henry van der Wiel. Content presentation . Introduction and research questions Description of used competition indicators and data Main results of research

banyan
Télécharger la présentation

Conference on ‘Measuring Competition’

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Conference on ‘Measuring Competition’ Competition in the Netherlands: What should policy know?Harold Creusen, Bert Minne and Henry van der Wiel

  2. Content presentation • Introduction and research questions • Description of used competition indicators and data • Main results of research • Policy implications • Concluding remarks and questions

  3. Trends to more competition in the Netherlands • International trend towards removing institutional barriers • WTO-agreements and unification of EU-market in 1992 • Technological developments improve transparency (e.g. ICT and internet) • Lowers transport costs induces more competition • Dutch competition policy  several regulatory reforms aiming to strengthen competition • New competition law (1998) • MDW-programs  removing public and private institutional arrangements in specific markets

  4. Competition in the Netherlands: 3 research questions • Did competition increase in the 1990s? • Do competition indicators tell the same story? • What can policy learn from it?

  5. Competition indicators: 2 traditional concepts • Profit rate: • Monopoly power to set prices above marginal cost • Higher profit rate implies less competition • Concentration index: • Concentration index (i.e. Hirschman Herfindahl-index) based on market shares • Higher concentration index implies less competition

  6. New concept: Boone indicator • Firms differ in efficiency in terms of marginal costs (or productivity level) • These cost advantages lead up to higher profits Competition increases Slope = Boone indicator

  7. Boone indicator (cont.) • If competition intensifies then the slope (i.e. the Boone indicator) becomes steeper • Efficient firms exploit efficiency advantage more • increases their relative profits (reallocation effect) • reduces profits inefficient firms, least efficient firms exit (selection effect) • The slope can be measured using econometric procedures: • Likewise profit rate, marginal costs are approximated by variable costs • Both scale parameter and firms-specific effect seem to be important

  8. Data • Firm-level data based on yearly Census of Statistics Netherlands • Manufacturing: 1978-1999 • Construction: 1982-1999 • Market services: 1987/93 –1999 • Data cleaned for: • Inconsistent firm-level data like huge growth rates • Lacks in dataset • Data set includes more than 130 selected branches at 3-digit level

  9. Change competition across branches • Boone indicator: less competition in the majority of Dutch branches in the 1990s More competition Less competition

  10. Overall results • Overall results of indicators point toward less fierce competition: • 56% of all branches experienced a decrease in the trend of the Boone indicator • 67% an increase in profit rate • 69% a higher concentration index • However, the results are diffuse • A number of branches faced a small change in competition intensity • According to Boone indicator, competition intensified in most services branches. • Other indicators do not confirm this

  11. Less competition: top 15 • Results in line with overall results: • 15 branches with huge decline in competition represent 20 percent of total output • 15 branches with largest increase only 9 percent • Largest drops particularly in manufacturing • Examples are ‘manufacture of motor vehicles’ and ‘manufacture of vegetable and animal oils’ • Few large declines in services are also found for • Renting of machinery and sale of motor vehicles

  12. Do the indicators tell the same story (I)? • Coherence between profit rate and Boone indicator in period 1993-1999 • But, in nearly 30 percent of the selected industries differences occur in sign of change competition

  13. Do the indicators tell the same story (II)? • Poor coherence between concentration index and Boone indicator over time • They do not match in more than 40% of all cases

  14. Indicators often tell different story at lower levels • Indicators point to the same direction in only 42 percent of all observed industries • Indicators coincide more in case of a fall in competition • Better coherence between profit rate and Boone indicator than between concentration index and Boone indicator • since both concepts are based on profits and marginal costs

  15. Exploiting information indicators • Profit rate and Boone indicator differ if large gap between efficiency levels exists • Efficient firms can use their cost advantage • Higher profit rate and rise in competition coincide • Empirical evidence partly supports this • Concentration index deviates from Boone indicator if: • A rise in competition is based on more strategic interaction • Comparison may provide information on the reason why competition declined: • Coherence suggests decline in number of firms • Disagreement suggests less aggressive interaction

  16. Why did competition weaken? • Less competition seems awkward finding given regulatory reform in the Netherlands. • Are economy-wide effects counteracting regulatory reforms? Open for discussion • E.g., business cycle effects, wage moderation, higher capital intensity and product differentiation • Comparison of indicators suggests that competition could be weakened: • mainly as result of decline in number of firms (in 80 percent of all cases)

  17. Policy implications • Scope competition policy is limited • Competition changes can have different sources • Indicators act like thermometers: • Separately, they say nothing about cause and cure of patient • Complete diagnosis based on more (detailed) information is needed • Beware of clash of information • reduction in administrative burden of firms has its costs

  18. Concluding remarks • Competition has become less fierce in the majority of Dutch branches in the1990s • Indicators often signal different developments • Causes decline competition unknown, but... • Indicators suggest that competition mainly weakened as a result of a reduction in the number of firms • Counteracting overall causes negligible? • Scope of competition policy is limited

  19. Do we have Dutch troubles? • Indicators suggest that competition has become less fierce in the 1990s! • Innovation expenditures are not high • Labour productivity growth is low in international perspective • What’s wrong with patient?

  20. Questions to audience • Why did competition intensity decrease in the Netherlands over time? • Where should we focus on in further research?

More Related