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Assessment and Monitoring in Operation EUFOR CHAD-CAR

Assessment and Monitoring in Operation EUFOR CHAD-CAR. Ltc Jean-Michel Millet J5 EMIA-FE, FR MOD (00 33) (0) 631 11 24 23 jean-michel.millet@inet.air.defense.gouv.fr. AGENDA. EUFOR Chad CAR settings and specific challenges Key features of the monitoring and evaluation system

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Assessment and Monitoring in Operation EUFOR CHAD-CAR

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  1. Assessment and Monitoring in OperationEUFOR CHAD-CAR Ltc Jean-Michel Millet J5 EMIA-FE, FR MOD (00 33) (0) 631 11 24 23 jean-michel.millet@inet.air.defense.gouv.fr

  2. AGENDA • EUFOR Chad CAR settings and specific challenges • Key features of the monitoring and evaluation system • Strengths and weaknesses • Lessons learned

  3. Key elements of framework • A long standing and deep-rooted regional crisis. • Ethnical allegiance trumps national sentiment. • International media focus

  4. Key Features of the operation • Complex Environment • EUFOR as a “learning organization” • Comprehensive approach as the hallmark of EU operations • Paramount Role of perceptions

  5. UNSCR 1778 • Approves the establishment in Chad and the Central African Republic, […] of a multidimensional presence(UN & EU)‏ • EU Operation is intended • To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons • To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations • To contribute to protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to insuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and UN and associated personnel

  6. EUFOR Mission • An EU military force is […] to contribute to establishing a SASE in the AOO, in order to contribute to: • protection of civilians in danger, • facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel through improved security, • protection of UN and associated personnel, • encouraging the voluntary return of IDPs, especially in the Dar Sila region

  7. EUFOR Objectives • Enable MINURCAT to deploy and operate • Improve security conditions for the civilian population & humanitarian organisations • Deter armed groups within the AOO, and especially those transiting from SUDAN to CHAD via CAR • Contribute to: • the creation of the conditions required for the voluntary return of IDPs to their places of origin, especially in the Dar Sila region, • the creation of the conditions for launching a longer-term civilian reconstruction effort necessary for the voluntary return of these persons.

  8. Area of Interest (AOI)‏ ALGERIA LIBYA EGYPT NIGER CHAD SUDAN NIGERIA CAR CAMEROON RD CONGO Work in progress GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS IMD GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS Joint Operational Area (JOA)‏ Area of Operation (AOO): Chad: part of Ennedi-est dept, Wadi-Fira, Ouaddaï and Salamat regions CAR: Vakaga region and part of Haute-Kotto (incl.Kaoudja village)‏ And appropriate LOCs, log. elements and HQ areas Kaoudja

  9. 900 KM AOO Infra. challenge 400 KM

  10. CAR (example UNHCR web)‏ WFP António Guterres SRSG CHAD/CAR Victor da Silva ANGELO ? High Comissioner for Refugees SRSG CAR Général Lamine CISSE HC as Deputy SRSG? HC/RC Toby LANCER MIL Etc. CIVPOL FAO Mai Moussa ABARI Mahimbo MDOE Bruno GEDDO Jean-Charles DEI Unclassified EU

  11. AGENDA • EUFOR Chad CAR settings and specific challenges • Key features of the monitoring and evaluation system • Strengths and weaknesses • Lessons learned

  12. Monitoring and Evaluation TOR • Monitoring Tool = Campaign Plan, linked to staff processes and Battle Rhythm • Evaluation = Mid Mandate Review process • Strong commonalities

  13. Campaign Plan as a means, not an end • A tool to enable the Force Commander to : • Understand the current status of the operation in the different domains at the operational level • Facilitatedecisionmaking • Communicate vision/status AN OPERATIONAL LEVEL “DASHBOARD” Campaign Plan Tool “At start” situation “Desired” situation time Actions, effects, Situation Awareness

  14. A TOOL TAILORED TO THE OPERATION • No “enemy center of gravity” to defeat, but multiple, interrelated problem sets. • Comprehensive approach, with multiple stakeholders. • Need a measure of performance to support mid mandate review and transition strategy. • Mix of enduring activities and tasks limited in time • Should facilitate the learning process NEED FOR A SPECIFIC TOOL

  15. DESIGN & PROCESS % and assessed issue : > 75 °%, no major issue foreseen for completion and maintenance 4.4.01 : LOCs & RSOM C2 established Supporting Evidence 2 IOC declaration used to demonstrate full range of capabilities and intent Supporting Evidence 3 MOP 2 EUFOR capability & Intent demonstrated Supporting Evidence 4 MOP 3 phase 2 Objective MOP 4 EUFOR EFFECTIVE phase 3 Objective Essential conditions 2 phase 4 Objective Essential conditions 3 Essential conditions 4 Building blocks Essential Conditions Phase Objectives Supporting Evidences Measure of Performance

  16. DESIGN & PROCESS Ph 2 (JCO1)‏ Ph 3.1 (JCO2)‏ Ph 3.2 (JCO3)‏ Ph 3.3 (JCO4)‏ Ph 4 (JCO5)‏ Critical objectives Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Condition 4 Condition 5 Condition 6 Condition 7 Condition 9 Condition 10 Condition 11 Obj 1

  17. BUILDING BLOCKS • Building Block 1 ENABLED • EUFOR is POLITICALLY ENABLED by its support from EU, UN, National and Regional powers. EUFOR is OPERATIONALLY enabled through the means, capabilities and conditions assigned within each operational phase. • Building Block 2 EFFECTIVE • EUFOR is EFFECTIVE at the tactical level in that it conducts its mandate in accordance with the agreed terms of reference outlined at the strategic and operational levels.

  18. ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS EC1 UN/EU support upheld EC2 Regional/national sponsorship upheld EC3 Vision for the future implemented EC4Situational awareness achieved and maintained EC5 EUFOR Freedom of Movement established and maintained EC6 EUFOR operational capabilities maintained EC7 EUFOR capability and intent demonstrated EC8 UN mission is supported within agreed parameters EC9 Spoilers aggression deterred EC10 Spoilers aggression defeated EC11 EUFOR Contribution to restoring local social-economic balance is effective EUFOR IS POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY ENABLED EUFOR IS EFFECTIVE

  19. Phase 31 Objectives Situational Awareness improves to a level sufficient to support both the expansion of the lodgment area and improving the local security 4 5 RSOM of forces to reach and sustain FOC is achieved EUFOR support level for the FOC is reached. Logistical preparation for the FOC achieved. 6 EUFOR mandated capabilities (FOC status) is reached 7 MINURCAT field offices are deployed and supported according to agreed terms of reference 8 There are indications that the perception of the security climate is changing as spoilers are sensitive to EUFOR presence and maintain a low profile or consider alternate courses of action to violent action 9 Spoiler’s violent actions in JOA are detected, preempted or opposed in an appropriate way (ROEs), that is changing the security climate 10 Priority areas to support crop sowing and return of IDPs are defined and activated 11 HN is supportive of EUFOR efforts to establish FOC 2 EU agencies and national audiences are supportive of the achievement of the FOC 1 EUFOR activities before the rainy season are supporting alternate exit strategies 3

  20. Measure of Performance Chart

  21. MONTHLY CAMPAIGN PLAN REVIEW SESSION What has changed ? What have we learned ? How does this impact our plan ? What should we do ? • SYNTHESIS : • RISKS : • RECOMMENDED MITIGATION

  22. J5 comparison of current status vs. phase objectives and analysis What has changed ? What have we learned ? How does this impact our plan ? What should we do ? • SYNTHESIS : • Logistical situation Improved, with yet several critical items • Improvement on perception of NGOs and actions to security • As EUFOR “footprint” increases, resistance to change is also increasing (paradigm shift)‏ • RISKS : • Logistical stoppage is still a possibility • Increasingly uncoordinated dispersion of limited EUFOR assets to provide ad hoc security • Alienation of stakeholders : EUFOR as an easy target • Insufficient/Non permanent representation at the “theater level of activity” • RECOMMENDED MITIGATION • Effort to solve the critical and important logistical obstacles • Continue to clarify rules on security provision. Reintroduce the security umbrella concept. • Implement “operational level contact group”, with an emphasis on EU accredited authorities End MAY 08

  23. Mid Mandate Review • Terms of Reference • Applied method • Update • Way Ahead

  24. Mid Mandate Review • Applied methodology • Requirement included during initial planning • MMR FHQ steering committee ( Dep Force Cdr, POLAD, J2 ACOS, J3 ACOS, J5 ACOS) since March 08 • Pro forma definition, scenario definition • Working group assembled for data refinement and assessment • SWOT and « comprehensive » analysis

  25. Compiling all analysts MOP criteria compiling Formatting of data Histograph collating Criteria 11 Criteria 12 Criteria 54 Functional area Criteria 11 Functional area Criteria 12 Functional area Functional area Criteria 54

  26. Assessment of the security situation Considerations should be given to these dimensions which will enable system analysis Xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx (S) STRENGTH (W) WEAKNESS (O) OPPORTUNITIES (T) THREAT (D) DEPENDENCY (V) VULNERABILITY (R) RELATIONSHIP Time New Roman 12 < 1000 words

  27. Systemic approach Functional area Links Functional area Strengths Dependencies Nodes Functional area Weaknesses Vulnerabilities Strengths Dependencies Relationships Weaknesses Vulnerabilities Strengths Dependencies Relationships Weaknesses Vulnerabilities Relationships evaluating analysis

  28. AGENDA • EUFOR Chad CAR settings and specific challenges • Key features of the monitoring and evaluation system • Strengths and weaknesses of the process(es)‏ • Lessons learned

  29. Strengths • Same planning team designed and implemented a process tailored to the mission • Shared and collaborative view developed • Staff and command group structured dialog • Heavy emphasis on « learning process » and flexibility • Heavy emphasis on « balance » rather than « level of achievment » • Provided a useful medium for communication with partners

  30. Weaknesses • Limited inclusiveness of stakeholders (UN, NGOs...)‏ • Bottom up process (OHQ limited influence)‏ • Campaign Plan and MMR used different processes • Metrics used in MMR were developed late in the process

  31. AGENDA • EUFOR Chad CAR settings and specific challenges • Key features of the monitoring and evaluation system • Strengths and weaknesses of the process(es)‏ • Lessons learned (best practices)‏

  32. Lessons learned • Intimate linkage between Operational design and Monitoring/Assessment process • Emphasis on Learning process in a complex environment (review of assumptions)‏ • Need to balance inclusiveness and realism (different documents based on same data)‏ • Have a view on best way to communicate results • Include different views on time horizons

  33. FHQ CJ5 overview BACK UP

  34. Strategic Political Background UNAMID AMIS & UNMIS + L & HSP UN Force in DARFUR + Multidimensional presence including Chad & CAR R170631/08/06 R176931/07/07 UNMIS - Liaison Officers EUFOR R177825/09/07 MINURCAT Darfur Peace Agreement 05/05/06 SUDAN- DARFUR 2007 2008 2006 2007 AMIS+ UNMIS CHAD CAR

  35. Legitimacy & Authority • UNSCR 1778 (25 September 2007) • EU Crisis Management Concept (10 September 2007)‏ • EU Initiating Military Directive (22 October 2007)‏ • EUFOR Concept of Operation (05 November 2007)‏ • EUFOR Operation Plan (18 January 2008)‏

  36. EU Political Objectives • EU wishes, […], to contribute to solving this crisis through the use of a spectrum of political, humanitarian and security instruments, within a comprehensive and regional approach. • […] Providing that UN is ready to deploy a multinational follow-on force, EU wishes to deploy a military force ITO contribute to enhance security in the area

  37. STAKEHOLDERS’ LOCATIONS POLITICAL SPOILERS MDJT RFC UFDD CRIMINAL SPOILERS UFDD- FONDAMENTALE Ex-FUC uncontrolled FUC JANJAWEED ARABIC MILITIA UFDR (RCA)‏ JANJAWEED TORO BORO & ROAD-CUTTERS FORMER REBELS & SUDANESE BANDITS & SMUGGLERS

  38. Cluster and lead agencies AOO

  39. PHASE 2 Deployment PHASE 3 Execution PHASE 4 Recovery FHQ planning timeline OPLAN PHASE 1 Pre-condition for deployment Force redeployed FOC Joint Action EU Council decision to launch the operation IOC IOC + 12 months OPO Rain season ORDERS IOC IOC + 12 months JCO 1 Deployment JCO 2 IOC to Rain Season JCO 3 Rain season JCO 4 JCO 5 FRAGO 1 FRAGO 2 FRAGO X Operational Effectiveness Analysis PLANNING TOOLS SYNCHRO MATRIX

  40. 2 2 A dynamic view : the hidden map II ? ? I I ? 1 3 ? New map New threats III ? 4 I : cattle II : harvest (Faya)‏ III : Markets 1. JEM internal fights 2. Raid from Sudan 3. Interethnic clashes 4. Criminality and banditry ? 4 I ? ?

  41. Current common situation picture : • Victims 1st level : population, IDPs, Refugees • Victims 2nd level : NGOs, Ios • Spoilers : Bandits, Rebels,… FAS?, • Conclusion : • >> Act against Spoilers to protect Victims, Spoilers Victims EUFOR Victims Spoilers

  42. Proactiv. - + Nuisance - + Threat Neutr. East Chad Car Stakeholders system PO U.N. MINU. IOs NGOs acknowledgement >> $ REF. EUFOR E.U. IDPs Power : GoC+.. LOW LEVEL FEELING OF INSECURITY POPU. Increasing Power BANDITS ? S. REBELS Tac. Rainy season C.REBELS Oper. SUD. Strat.

  43. OHQ campaign plan

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