Nationalism, Politics, and Terrorism in Spain: The Case of ETA

1. Department of Spanish, Portuguese and Latin American Studies SPPO 1400Nationalism, Politics and Terrorism in Spain: The case of ETADr Pablo San Martinp.sanmartin@leeds.ac.uk

2. Indicative Readings • Llera, F.J., Mata, J.M. and Irvin, C.L., “ETA: From Secret Army to Social Movement – The Post-Franco Schim of the Basque Nationalist Movement”, in O’Kane, Rosemary H.T., ed., Terrorism (Cheltenham Glos: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005), pp. 366-394. • Jáuregui, G., “ETA: Orígenes y Evolución Ideológica y Política”, in Elorza, A., ed., La Historia de ETA (Madrid, Temas de Hoy, 2000), pp. 171-274. • Domínguez Iribarren, F., “El Enfrentamiento de ETA con la Democracia”, in Elorza, A., ed., La Historia de ETA (Madrid, Temas de Hoy, 2000), pp.277-419. • Domínguez Iribarren, F., Las Raíces del Miedo (Madrid: Aguilar, 2003). Capítulo I: “Algo habremos hecho”, pp. 17-46. Capítulo IX: “El Camino de la Fractura Social”, pp. 217-246. • Domínguez Iribarren, F., ETA: Estrategia Organizativa y Actuaciones. 1978-1992 (Bilbao: Universidad del Pais Vasco, 1998). Capítulo III: “ETA: Estructura interna”, pp.79-185. Capitulo IV: “La estructura ‘militar’”, pp. 187-216. • Reinares, F., Patriotas de la Muerte. Quienes han Militado en ETA y Por Qué (Madrid: Taurus, 2001). Capítulo 1: “Quienes son los militantes de ETA?”, pp.19-49. • Funes Rivas, M.J., La Salida del Silencio. Movilizaciones por la Paz en Euskadi. 1986-1998 (Madrid: Ediciones AKAL, 1998). Capítulo II: “Quienes son?”, pp. 35-54. • Uriarte, E., Cobardes y Rebeldes. Por Qué Pervive el Terrorismo (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2003). Capítulo 10: “La Rebeldía”, pp. 227-250. • Alonso, R., “The Ending of ETA Terrorism: Lessons to Learn and Mistakes to Avoid from Northern Ireland”, Real Instituto Elcano, Análisis 51/2006, pp. 1-8.

3. Basque Nationalism • Sabino Arana: purity versus impurity. • Author of ‘Bizkaia por su Independencia’. • Founder of Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV). Antecedents: • Medieval racist discourses about the ‘purity of blood’ of the northern ‘old Christians’. • Carlism: Fundamentalist Catholic ideology. Traditionalist and reactionary movement opposed to liberalism. • First third of 20th Century: two sectors • within nascent Basque nationalism: • Separatist (marginal). • Autonomist/Regionalist (dominant). • Spanish Civil War: • Basque nationalist and workers parties support the Republic. • Basque Carlists and traditionalists support Francoist rebels.

4. Francoist repression? • “La represión no fue cuantitativamente tan intensa como en otras zonas de España, pues en definitiva los nacionalistas eran gentes de orden, y para el nuevo régimen se trataba de extirpar el virus “separatista”, no de exterminar grupos sociales enteros de acuerdo con la operación quirúrgica que Franco anunciara para la izquierda Española en noviembre de 1935. Pero no por eso faltaron los fusilamientos, las penas de cárcel, las deportaciones (…) y destierros, así como una prolongada persecución del euskera en la esfera pública, por no hablar de los símbolos nacionalistas.” • [Elorza, 2000: 56] • […and, anyway, who repressed the Basques?] • “Sabino Arana había descrito erróneamente a Euskadi como un país ocupado, pero Franco hizo efectiva esa ocupación.” • [Gurutz Jaurequi, quoted in Elorza, 2000: 56]

5. …in the meantime • …and, in the meantime, what was the Basque exiled (nationalist) opposition doing? • 1940s: Francoist Regime part of • the (Fascist) ‘Axis of Evil’ •  Hopes for an Ally • intervention in Spain. • 1950s: New context of Cold War Francoist Regime as an anti-Communist champion. • No hope for international intervention. • Progressive integration of Francoism in international community (UN, USA support, etc.) DISSORIENTATION.CRISIS. [crisiscrisiscrisiscrisisdissorientationnohopenohopenohope…yaguirrequenolesenseñoeuskerasushijostraidor!]

6. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) • 1952: creation of ‘study group’ EKIN Revision of nationalist history, ideology... Temporary coalition with EGI (PNV’s youth organisation). 1958: Split between EKIN and EGI. EKIN (with some former militants of EGI) reconverts into a new group called ETA. 1958-1968: Internal ideological debate and low intensity actions. Summer 1968: First armed actions. • Civil Guard killed in an unexpected clash with ETA militants in a road control. • ETA militants escape, but they are persecuted by Civil Guard and one of them (Txabi Etxebarrieta) killed hours later after a new shooting. First ETA ‘martyr’. • Police Chief Melitón Manzanas killed by ETA in San Sebastian one month later.

7. Ideological Debate and the Reformulation of Basque Nationalism: 1959-1968 (i) • 1962: ETA I Assembly (Belloc Abbey, French Basque Country). • - Publication of Zutik! (ETA’s official bulletin) • - Ideological document: ‘Principios de ETA’.  Return to Arana: - Rediscovery of traditional and radical nationalism, including the rigid dichotomist division ‘purity vs impurity’. - Regenerationist spirit: need to rearticulate Basque nationalism (incarnated by PNV).  Departure from Arana: - Rejection of concept of race as main element defining Basqueness. - Less emphasis on religion. - Elevation of language (Euskera) at the centre of the nationalist discourse. - Growing influence of revolutionary and anti-colonial ideologies.

8. Ideological Debate and the Reformulation of Basque Nationalism: 1959-1968 (ii) • 1963-1965: Towards Ethno-nationalism. • 1965: Publication of Federico Krutwig’s influential work Vasconia. Estudio Dialéctico de una Nacionalidad. • Development of Ethno-nationalism: language as main identity marker. • Attempt to use Marxism to interpret Basque history. • 1964-1965: ETA’s III and IV Assemblies. • Growing centrality of anti-colonial (and revolutionary ideas and theories) Adoption of the principle of ‘action-reaction-action’. • 1965-1968: Ideological Confrontation. • Tensions between the ‘leftist’ and the ‘nationalist’ sectors.

9. 1970-1973: The rise of ETA • 1970: Burgos Process • Show trial against 7 ETA militants, aimed at showing the determination of the Government to finish with Basque separatism.  BUT became a trial against the Francoist Regime, attracting international attention and the support of the Spanish opposition to Francoism.  ETA gained prestige as an anti-Francoist organisation. 1973: Assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco

10. 1974: The break up of ETA • Context of continuous internal ideological confrontation: expulsion of several groups of militants, such as for example the so-called ‘Red Cells’ in 1970. Problematic Issues: • - Nationalist or Socialist? • - Strategic issues: •  Primacy of armed struggle over social mobilisation? •  Should armed struggle function autonomously from a wider nationalist and social mobilisation? •  Is it worth to participate at all in social mobilisation? • 1974: Division of ETA: • - ETA militar (ETA m): Separation of military organisation and ‘popular front’. Primacy of Military organisation (popular insurrection) over social movement. • - ETA politico-militar (ETA pm): Combination of military activities (selective use of violence) and social mobilisation. Primacy of political/social movement over military branch.

11. 1975-1982: Transition to Democracy • New context marked by new political opportunities and spaces for mobilisation: Both ETAm and ETApm recognised the necessity to create a social movement / network: Movimiento Nacional de Liberación Vasco (MNLV)  KAS. • 1976:  ETApm: Ponencia Otsabiaga: i) Established the primacy of the social front over the military branch. ii) Called for the progressive dissolution of the military organisation. VIII Assembly: Decided to create a political party.  ETAm: Rejected the Ponencia Otsabiaga and the new emerging spaces for social and political mobilisation. Alternativa KAS. • 1977: 1st Democratic elections + Amnesty  Definitive split between ETApm and ETAm. • Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE): Political party linked to ETApm. Created in 1977. Systemic party. • Herri Batasuna (HB): Political party linked to ETAm. Created in 1978. Anti-systemic party. • 1981: ETApm dissolves and accepts the new democratic context. EE fully integrated in the Basque political and institutional life.

12. ETA’s network of support

13. People killed by ETA (1968-1992)

14. 1980s: From ‘Insurrectionalism’ to Negotiation • Alternativa KAS, as base of any negotiation process: • Recognition of the national sovereignty of Euskal Herria. • Exit from the Basque Country of the occupying police and armed forces. • Creation of a ‘Transitional government in Euskal Herria’ free from Spanish interference (negotiation among Basques organizations, without Spanish interference) • Self determination of Euskal Herria. • Amnesty. 1988-9: Failed Algiers Negotiations.

15. 1988: Pacto de Ajuria Enea • “1. El Estado democrático de derecho tiene su pilar básico en la soberanía de la voluntad popular, expresado mediante el sistema de sufragio libre. Este Parlamento rechaza. en consecuencia, la utilización de la violencia tal y como viene produciéndose en Euskadi por entender que, además de constituir una práctica éticamente execrable y de acarrear desastrosas consecuencias de todo orden para nuestro pueblo, representa la expresión más dramática de la intolerancia, el máximo desprecio de la voluntad popular y un importante obstáculo para la satisfacción de las aspiraciones de los ciudadanos vascos.” • “2.a. El Estatuto de Gernika representa la expresión de la voluntad mayoritaria de los ciudadanos del País Vasco y constituye, en consecuencia, la norma institucional básica de que se ha dotado para acceder a su autogobierno, por lo que su asunción o acatamiento es una condición necesaria para alcanzar su definitiva normalización y pacificación.”

16. The new context of the late 1980s and early 1990s • Consolidation of Democracy: Strengthening of Basque Autonomic Institutions, increase in the level of self-government, and growing legitimacy of Estatuto de Autonomía. New civil society. • GAL scandal: • 1987  dissolution of GAL. • 1990s  GAL trials and jail sentences to high-ranking members of the Socialist Government. • Dialectic ammunition to ETA. • France starts to collaborate actively. End of French ‘safe haven’. • Justice ‘doing its job’: no-one has immunity. State accountable. • Assassination of Yoyes (1986): • Internally: ‘Yoyes Syndrome’ (Fear to abandon the organisation, lack of internal debate and criticism). • Externally: Collapse of ETA’s popularity (increasingly seen as ‘fanatics’, etc.) • Pacto de Ajuria Enea (1988): New ‘Democratic bloc’ (including Basque nationalist and non-nationalist parties)  Isolation of Herri Batasuna. • Targeting of ‘innocent civilians’ (for example, Hipercor bombing in 1987): Collapse of ETA’s popularity. • Failure of Algiers Negotiations (1989).

17. 1980s: strategy of ‘Negociación’ • “En la década de los 80, ETA recrudece su ofensiva para forzar las negociaciones con el Gobierno y los atentados masivos e indiscriminados azotan a la sociedad española como no lo había hecho hasta entonces.” • Especial ETA, El Mundo (http://www.elmundo.es/eta/historia/anios80.html) • Main ETA attacks- July 1986: Car bomb against a convoy of Civil Guards in Madrid •  12 killed. • June 1987: Bombing of Hipercor Car Park  21 killed. • December 1987: Bombing of Civil Guard’s Casa Cuartel in Zaragoza  11 killed. • May 1991: Bombing of Civil Guard’s Casa Cuartel in Vic (Barcelona)  10 killed.

18. Bidart Crisis (1992) • Detention in Bidart (France) of ETA’s heads: • Francisco Mújica Garmendia, "Pakito”. • José María Arregi Erostarbe, "Fiti“. • José Luís Álvarez Santacristina, "Txelis“. Symbolic end to French ‘safe haven’. ETA papers: Invaluable internal information about ETA. Beheaded organisation: all the sections damaged. Disarticulation of several commandos and detention of dozens of militants in the following months. For the first time ETA and its network fear (and the Spanish Government realises) that the ‘vía policial’ could finish with ETA, without any need to negotiate.

19. Victimas mortales de ETA (1992-2000)

20. ETA’s strategic evolution How to ‘socialize the suffering’? Intensification of KALE BORROKA.Targeting of: journalists, lecturers, intellectuals, low-ranking politicians and members of non-nationalist movements, etc. - 1970s: INSURGENCY WAR. • - From late 1970s to early 1990s: NEGOTIATION. • - 1990s  NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION – SOCIALIZATION OF SUFFERING: • “Llevar a la práctica la socialización del sufrimiento significa, lisa y llanamente, perpetrar agresiones personales, acosar en la vida cotidiana a los ciudadanos – por ejemplo cuando utilizan el transporte público, atacado una y otra vez – y hacer la vida imposible, a menudo al pie de la letra, a los adversarios ideológicos”. • Domínguez Iribarren, F., Las Raíces del Miedo (Aguilar: Madrid, 2003), p. 218)

21. New Pacifist Social Movements (early 1990s) • Elkarri: Nationalist movement. Conflict resolution strategy, favouring dynamics for peaceful negotiations. Stronghold: Guipúzcoa. • http://www.elkarri.org • Gesto por la Paz: Pacifist movement. Rejection of all kind of violence. Passive strategy. Stronghold: Vizcaya. • http://www.gesto.org

22. New Constitutionalist Social Movements (late 1990s) • Turning point: Kidnap and assassination of Ermua’s PP councillor Miguel Angel Blanco (1997)  Massive social response: Espíritu de Ermua. • New organizations: Foro de Ermua, Basta Ya!, Fundación para la Libertad, Ciudadanía y Libertad, etc. • New discourse: Spanish Constitutional Patriotism. • New language: Radical nationalism = Basque fascism, Basque Nazism, totalitarism. • New oppositions: Nationalist Ethnic communitarian project versus Constitutional Civic project.

23. Example of new ‘constitutionalist’ discourse • “Reconociendo la gran labor realizada por los grupos pacifistas creados en Euskadi durante estos difíciles años, creemos que nuestra sociedad demanda nuevas formas de oposición al fascismo vasco, que apelen más al derecho democrático, a la palabra que al pacifismo gestual y al silencio testimonial. Reivindicamos el espíritu civil iniciado en Ermua en las jornadas de julio, en las que la sociedad vasca recupero no solo la calle, sino la voz, y demostró que es posible luchar pacífica y contundentemente contra ETA y quienes amparan, promueven y se benefician de su proyecto totalitario”. • [Foro Ermua, Manifiesto por la democracia en Euskadi, Bilbao, 13 Febrero 1998, punto 4]

24. The rearticulation of the Izquierda Abertzale: Pacto de Lizarra (1998) and ETA’s ceasefire (1998-99) Key Elements: The conflict has political origins and nature, so the solution should be political.No party of the conflict will win, so it is necessary to negotiate.Main issues to negotiate: territoriality, decision-making (collective) subject and sovereignty. No pre-conditions in the negotiation process.Formula: to deal with the “roots of the conflict”. “Euskal Herria debe tener la palabra y la decisión”  Self-determination • Accords signed by the following nationalist organisations: Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), Herri Batasuna (HB), Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), Ezkerra Batua (EB), ELA/STV, LAB, AB, Batzarre, Zutik, EHNE, ESK-CUIS, STEE-EILAS, Ezker Sindikala, Hiru, Gogoa, Amnistiaren Aldeko Batzordeak, Senideak, Bakea Orain, Elkarri, Egizan, Herria 2000 Eliza, Gernika Batzordea y Autodeterminazioaren Biltzarrak. • Creation of a ‘nationalist front’, opposed to the growing strength of the ‘constitutionalist front’. 1998-1999 CEASEFIRE- Ceasefire ‘indefinido y sin condiciones’, anounced by ETA on the 16 Oct 1998.- Aims: Strengthen ‘nationalist block’ against ‘constitutionalist block’, opportunity to reorganize (damaged) military structure, and pressure on the government to ‘move’ and negotiate. - May 1999: Meeting in Switzerland with Spanish Government representatives  No agreement over issues to be negotiated: Government do not accepted to negotiate political issues. - November 1999: End of ceasefire.

25. Towards the end of ETA? • March 2004: PSOE wins Spanish General elections. Rodríguez Zapatero appointed new Spanish President. Government expresses its willingness to ‘talk’ with ETA. • 22 March 2006: ETA announces a new ceasefire. • Growing tension between Government (PSOE) and main opposition party (PP): PP breaks relations and all forms of communication with Government (06/06/2006) as a protest against the unconfirmed contacts with ETA and Government willingness to ‘make political concessions’. • Official meetings between Batasuna and PSE (summer 2006), following unofficial negotiations between PSE and Batasuna / ETA representatives over the previous months. • Kale Borroka continues to put pressure on Government. • 30 December 2006: ETA’s bomb in Madrid Airport kills two in car park. End of ceasefire (not confirmed by ETA). • 5 June 2007: ETA announces the end of the ceasefire.

26. Any Questions?