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NSS 2002 "The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists

NSS 2002 "The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.". NSS 2002

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NSS 2002 "The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists

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  1. NSS 2002 "The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents."

  2. NSS 2002 "The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents." "The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes—some seen, some unseen."

  3. Rogue states brutalize their own people; no regard for international law; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction; sponsor terrorism around the globe; hate the United States.

  4. Rogue states brutalize their own people; no regard for international law; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction; sponsor terrorism around the globe; hate the United States. Deterrence worked against the Soviets.

  5. Rogue states brutalize their own people; no regard for international law; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction; sponsor terrorism around the globe; hate the United States. Deterrence worked against the Soviets. "Less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks".

  6. Rogue states brutalize their own people; no regard for international law; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction; sponsor terrorism around the globe; hate the United States. Deterrence worked against the Soviets. "Less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks". Leaders of rogue states "see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice."

  7. Rogue states brutalize their own people; no regard for international law; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction; sponsor terrorism around the globe; hate the United States. Deterrence worked against the Soviets. "Less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks". Leaders of rogue states "see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice." Deterrence won't work against terrorists who "seek martyrdom in death."

  8. Rogue states brutalize their own people; no regard for international law; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction; sponsor terrorism around the globe; hate the United States. Deterrence worked against the Soviets. "Less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks". Leaders of rogue states "see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice." Deterrence won't work against terrorists who "seek martyrdom in death." "The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action."

  9. "The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."

  10. "The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively." From speech 3/17/2003: "The danger is clear: Using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any other."

  11. When an attack is imminent, a preemptive strike against the attacking force is justified.

  12. When an attack is imminent, a preemptive strike against the attacking force is justified. We can never have advance warning of a terrorist attack.

  13. When an attack is imminent, a preemptive strike against the attacking force is justified. We can never have advance warning of a terrorist attack. Therefore, when we find that a state

  14. When an attack is imminent, a preemptive strike against the attacking force is justified. We can never have advance warning of a terrorist attack. Therefore, when we find that a state is hostile to us, and

  15. When an attack is imminent, a preemptive strike against the attacking force is justified. We can never have advance warning of a terrorist attack. Therefore, when we find that a state is hostile to us, and has acquired or is likely to acquire advanced military technology, and

  16. When an attack is imminent, a preemptive strike against the attacking force is justified. We can never have advance warning of a terrorist attack. Therefore, when we find that a state is hostile to us, and has acquired or is likely to acquire advanced military technology, and has a cooperative relationship with a group that practices terrorism,

  17. When an attack is imminent, a preemptive strike against the attacking force is justified. We can never have advance warning of a terrorist attack. Therefore, when we find that a state is hostile to us, and has acquired or is likely to acquire advanced military technology, and has a cooperative relationship with a group that practices terrorism, we must conclude that an attack is imminent.

  18. When an attack is imminent, a preemptive strike against the attacking force is justified. We can never have advance warning of a terrorist attack. Therefore, when we find that a state is hostile to us, and has acquired or is likely to acquire advanced military technology, and has a cooperative relationship with a group that practices terrorism, we must conclude that an attack is imminent. Therefore, a preemptive attack against that state is justified.

  19. When an attack is imminent, a preemptive strike against the attacking force is justified. We can never have advance warning of a terrorist attack. Therefore, when we find that a state is hostile to us, and has acquired or is likely to acquire advanced military technology, and has a cooperative relationship with a group that practices terrorism, we must conclude that an attack is imminent. Therefore, a preemptive attack against that state is justified. This is the justification given for the invasion of Iraq (at the time of the invasion).

  20. When an attack is imminent, a preemptive strike against the attacking force is justified. We can never have advance warning of a terrorist attack. Therefore, when we find that a state is hostile to us, and has acquired or is likely to acquire advanced military technology, and has a cooperative relationship with a group that practices terrorism, we must conclude that an attack is imminent. Therefore, a preemptive attack against that state is justified. This is the justification given for the invasion of Iraq (at the time of the invasion). We now know that Iraq had neither advanced military technology nor a cooperative relationship with a terrorist group.

  21. When an attack is imminent, a preemptive strike against the attacking force is justified. We can never have advance warning of a terrorist attack. Therefore, when we find that a state is hostile to us, and has acquired or is likely to acquire advanced military technology, and has a cooperative relationship with a group that practices terrorism, we must conclude that an attack is imminent. Therefore, a preemptive attack against that state is justified. This is the justification given for the invasion of Iraq (at the time of the invasion). We now know that Iraq had neither advanced military technology nor a cooperative relationship with a terrorist group. Let's assume the administration was sincere in its beliefs.

  22. When an attack is imminent, a preemptive strike against the attacking force is justified. We can never have advance warning of a terrorist attack. Therefore, when we find that a state is hostile to us, and has acquired or is likely to acquire advanced military technology, and has a cooperative relationship with a group that practices terrorism, we must conclude that an attack is imminent. Therefore, a preemptive attack against that state is justified. This is the justification given for the invasion of Iraq (at the time of the invasion). We now know that Iraq had neither advanced military technology nor a cooperative relationship with a terrorist group. Let's assume the administration was sincere in its beliefs. What can we conclude?

  23. When basing the estimation of an invisible threat on the presumed intent of a state that has made no visible signs of preparing to attack, it is very easy to be mistaken.

  24. When basing the estimation of an invisible threat on the presumed intent of a state that has made no visible signs of preparing to attack, it is very easy to be mistaken. In other words, it appears that the new standard for imminent threat is too risky.

  25. When basing the estimation of an invisible threat on the presumed intent of a state that has made no visible signs of preparing to attack, it is very easy to be mistaken. In other words, it appears that the new standard for imminent threat is too risky. If you adopt a standard for imminent threat that makes it very easy to be wrong, then you cannot claim that your strike is preemptive.

  26. When basing the estimation of an invisible threat on the presumed intent of a state that has made no visible signs of preparing to attack, it is very easy to be mistaken. In other words, it appears that the new standard for imminent threat is too risky. If you adopt a standard for imminent threat that makes it very easy to be wrong, then you cannot claim that your strike is preemptive. You are attempting to justify preventive war—a war to prevent a situation in the relatively distant future that might or might not occur.

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