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David Porter, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon Smith Interdisciplinary Center for Economics Science

A Computationally Friendly Combinatorial Auction: Why Ask Wochnick When You Can Watch The Clock Tick?. David Porter, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon Smith Interdisciplinary Center for Economics Science George Mason University October 20, 2014. Costs of Using Combinatorial Auctions. Computation

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David Porter, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon Smith Interdisciplinary Center for Economics Science

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  1. A Computationally Friendly Combinatorial Auction: Why Ask Wochnick When You Can Watch The Clock Tick? David Porter, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon Smith Interdisciplinary Center for Economics Science George Mason University October 20, 2014 Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

  2. Costs of Using Combinatorial Auctions • Computation • Solution Time • Complexity • Cognitive and Participation Costs • Placing Bids • Interpreting Results (Transparency) • Incentives • Strategic Bidding • Threshold Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

  3. Combinatorial Auctions with Price Information • Determine accepted and rejected bids (Primal) • Signals are based on pseudo-dual prices • Prices that signal rejection • Prices that signal acceptance • Ambiguous signals Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

  4. Combinatorial Auctions with Price Information • Trade-offs • Computation • Still an issue • Complexity • Prices help guide decisions • Prices are not perfectly transparent: still need to ask Wochnick • Incentives • Experiments • Harder (overlaps/synergies)problems have higher efficiencies Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

  5. Clock Auction • Clock Auctions • Eliminate Jump Bidding • Simplicity • Features • Price Posted • Demand Registered • Prices Increased based on Excess Demand • No IDs, etc. Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

  6. Combinatorial Clock Auction • Basic Design Features (1999) • Prices per object • Submit demand (packed, etc.) • Excess Demandi = Number of Participants bidding on i • Increase Price until only 0 or 1 for each excess demand • Fill by doing full optimization • If 1 is reallocated  excess demand Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

  7. Combinatorial Clock Auction • Tradeoffs • Computation • No Computation required until end • Good Upper bound • Dominated bids calculation during rounds • Complexity • Price information guidance is unambiguous • Incentives? Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

  8. Experiments with the Clock • Environments Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

  9. Experiments with the Clock • Environments Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

  10. Auction Treatments • Mechanisms • SMR • Combo Auction (Plott) • Clock Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

  11. Results Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

  12. Extensions • Moving the Clocks • OR/Eliminate past rounds • Dealing with budget constraints • Exchange • Seller commitment and buy-back Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

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