Module 1: Evolution and Economics

1. Module 1:Evolution and Economics The Development of Economic Systems

2. From an Evolutionary Perspective… • Isolate the basic biological aspects. • Explore how it has been altered throughout a species’ (our) evolutionary heritage.

3. economics 2. The branch of knowledge (now regarded as one of the social sciences) that deals with the production, distribution, consumption, and transfer of wealth; the application of this discipline to a particular sphere; (also) the condition of a state, etc., as regards material prosperity; the financial considerations attaching to a particular activity, commodity, etc.

4. Evolutionary Game Theory

5. Game Theory and Biology:Optimal Foraging Theory ?

6. Game Theory and Biology:Optimal Foraging Theory E = 500 cal. T = 15 min. E = 250 cal. T = 5 min. ?

7. Game Theory and Biology:Optimal Foraging Theory

8. Game Theory and Biology:Optimal Foraging Theory Eaten: Only

9. Game Theory and Biology:Optimal Foraging Theory Eaten: Only

10. Game Theory and Biology:Optimal Foraging Theory Eaten: &

11. Game Theory and Biology:Optimal Foraging Theory Eaten: &

12. Game Theory and Biology:One-on-One Interactions • John Maynard Smith: • Hawk-Dove Models

13. D H ½ Food D H

14. D H ½ Food Nada D H

15. D H ½ Food Nada D Food H

16. D H ½ Food Nada D ½ Food Minus Cost Food H

17. Relative Fitness • Graph

18. Game Theory and Biology:One-on-One Interactions • Tit-for-Tat strategy cooperates with cooperators and defects on defectors.

19. T H ½ Food T H

20. T H ½ Food Minus Cost ½ Food T H

21. D H ½ Food Minus Cost ½ Food D ½ Food Minus Cost H

22. D H ½ Food Minus Cost ½ Food D ½ Food Minus Cost ½ Food Minus Cost H

23. Relative Fitness

24. Tit-for-Tat in Nature:Birds

25. Tit-for-Tat in Nature:Fish

26. Tit-for-Tat in Nature:Primates

27. Game Theory and Biology:Why Begin Cooperating? E = 4000 cal. T Alone = N/A T w/Help = 30 min. E = 500 cal. T = 20 min. ?

28. Game Theory and Biology:Why Begin Cooperating?

29. Game Theory and Biology:Why Begin Cooperating?

30. Game Theory and Biology:Why Begin Cooperating?

31. Cooperation and Culture

32. Evolutionary Game Theory:Ultimatum Game Player 1 Player 2 Or Player 2 can refuse the offer, and no one gets any money. Player 1 can then give as much or as little of the money as he or she wants to Player 2. Player 2 can approve of the amount given, and both keep the money.

33. Quichua • Individual farmers of the Amazon Basin.

34. Lamalera • Whale hunters from Indonesia.

35. Kazakh • Pastors of Mongolia.

36. Au and Gnau • Foraging peoples from New Guinea.

37. What Explains the Variation? Social Dependency Social Integration

38. Make CBG-Only Map

39. Using the Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma • First Mover: Plays “blindly” • Second Mover: Plays with knowledge of first mover’s behavior.

40. Using the Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma • 1) How would you play as a first mover? • 2) How would you play as a second mover if your partner cooperated? • 3) How would you play as a second mover is your partner did not cooperate?

41. Predictors of Cooperation:A World in a City Social Dependency Inverse of Median Income Social Integration N’bhd Quality

42. Cooperation and Subcultures

43. Predictors of Cooperation:In-Class Study #1 Social Dependency Risk Taking Behavior Social Integration Trusting People

44. How to Maintain Cooperation?

45. How to Maintain Cooperation?

46. How to Maintain Cooperation?

47. How to Maintain Cooperation?

48. How to Maintain Cooperation?:Imitation

49. How to Maintain Cooperation?:Punishment

50. How to Maintain Cooperation?:Punishment • Moralistic Punishers • Prosocial individuals who also punish. • Selfish Punishers • Individuals who are generally selfish but punish other selfish individuals.