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Chapter 14

Chapter 14. Strategy. Table 14.1 Simultaneous Entry Game. Solved Problem 14.1 (Page 483). Figure 14.1 Whether an Incumbent Pays to Prevent Entry. Figure 14.2 Noncredible Threat. Figure 14.3 Game Trees for the Deterred Entry and Stackelberg Equilibria.

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Chapter 14

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  1. Chapter 14 Strategy

  2. Table 14.1 Simultaneous Entry Game © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  3. Solved Problem 14.1 (Page 483) © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  4. Figure 14.1 Whether an Incumbent Pays to Prevent Entry © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  5. Figure 14.2 Noncredible Threat © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  6. Figure 14.3 Game Trees for the Deterred Entry and Stackelberg Equilibria © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  7. Table 14.2Entrant’s Best Response and Profit © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  8. Figure 14.4Cournot and Stackelberg Equilibria © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  9. Figure 14.5 Incumbent Commits to a Large Quantity to Deter Entry © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  10. Figure 14.6 Incumbent Loss if it Deters Entry © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  11. Solved Problem 14.3 (Page 496) © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  12. Figure 14.7Investment Game Tree © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  13. Figure 14.8Raising-Costs Game Tree © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  14. Application (Page 503) Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  15. Figure 14.9 Advertising © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  16. Figure 14.10 Shifts in the Marginal Benefit of Advertising © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  17. Table 14.3 Advertising Game © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

  18. Cross-Chapter Analysis (Page 515) Magazine Subscriptions © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

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