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Population aging and intergenerational transfers: a macro-perspective

Population aging and intergenerational transfers: a macro-perspective. Ronald Lee UC Berkeley August 31, 2006 University of Southern California. Colaborative work. Andy Mason and I are co-Directors for this project, with NIA funding through parallel grants.

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Population aging and intergenerational transfers: a macro-perspective

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  1. Population aging and intergenerational transfers: a macro-perspective Ronald Lee UC Berkeley August 31, 2006 University of Southern California

  2. Colaborative work • Andy Mason and I are co-Directors for this project, with NIA funding through parallel grants. • Many collaborators on research teams in other countries.

  3. Conceptual roots • Samuelson’s classic article on consumption loan economy with overlapping generations • Arthur and McNicoll • Willis • Lee and Bommier-Lee

  4. References – downloadable from http://www.schemearts.com/proj/nta/web/nta/show/Working%20Papers • Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “A Research Plan for the Macroeconomic Demography of Intergenerational Transfers”, January 2004. • Antoine Bommier, Ronald Lee, Timothy Miller, and Stephane Zuber, “Who wins and who loses? Public transfer accounts for US generations born 1850 to 2090”, NBER working paper, December 2004. • Andrew Mason, Ronald Lee, An-Chi Tung, Mun-Sim Lai, and Tim Miller, forthcoming. “Population Aging and Intergenerational Transfers: Introducing Age into National Accounts”, Economics of Aging Series, David Wise, ed. NBER and University of Chicago Press. NBER working paper. • Ronald Lee, Sang-Hyop Lee, and Andrew Mason. “Charting the Economic Life-Cycle”, (forthcoming) NBER working paper

  5. The economic life cycle: Labor earnings and consumption per capita Output per person per year Labor earnings, yl(x) + + + + + + Consumption, c(x) • - - - • - - - - • - - • - - - - Age

  6. The NTA project estimates • Average consumption and labor earnings by age for a number of countries • The institutional arrangements and mechanisms by which surplus earnings in the middle years are reallocated to children and the elderly. • Comparisons across countries and over time, and projections. • Will analyze • Descriptive patterns by culture and insitutions • interaction with population aging • consequences for economic growth, • intergenerational equity.

  7. 3. Resource Reallocation Across Age and Time by Institution and Mechanism Source: Lee, 1994

  8. A little theoretical background to motivate empirical accounts • How are earning and consumption at the individual level related to the aggregate economy? • In what direction is income reallocated, up or down the age distribution? • How do these reallocations generate a demand for wealth to achieve desired consumption path? • In what ways can the demand for wealth be satisfied? • I will discuss briefly for a simple case (golden rule).

  9. Is income redistributed upwards or downward across age, on average? • Caldwell has argued that “wealth flows” are upwards in traditional societies, from children to adults. • Others have argued that wealth (income) flows downwards on net, from adults to children. • Assess by calculating the average age at which a dollar (or calorie) is consumed in the population, and similarly at which one is produced, Ac and Ay. • Weight these age profiles by the share of the population at each age. • If Ac < Ay, then consumption precedes production on average, so income is redistributed downwards across ages, from old to young. • If Ay < Ac then the reverse: the young are transferring to older individuals on average.

  10. Stylized human life cycle for surviving individuals y(x) Ac Here, average consumption is later than average production, so wealth flows upwards. Ay Output per person per year c(x) AGE

  11. Average ages and direction of net flows y(x) Ac How does average $ flow upward to older ages? Transfers to the elderly? Saving by young, dissaving by old? Ay Output per person per year c(x) AGE

  12. Cumulated surplus or deficit W(x) (life cycle wealth) Note that W(x) reaches min and max when y(x) crosses c(x) and they are equal. Labor earnings, y(x) Consumption, c(x) Wealth (+) or Debt (-), W(x) Wealth, by age W(x) AGE

  13. Now calculate the average amount of wealth, W(x), per person in the pop y(x) Output per person per year c(x) Population weighted average per capita wealth W in pop; could be pos or neg. W(x) Output per person }W AGE

  14. Wealth and average ages • If Ac>Ay then indivs want to hold onto some output for later consumption, or accumulate claims on later production. This means wealth, W, is on average positive in the population. • If Ac<Ay then people want to consume before they produce, and must go into debt on average, so W is negative.

  15. A nice result, due mainly to Willis W = c(Ac – Ay) , where c = per capita cons The aggregate demand for wealth in a golden rule steady state economy equals per capita consumption times the average ages of consumption minus earning

  16. The Willis result graphically y(x) Ac Here, average consumption is later than average production, so wealth flows upwards. Ay Output per person per year c(x) The area of the arrow = W, direction of arrow shows upward. This equals height of green line. c W(x) Output per person Population weighted average per capita wealth W in pop; could be pos or neg. Here, pos. AGE

  17. W, this aggregate demand for life cycle wealth, can be satisfied in two ways • Holding capital K(x) (owning stocks, a house, family business) • Through transfer wealth T(x) (expecting to receive more transfers in the future than you expect to give) • Basic identity: W = K + T • K cannot be negative • T can be positive or negative, depending on average direction of transfer flows over all. • Borrowing and lending cancels out in a closed economy.

  18. A link to growth theory in case of “golden rule” or optimal aggregate saving and consumption • Population aging is due both to low fertility and to low mortality. • Here focus on role of low fertility, causing low population growth rate, n. • How would lower n affect life cycle consumption across steady state paths?

  19. I will just assert some results • For standard analysis with no age distribution, dc/dn = -k/c • Faster population growth leads to lower optimal per capita consumption • Here, low fertility and population aging raises optimal consumption, because we don’t need to save as much to equip new workers. • Now introduce age: c(x), yl(x) are given age paths of consumption and earning. • What is effect of fertility and n on life cycle consumption:

  20. Result for population with age distribution

  21. In words: The effect of low fertility on life cycle consumption can be positive, negative, or nill depending on sign and size of transfer wealth. With upward transfers (Soc Sec?), slow growth and aging reduces life cycle consumption (even though per capita cons rises) Caution: assumes we stay on path of optimal saving, and does not consider how pop aging will affect savings etc.

  22. More complicated and realistic analyses involve additional factors • Basic points carry over • Age patterns of consumption and earnings, and direction of reallocations, matter to outcome. • Whether reallocations are achieved through transfers or through individual saving and investment is also key. • Reliance on upward transfers for support of elderly makes population very costly (familial support, unfunded public pensions).

  23. An important conclusion about aging • Population aging will lead to a substantial increase in the demand for wealth, due to increased share of the population at older wealth-holding ages • In addition, longer life and lower fertility will raise the demand for wealth per elderly person. • Combined, these mean that aggregate demand for wealth per capita and per worker should double or triple over the demographic transition. • If this increased wealth takes form of capital rather than transfer wealth, population aging will boost productivity and consumption.

  24. Now look at estimated average ages for some very different economic/cultural regimes • Estimated from different kinds of data • Tell a consistent story

  25. 2050 +3 -2 United States [Lee & Miller] Lee, 2000, 2003 (see cv)

  26. 5. Estimated age profiles of production and consumption • These come from NTA project • Research by teams working in each country. • Looks simple; actually a great deal of analysis lies behind them.

  27. Indonesia, 1996 Source: Maliki, Nur Hadi Wiyono, Suahasil Nazara, and Chotib

  28. Taiwan, 1998 Source: An-Chi Tung and Mun Sim Lai

  29. Thailand, 1996 Source:, Amonthep (Beet) Chawla, Mathana Phananiramai, Suntichai Inthornon

  30. Japan, 1999 Source: Naohiro Ogawa and Rikiya Matsukura

  31. Costa Rica, 2004 Source: Luis Rosero-Bixby

  32. Amazing rise in consumption with age in the US

  33. Source: See Lee, Lee and Mason (2005).

  34. Source: See Lee, Lee and Mason (2005).

  35. What causes the reversal of the direction of income shifting from down to up? • To what extent is it simply due to population aging? • To what extent is it due to increased consumption by the elderly? • To what extent is it due to reduced labor supply by the elderly (falling age at retirement)?

  36. The role of population aging: Japan

  37. Average Age of Labor Earnings Average Age of Consumption Source: Rikiya Matsukura and Naohiro Ogawa, Nihon University Population Research Institute (NUPRI).

  38. Average Age of Labor Earnings Average Age of Consumption Conclude that almost all change in average ages is due to population aging rather than to changing shape of the age profiles. Source: Rikiya Matsukura and Naohiro Ogawa, Nihon University Population Research Institute (NUPRI).

  39. Crosses around now, and continues upward Source: Rikiya Matsukura and Naohiro Ogawa, Nihon University Population Research Institute (NUPRI).

  40. The role of changing shape of consumption and earning: US • For the US, we have some CEX type surveys of special subpopulations at a few dates • 1888: Industrial workers and their children • 1917: Industrial workers and their children • 1935: Urban Families with Native-Born Head • 1960, 1980, 1990, 2002: US Households • Analyzed (with great care and ingenuity) by Avi Ebenstein and Gretchen Donehower

  41. More on the historical data • Profiles have been adjusted to national control totals • Limitations • These do not include public in-kind transfers, only private. • Because of varying sample limitations, not strictly comparable before 1980. But let’s take a look anyway…

  42. Source: estimates by Avi Ebenstein and Gretchen Donehower

  43. Source: estimates by Avi Ebenstein and Gretchen Donehower

  44. Source: estimates by Avi Ebenstein and Gretchen Donehower

  45. Source: estimates by Avi Ebenstein and Gretchen Donehower

  46. Source: estimates by Avi Ebenstein and Gretchen Donehower

  47. In 1990, we see that consumption is rising until age 60, and then is flat until 80. Source: estimates by Avi Ebenstein and Gretchen Donehower

  48. This pattern has become even stronger in 2002. Private consumption is about 50% higher in old age than in early 20s. Source: estimates by Avi Ebenstein and Gretchen Donehower

  49. Av age of earnings Av age of private cons Source: estimates by Avi Ebenstein and Gretchen Donehower

  50. In historical US, private consumption shifts strongly towards older ages. Why? • Decline in coresidence? Could go either way. • Rising private health spending in old age? • Rise of public sector transfers, private pensions, and improved financial institutions? • Decline in family solidarity, rise in selfishness? • Will this happen in other countries? Any signs of it?

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