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Tanggung Jawab Direksi dalam Kepailitan

Tanggung Jawab Direksi dalam Kepailitan. Teddy Anggoro. KONSEPSI PERSEROAN TERBATAS. Artificial Person; Legal Entity; Separate Legal Personality; Limited Liability. Artificial Person.

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Tanggung Jawab Direksi dalam Kepailitan

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  1. Tanggung Jawab Direksi dalam Kepailitan Teddy Anggoro

  2. KONSEPSI PERSEROAN TERBATAS • Artificial Person; • Legal Entity; • Separate Legal Personality; • Limited Liability.

  3. Artificial Person • Lord Shaw of Dunfermline’sdalamperkaraDaimler Co. Ltd. V. Continental Tire & Ruber Co. (G.B.) Ltd[1916] 2 A.C. 307. menyatakanbahwabadanusahamandiridengantanggungjawabterbatassebagai“It is a creation of law convenient for the purposes of management, of holding of property, of the association of individuals in business transaction …”

  4. Legal Entity • Yang membedakanantaraorangpribadidanbadanhukum, menurut Buckley L.J. Daimler Co. Ltd. V. Continental.. adalah" The artificial legal person called the corporation has no physical existence. It exists only in contemplation of law. It has neither body, parts, nor passions. It cannot wear weapons nor serve in wars. It can be neither loyal nor disloyal. It can-not compass treason. It can be neither friend nor enemy. Apart from its corporators it can have neither thoughts, wishes, nor intentions, for it has no mind other than the minds of the corporators. "

  5. Separate Legal Personality • Ross Grantham, dalamhasilpenelitiannya The Limited Liability of Company Director, The University of Queensland, TC Beirne School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-03, 2007, menyatakan“Corporate personality entails that the company is recognised for the purposes of the law as a right and duty bearing entry that is distinct from those natural persons who benefit from the company’s business or through whom, …”

  6. Limited Liability • Pettet, dalamtulisannyadalam Limited Liability, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law 7th Ed. Menyatakan, “meaning of limited liability in company law is that by virtue of statute a shareholder is not liable to contribute to the assets of the company on a winding up beyond the amount remaining unpaid on his or her shares.” • United Kingdom, dalam Section 74 The Insolvency Act 1986, Limited liability diartikansebagai “Immunity of shareholders for the company’s debt incurred while it is going concern.”

  7. Ross Grantham dalampenelitiannya The Limited Liability of Company Director… bahwaprinsiplimited liabilityadalah“speaks expressly to shareholders,”sedangkanprinsipseparate legal personalityadalahmemberikansecaratidaklangsungperlindunganbagiDireksidanjugaperlindunganatasinvestasidaripemegangsahamdalambisniskorporasi. Grantham.

  8. Pasal 92 Ayat (1) Direksi menjalankan pengurusan Perseroan untuk kepentingan Perseroan dan sesuai dengan maksud dan tujuan Perseroan

  9. Pasal 97 • Direksi bertanggung jawab atas pengurusan Perseroan sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal92 ayat (1). • Pengurusan sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (I), wajib dilaksanakan setiap anggota Direksi dengan itikad baik dan penuh tanggung jawab. • Setiap anggota Direksi bertanggung jawab penuh secara pribadi atas kerugian Perseroan apabila yang bersangkutan bersalah atau lalai menjalankan tugasnya sesuai dengan ketentuan sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (2).

  10. Pasal 104 • Direksi tidak berwenang mengajukan permohonan pailit atas Perseroan scndiri kepada pengadilan niaga sebelum memperoleh persetujuan RUPS, dengan tidak mengurangi ketentuan sebagaimana diatur dalam Undang-Undang tentang Kepailitan dan Penundaan Kewajiban Pembayaran Utang • Dalam ha1 kepailitan sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) terjadi karena kesalahan atau kelalaian Direksi dan harta pailit tidak cukup untuk membayar seluruh kewajiban Perseroan dalam kepailitan tersebut, setiap anggota Direksi secara tanggung renteng bertanggung jawab atas seluruh kewajiban yang tidak terlunasi dari harta pailit tersebut, • Tanggung jawab sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (2) berlaku juga bagi anggota Direksi yang salah atau lalai yang pernah menjabat sebagai anggota Direksi dalam jangka waktu 5 (lima) tahun sebelum putusan pernyataan pailit diucapkan, • Anggota Direksi tidak bertanggungjawab atas kepailitan Perseroan sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (2) apabila dapat membuktikan: • kepailitan tersebut bukan karena kesalahan atau kelalaiannya; • telah melakukan pengurusan dengan itikad baik, kehati-hatian, dan penuh tanggungjawab untuk kepentingan Perseroan dan sesuai dengan maksud dan tujuan Perseroan; • tidak mempunyai benturan kepentingan baik langsung maupun tidak langsung atas tindakan pengurusan yang dilakukan; dan • telah mengambil tindakan untuk mencegah terjadinya kepailitan. • Ketentuansebagaimanadimaksud pada ayat (2), ayat (3), dan ayat (4) berlaku juga bagi Direksi dari Perseroan yang dinyatakan pailit berdasarkan gugatan pihak ketiga.

  11. Bagaimana Menarik Tanggung Jawab Direksi ?

  12. Direksidan Perseroan Terbatas • Direksi Organ Tubuh; GENERAL Meeting sebagai Otak, oleh karena itu seolah-olah Direksi adalah Personifikasi PT. • 2 (dua) Konsep Direksi: • Trustee Doctrine • Agency Doctrine • Agency Doctrine, sejalan dengan Financial Theory. • John R. Boatright mengatakan, “The most important right of shareholder are elect the board of director”

  13. TanggungJawabDireksi • Berdasarkan Waktu • Sebelum (PT Evergreen Printing Glass vs. Willem Sihartoe Hoetahoeroek) • Setelah (PT Asuransi Kerugian Jasa Raharja vs. Setiarko”Graha Gapura” dan KRT Rubianto Argonandi“PT Rencong Aceh Semen” • Berdasarkan Fiduciary Duty( Delaware Supreme Court Decision) • Duty of Loyalty, Re Emerging Comunication Inc. Shareholder Litigation. 3 dari 7 dihukum. Inside Director: Prosser, Inside Director and Company Counsel: John Raynor dan Outside Director Salvatore Mouio. • Duty of Care, Smith vs Van Gorkom (Trade Union Corporation Case, Marmon Group) Kesepuluh Direktur dihukum mengganti kerugian US $ 23.5 Million

  14. Fiduciary Duty • Steven C. Peck, dalam artikrlnya berjudul The Confidence and Trust That Encompasses the Fiduciary Relationship, California Business Lawyer, 28 Desember 2009, menyatakan “A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for and on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence… A fiduciary is expected to be extremely loyal to the person to whom he owes the duty (the "principal"): he must not put his personal interests before the duty, and must not profit from his position as a fiduciary, unless the principal consents." • .

  15. Fiduciary Duty • Robert Brown Jr. Dalam artikel Disloyalty Without Limit: Independent Directors and the Elemination of the Duty of Loyalty, Kentucky Law Journal, Vo. 95, 2006, mengatakan “absolute require of existing fiduciary relation and fiduciary duty is a fairness.”

  16. Fiduciary Duty • Fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith • Duty of loyalty, “the decision makers within the company should act in the interest of the company, and not in their own interest” (Bernard S. Black) • Duty of Good Faith, “… that directors must act in good faith in what they believe to be the best interest of the company” (Paul L. Davies) • Fiduciary duties of Skill and Care • Diligently (Rajin) • Carefully (Hati-hati) • Skillfully (Terampil) Standart of Conduct

  17. Fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith • Directors must act bona fide, in what they believe to be in the best interest of the company, (Lord Greene dalamSmith v. Fawcett Ltd [1942] 1 A11 ER. 542, Lipton, “They (board of directors) must exercise their discretion bonafide in what they consider to be in the interest of the company, and not for any collateral purposes.”

  18. Fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith • Directors must exercise their powers for the purpose for which they were conferred and not for an extraneous purpose(Direksidiharapkandapatbertindakadildalammemberikanmanfaat yang optimum bagikorporasidenganmenjalankantujuandarikorporasi. Direksitidakdapatmelakukantindakandiluardaritujuankorporasi, walaupunmenurutpertimbangannyatindakantersebutbaikbagikorporasi.)

  19. Fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith • Directors must not fetter their discretion to exercise their powers(Direksi tidak boleh melakukan pembatasan dini untuk bertindak yang sesuai dengan tujuan dan kepentingan korporasi. Direksi dalam menjalankan tugasnya harus tetap bebas dalam mengambil keputusan atau membuat kebijaksanaan sesuai pertimbangan bisnis dengan sense of business yang dimilikinya.)

  20. Fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith • Directors must not place themselves in position of conflict of interest without the consent of the company, Lord Herschell’s dalam kasus Bray v. Ford[1896] A.C. 44, 50; “it is an inflexible rule of a court of equity that a person in a fiduciary position ... is not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict.”

  21. Fiduciary duties of skill and care • Duty of Skill (Direksi tidak diharapkan tingkat keahlian kecuali hanya setingkat yang dapat diharapkan secara wajar dari orang yang sama pengetahuan dan sama pengalaman dengannya) • Duty of Care (Direksi harus memiliki pemahaman yang sama mengenai bagaimana koeporasi harus dijalankan, sekalipun dalam keadaan sulit)

  22. Business Judgement Rule • Roger LeRoy dan Gaylod A. Jentz dalam, Business Law Today: The Essentials, Cengage Learning, 2007, mengatakan bahwa “A rule that immunizes corporate management from liability for action that result in corporate losses or damages if the action are undertaken in good faith and are within both the power of the corporation and the authority of management to make.”

  23. Business Judgement Rule • Douglas M. Branson, dalam artikelnya The Rule That Isn’t a Rule- The Business Rule, Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 36, 2002 mengatakan American Legal Institute, membuat parameter perlindungan bagi direksi dan keputusannya dari Legal Attack, yaitu: • first, she and her colleagues made a judgement or decision; • second, the decision makers were free from disabling conflict of interest; • third, they exercised some (not necessarily reasonable) care in informing themselves about the matter decided; and • fourth, they had rational (not necessarily reasonable) basis for the decision they made.”

  24. Business Judgement Rule • Business Judgement Rule as standart of liability • Business Judgement Rule as abstention doctrine

  25. BusinessJudgementRule as standart of liability, • Delaware Supreme Court, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. 188 A2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) • Dasar Pemikiran “What a directors to act with the same amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstance.”

  26. BusinessJudgementRule as abstention doctrine • Shlensky v. Wrigley, 273 N.E.2d 776 (III. App. 1968)dengan argument sebagai berikut: “that the court will not step in and interfere with honest business judgement of the directors unless there is a showing of fraud, illegality or conflict of interest”. • Harlowe’sNominees Pty Ltd v. Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co.Oil Co. N.L.121 C.L.R. 483 dengan argumen sebagai berikut:“directors in whom are vested the right and duty of deciding where the company’s interest lie and how they are to be served may be concerned with a wide range of practical considerations and their Judgement if exercised in good faith and not for irrelevant purposes is not open to review by the court”

  27. Philosophy of Bussines Judgement Rule • Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, dalam bukunya The Economics Structure of Corporate Law, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) menyatakan “behind business judgement rule lies recognition that investors wealth would be lower if managers decision were routinely subjected to strict judicial review… precisely why investors wealth not be maximized by closed judicial scrutiny is less clear. The standard justifications are that judges lack competence in making business decisions and that the fear of personal liability will cause corporate managers to be more cautious and also result in fewer talented people being willing to serve as director”

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