DAY 2 Session 1 Strategy for Coalitions

1. DAY 2Session 1Strategy for Coalitions Sahr J. Kpundeh World Bank Institute

2. What are Coalitions? • By social action coalitions we mean self-conscious, freely-organized, active, and lasting alliances of elites, organizations, and citizens sharing partially overlapping political goals—in this instance, including but not restricted to the control of corruption—and a basic commitment to peaceful reform.

3. D. Kaufmann et al.

4. Who Should take the lead in a National Governance/Anticorruption Program? Percentage of Respondents A-C: Anti-Corruption

5. Why Coalitions are Important? • Can strengthen and sustain political will to act against corruption and improve governance generally • Strong coalitions can make citizens less vulnerable to corruption by providing new political and economic alternatives • the inclusive and participatory approach to addressing governance issues creates a necessary consensus for reform which ensures they are sustainable.

6. Coalitions • Social action coalitions, linking public and private actors, are a way to mobilize participation and advocacy. Such coalitions are neither a new idea nor a guarantee of successful reforms; indeed, in many instances they win out by default as an anti-corruption strategy. But the contentions is if sustained by careful planning and a diverse set of incentives, they can reinforce political will and enhance the strength of civil society. • Coalition-building efforts are underway in many societies. But too often, they have focused only on anti-corruption tactics and pursuing their own growth, rather than looking at the coalition-building process in more general terms.

7. Coalitions Cont’d. • Still, social action coalitions are the best strategy we have for creating a visible, legitimate reform movement quickly, and for mobilizing resources from within a society. They allow reform constituencies to "borrow" size and resources from each other as they work together. • Even more important in the long run, the internal incentive systems of coalitions can sustain reform after initial enthusiasm has faded, and can help protect members from reprisals. Particularly critical is their potential for moderating costs and risks for "first movers"—that is, those who take the first steps against corruption in the face of both popular apathy and entrenched opposition from corrupt interests.

8. Coalitions Cont’d. • Where they are successful, social coalitions will not totally eradicate corruption. They can, however, provide necessary support for institutional reforms, weaken the combinations of monopoly, discretion, and lack of accountability that make for systemic corruption, and help institutionalize reform for the long term by linking it to lasting interests contending in active political and social processes.

9. Strategy for Coalitions: Cooperative or Adversarial? • When engaging in an anticorruption campaign a coalition must choose the kind of relationship to establish with the regime—cooperation or opposition. • A cooperative relationship is essentially one in which the coalition along with government officials, who have a stake in reform, develop a plan of action to tackle corruption as a criminal offence. • With an adversarial strategy, the coalition fights from the opposition corner, refusing any connection with a government considered unable or unwilling to make credible pro-reform commitments.

10. Advantages of a cooperative Style • First, by reducing the likelihood of officials’ reprisals, cooperation with government reduces the risks of opposing the status quo, which may also work as an incentive for stakeholders in civil society and/or the business sector to join the anticorruption process. • Second, officials and political leaders who are able to take credit for anticorruption actions, particularly where such actions are popular among citizens, are more likely to promote and support long-term strategies; thus, reinforcing their political will.

11. Adversarial Style • In contrast, an adversarial stance decreases the coalition’s ability to sustain its actions as the government (or the regime) can use its power to silence or co-opt potential stakeholders. • The question remains as to the strategy that should be adopted when democracy is non-existent and/or cooperation with government is detrimental to the coalition’s credibility and the success of the anticorruption process. • More importantly, the problem is how to design a successful adversarial strategy, given that all efforts to promote cooperation have failed and any adversarial stance is, by definition, highly risky and dangerous.