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Crime Prevention and Soft Technology

Crime Prevention and Soft Technology. Various forms of soft, information-based technology have been applied to the prevention of a diverse number of crimes, including terrorism, school violence, workplace violence and sex crimes. Preventing Terrorism Using Soft Technology.

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Crime Prevention and Soft Technology

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  1. Crime Prevention and Soft Technology Various forms of soft, information-based technology have been applied to the prevention of a diverse number of crimes, including terrorism, school violence, workplace violence and sex crimes.

  2. Preventing TerrorismUsing Soft Technology • Identifying Risky People: identifying potential Terrorists using information technology • interrogating / foreigners, apprehending illegal aliens, wiretaps, monitoring phone conversations, monitoring financial transactions, tracking hate-related groups • Identifying Risky Places: Airports, Public Transportation, Nuclear Plants, Federal Office Buildings

  3. The Exceptional Case Study Project • In the mid-1990s, the United States Secret Service commissioned a study of 83 individuals known to have attacked or approached with the intent of attacking, a prominent public official or public figure. • . Researchers concluded that attempts to develop a useful profile of potential assassins were essentially futile. Nonetheless, they identified a key characteristic shared by all of its subjects, namely, patterns of behaviors in the period leading up to the assassination or assassination attempt

  4. Core Principles of Threat Assessment • First, , the study found that any attempts to develop a profile of targeted-violence perpetrators would be neither specific enough to have any real discriminatory value nor sensitiveenough to effectively identify potential attackers who might fall outside of the “typical profile”

  5. Core Principle 2 • Second, threat assessment draws a critical distinction between making a threat and posing a threat. The working premise is that the majority of individuals who make specific threats of violence never carry them out, and that many cases of specific violence involve no explicit threats before any action is taken. • Although 77% of the ECSP sample had communicated their threat to someone before the incident, threat assessment views articulated threats as neither necessary nor sufficient for the presence of an actual threat.

  6. Core Principle 3 • Third, acts of targeted violence are not spontaneous events but are planned activities that typically permeate the thoughts of potential perpetrators in the period leading up to the violence. • Threat assessment views virtually all acts of targeted violence as preceded by a chain of behaviors, and, • There are a series of behavioral warning signs that are amenable to identification and interdiction.

  7. Core Principle 4 • Fourth, threat assessment takes a dynamic view of the etiology of targeted violence, holding that the trajectory from idea to execution is highly influenced by interactions between would-be attackers, their views of and perceived relations with the target, and a range of situational variables. • Effective prevention and interdiction involves evaluating interactions among potential perpetrators, situational and opportunistic contexts, and potential targets.

  8. Can We Accurately Profile Likely Terrorists? • Borum (2004) refutes the notion that there is a “terrorist personality” or any valid psychological, demographic, or behavioral profile of a terrorist (see also Horgan, 2003). • The problem with this approach is its lack of both specificity (the ability to exclude “false positives”) and sensitivity (the ability to avoid “false negatives”). • The identification and assessment of terrorism risk becomes far more dependent on sophisticated systems of intelligence than assessment of most other forms of targeted violence.

  9. Threat Assessment Process • QUESTIONS TO ASK IN A THREAT ASSESSMENT • (Adapted from Borum et al., 1999) • What motivated the subject to make the statement or take the action that caused him or her to come to attention? • What has the subject communicated to someone else (target, law enforcement, family, friends, colleagues, associates) or written concerning his or her intentions? • Has the subject shown an interest in assassination, weapons, militant of radical ideas/groups, murderers and/or mass murderers, and workplace violence and stalking incidents? • Is there evidence that the subject has engaged in menacing, harassing, and/or stalking-type behaviors? Has the subject engaged in attack-related behaviors such as: • Developing an attack idea or plan. • Approaching, visiting, and/or following the target. • Approaching, visiting, and/or following the target with a weapon. • Attempting to circumvent security. • Assaulting or attempting to assault a target. • Does the subject have a history of mental illness involving command hallucinations, delusional ideas, feelings of persecution, etc., with indications that the subject has acted on those beliefs? • How organized is the subject? Does the subject have the ability to plan and execute a violent action against a target? • Is there evidence that the subject is experiencing desperation and/or despair? Has the subject experienced a recent personal loss and/or loss of status? Is the subject now, or has the subject ever been, suicidal? • Is the subject's "story" consistent with his or her actions? • Are those who know the subject concerned that he or she might take action based on inappropriate ideas? • What factors in the subject's life and/or environment might increase or decrease the likelihood that the subject will attempt to attack a target (or targets)?

  10. Threat Assessment Instruments • Design Issues: We are in the very early stages of development • Linking Assessment to Crime Prevention: the use of alert codes, resource allocation • Role of the Private Sector

  11. Preventing Homicide • Do we need a Department of Pre Crime, as depicted in Minority Report? • Can potential Homicide Offenders and Victims be identified? • In London, the police have created a list of 100 likely homicide offenders, based on extensive research on offender characteristics • In Philadelphia, U-Penn researchers found that 70% of all homicide offenders AND victims were on probation or parole at the time of the homicide

  12. Can School Violence be Prevented? • Bullying identification protocol • The use of mental health data by school officials; and linking mental health, criminal record, and gun purchase data bases; lessons learned from Virginia Tech tragedy • The application of other forms of soft technology to crime prevention (e.g. information sharing, improved nationwide data collection protocol for criminal histories, etc.)

  13. Myths and Facts about Sex Offenders • Myth: "Most sexual assaults are committed by strangers." • Fact: Most sexual assaults are committed by someone known to the victim or the victim's family, regardless of whether the victim is a child or an adult.

  14. Myth 2 • Myth: "The majority of sexual offenders are caught, convicted, and in prison." • Fact: only a fraction of those who commit sexual assault are apprehended and convicted for their crimes. Most • convicted sex offenders eventually are released to the community under probation or parole supervision.

  15. Myth 3 • Myth : "Most sex offenders re-offend. " • Fact: Reconviction data suggest that this is not the case. Further. Re-offense rates vary among different types of sex offenders and are related to specific characteristics of the offender and the offense.

  16. Myth 4 • Myth: "Sexual offense rates are higher than ever and continue to climb." • Fact: Despite the increase in publicity about sexual crimes, the actual rate of reported sexual assault has decreased in recent years, following the significant downward trend in all forms of violence over the past twenty years

  17. Myth 5 • Myth: "Children who are sexually assaulted will sexually assault others when they grow up.“ Fact: Most sex offenders were not sexually assaulted as children and most children who are sexually assaulted do not sexually assault others • Among adult sex offenders, approximately 30% have been sexually abused. • Some types of offenders, such as those who sexually offend against young boys, have still higher rates of child sexual abuse in their histories. • While past sexual victimization can increase the likelihood of sexually aggressive behavior, most children who were sexually victimized never perpetrate against others

  18. Other Myths About Sex Offenders • Myth: "All sex offenders are male.“ • Myth: "Sex offenders commit sexual crimes because they are under the influence of alcohol.“ • Myth: "Youths do not commit sex offenses.“ • Myth: "Juvenile sex offenders typically are victims of child sexual abuse and grow up to be adult sex offenders.“ • Myth: "Treatment for sex offenders is ineffective."

  19. Can Sexual Assault be Prevented using Soft Technology? Examples • Sex offender registration of all known sex offenders • Sex Offender registration does not prevent recidivism( re-offense rates are very low( 5% for new sex crimes) • but it does make it more difficult for offenders to hide from authorities • Estimates of the number of sex offenders who fail to register vary from 25,000 to 50,000 • Identity Theft and Identity Manipulation by Sex Offenders who fail to register or abscond

  20. Soft Technology Applications • Lifetime monitoring of known sex offenders is now allowed by statute in over 30 states. • Electronic monitoring can be used to locate and track sex offenders. • Sex Offenders can be restricted from certain locations ( living, working, visiting) using new GPS-based location/mapping systems • Private Sector operation of electronic monitoring raises cost and privatization concerns

  21. Soft Technology Applications • Community Notification of High Risk Offenders • Issue: How do we define different levels of sex offender risk? • In Massachusetts, this decision is made by the Sex Offender Registry Board • Level 1, 2 , and 3 Sex offenders are identified by the board

  22. Soft Technology Applications • Early identification of Adult Sex Offenders( as Juveniles) using various assessment tools • Approximately 40% of all known sex offenders are juveniles • Currently, it is estimated that adolescents (ages 13 to 17) account for up to one-fifth of all rapes and one half of all cases of child molestation committed each year. • The majority of juvenile sex offenders desist; a subgroup continue to commit sex crimes as adults • Policy Problem: heterogeneity of sex offenders-We need to distinguish different types of sex offenders when developing new strategies.

  23. Soft Technology Applications • The use of “profiling” to prevent sex crime • Can we accurately predict who will become sex offenders? • Is there a link between early victimization and later offending in terms of sex crime? • Sex Offender prediction and the false positives problem

  24. Soft Technology Applications • Geographic Residency Restrictions • Map location of schools, parks, libraries • Use Mapping technology to create restriction zones • Use EM technology to monitor sex offender movements and identify any violations • Real time response to violations via police, probation, parole, and/or private sector • Problem: Sex offending rarely occurs in public places

  25. Soft Technology Application • Background Checks on all volunteers in schools, youth sports, and all jobs involving minors. • Blanket restrictions on all convicted sex offenders • Issues to Consider: • Role of private sector in data management, cost of system integration

  26. Risk Assessment Tools • RRASOR. The Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offense Recidivism (RRASOR) is brief and simple to use; it consists of only four variables, all of which can be easily retrieved from official records (Hanson, 1997). These four factors – previous sexual offenses, extra-familial victims, offender age under 25, and male child victims – were based on research that demonstrated a strong correlation between these factors and the risk of re-offending.

  27. Risk Instruments • Static-99 considers a range of additional factors, including sexual deviance, types of available victims, persistence, and pattern of antisocial behaviors (Hanson & Thornton, 1999; Hanson & Thornton, 2000). • In a comparative review, the Static-99 added to the predictive accuracy of the RRASOR in the measurement of long-term risk potential (Hanson & Thornton, 2000).

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