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Lecture 21: Elites in China and Russia

Lecture 21: Elites in China and Russia. SOSC 152. A. Where do we find the elites? B. Elite recruitment C. Elite background D. How Elites Interact E. Leadership change: short-term and long term, role of generations. A. Where do we Find the Elites?. 1. Positional Analysis:

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Lecture 21: Elites in China and Russia

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  1. Lecture 21: Elites in China and Russia SOSC 152

  2. A. Where do we find the elites? B. Elite recruitment C. Elite background D. How Elites Interact E. Leadership change: short-term and long term, role of generations

  3. A. Where do we Find the Elites? 1. Positional Analysis: • a. Clearer leadership group than in non-socialist systems because of the fusion of hierarchies. • if they are not in Central Committee, they are not part of elite. • in socialist systems, even economic and cultural elites are in Central Committee • b. Second level elites in regional or provincial party committees, military regional commanders

  4. A. Where do we Find the Elites? (con’t) • c. For USSR could pick 62 top posts, for China top 35 positions for real elite. • in China would include • Standing Committee of Politburo, • Politburo, • Central Committee (中央), • Military Affairs Commission, • Standing Committee of NPC, • Vice Premiers • State Councilors,

  5. A. Where do we Find the Elites? (con’t) 2. Reputational Analysis • in Asian political elites, can find top leaders not among formal positional elite • top 8 leaders who with Deng purged Zhao Ziyang in 1989 had no formal positions • Personal networks let retired politicians maintain power 3. Decisional Analysis • Follow a policy decision making process • Also gives rise to more diffuse view of power in socialist system as many people at lower levels of the system are involved in policy making process.

  6. B. Recruitment of Elites 1. Recruitment Channels • socialist systems try to establish very clear channels for elite recruitment • major channels include communist youth league (共青團), military, universities, all of which are important centres where one joins the communist party • Entry to CCP is first key step into political elite • But political unrest can disrupt these channels which affects the type of people who join elite.

  7. B. Recruitment of Elites (con’t) 2. Once CCP took over, it needed to recruit a large number of elites to fill bureaucratic & political posts • number of party members: • 1949 720,000 • 1952 3,310,000 • 1955 5,270,000 • 1958 7,920,000 • People enter CCP during mass campaigns, making Land Reform, collectivization, Great Leap Forward, important periods for elite recruitment (土改幹部) • mid-1950s saw institutionalization of recruitment channels, with increase of urban recruitment, decrease in number of rural people joining the party.

  8. B. Recruitment of Elites (con’t) • peasants who had been recruited remain in party, move up through hierarchy, become conservative force who resist reforms that Deng must deal with in 1980s. • In PRC and USSR (1927-29), Cultural Revolutions lead to major party purges and introduction of new blood into party. • in PRC, Cultural Revolution expands the channels of elite recruitment and opens the system by destroying Young Communist League • Also, Cultural Revolutions as key period for downward mobility • rise of working class elites in both systems • in USSR, in 1927-29 the channels did not change but class background of new entrants changed

  9. 整風

  10. B. Recruitment of Elites (con’t) We can track upward mobility channels to see the path one needs to follow to get to top: • Look at the positions elites held on the way to power • in USSR important role of heavy industry ministry at regional level, regional party post in Ukraine, Georgia or Russian Federation • for China, in 1980’s importance of time in provinces to bring in new policies, example of Zhao Ziyang • could also rise in central apparatus as Li Peng, Hu Yaobang Recruitment channels: So What? • Assumption that when people join the party, what campaign will affect the type of people they are. • who was recruited during Land Reform different from those recruited during Cultural Revolution (土改幹部) • those who join the CCP during Revolutionary War different than those who join after, in former, risks are high and survival rate is low. • rise of generations (年代) in response to sudden opening due to purges or revolutionary events such as Long March.

  11. C. Background of Elites 1. revolutionary elite had higher class background than overall population. • “status inconsistency”—revolutionaries were members of social class slightly below ruling class and who are excluded from power. • for China, revolutionaries were children of rich peasants, landlords or urban intellectuals. Hakka background. • USSR also had high minority representation, many Jews among revolutionaries, people alienated from regime.

  12. C. Background of Elites (con’t) 2. Law of Increasing Disproportion • post revolutionary elites follow same pattern as pre-revolution due to bureaucratic nature of mobility channels. • Tight selectorates • after 1956, peasants and workers can‘t enter top elite, difficulties for workers in 1960’s, except for during Cultural Revolution • women rarely make it into top leadership unless the wives of top leaders

  13. Female members of the Party central Committee

  14. D. Structure of Elites: How they Interact 1. Factions as key structure of personal relations among elites, forming alliances based on policy and power. • leaders in 1980s divided into "radicals," "bureaucrats" (conservatives), and "market" (or radical) reformers. • based on personal ties to powerful leaders, guanxi networks across entire system. • based on long, deep ties built over years of working together, common experiences. • Patron-client ties

  15. D. Structure of Elites: How they Interact (con’t) 2. Communist elites experienced conspiratorial world, highly mistrusting in early post-revolutionary days. • assumed more trusting today due to rise to power of post-revolutionary elite.

  16. E. Short-term Leadership Changes 1. Succession seen by Western scholars as crisis situation (危機) • but could also be seen as chance for innovation, change of top leaders allows new ideas which may have been suppressed by former leaders. • New leaders do make a difference. • in USSR, each leadership change brought new reform efforts, even if they failed. • Stalin • Krushchev 1956-65 • Brezhnev 1965-85 • Gorbachov 1985-1991

  17. E. Short-term Leadership Changes (con’t) • also for China, with Mao's loss of power in 1960 leading to reforms in 1960-65, led by Liu Shaogi • re-emergence of Deng in 1978  leads to beginning of reform era • Zhao’s rise to power in 1987, major reforms until fall 1988 • Jiang Zemin’s reform of SOEs after 1997 15th Party Congress

  18. E. Short-term Leadership Changes (con’t) 2. Stability of Elite Rotation • sign of mature political system when forced retirement purges become non-violent • began with Krushchev in 1965 • Deng's major contribution not to shoot Hua Guofeng • Changes in “Exit pattern”—no more “defenestration”

  19. Factional split in 1980s over Reforms • Polarized between “radical reformers,” Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, versus “conservatives” Li Peng, Yao Yilin, and Chen Yun, with Deng Xiaoping maintaining balance. • Summer 1988 price reform led to big run on banks, conservatives attack Zhao Ziyang in fall 1988. • Zhao uses student protests in April 1989 to get power back but is purged from posts after June 4th, 1989 Tiananmen crackdown.

  20. Distribution of Elite Values

  21. F. Long-term Trends 1. Aging of Revolutionary Leaders • people who make the revolution stay in power till they die. • in China, members of 8th Party Congress (1956) purged in CR are returned to power in 11th (1977) and 12th (1982) Party Congresses. • every member of 8th Party Congress alive in 1982 is back in Central Committee, but 26 years older. • created serious aging problem for leadership, but in 1985 Deng introduces new younger leadership generation, three-tiered elites. • Puts the old leaders in the Central Advisory Committee

  22. F. Long-term Trends (con’t) 2. Rise of Technocratic Elite • new generation of post-revolutionary elites, trained in universities, eventually come to power • often source of reforms

  23. Age & education before 7 after 1982-84

  24. Leader’s work experience, 1982-87

  25. F. Long-term Trends (con’t) 3. Importance of Generations -- a group of leaders of the same age who shared a common experience who rise to power at the same time • a. For former USSR • Cultural Revolution of 1927-29 brings workers into universities, enter middle level posts in early 1930s. • Stalin purges of 1934-37 creates huge vacuum which they fill. • working under Stalin, move into top posts when remainder of Stalin's group die in 1950s • stay in power until early 1980s, the Brezhnev generation • big gap between them and provincial/regional leaders waiting in wings • some predicted rise of Gorbachev generation with very radical views.

  26. F. Long-term Trends (con’t) • b. For China, four key generations. • Long marchers, now dead. • graduates from universities in 1950s, trained in USSR, Li Peng, Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji • third group is “lao san jie” (老三級) or third generation who went to countryside during CR. • Many went to universities in 1977-79, in their 50 today, with very specific experiences. • waiting in wings to take power from Soviet-trained generation in their 60 and 70s • 4th generation, Hu Jintao, in universities in 1940s before cultural revolution • Now a generation called the “cross-century’ group, in their early 40s, mid-40’s

  27. Succession: seen as “crisis” in communist states • We have witnessed first truly peaceful transition of power in CCP history. • But new leader’s power of appointment constrained by former leader. • Irony of Chinese elite politics--retiring leader picks elites that surround Prime Minister and General Secretary on the Politburo and SC-Politburo

  28. Succession: seen as “crisis” in communist states (con’t) • Succession not institutionalized, so leadership change can trigger crisis. • Zeng Qinghong, head of Organizational Bureau, had big say on leaders in Central Committee and provinces. • Hu Jintao could not pick all his own people, nor could PM Wen Jiabao. First 5 years to consolidate power. • Succession as long-term process; over time, new leader moves his people into key positions, even as he pushes his political agenda. • If Bill Clinton had picked George Bush’s cabinet political stagnation • Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang purged by old guard in 1980s. They had no formal positions, but could determine next leader. • Jiang cautious until Deng died (2/97), pushed for rapid privatization of SOEs at 16th Party Congress (10/1997).

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