Airpower: End of WW I Through WW II

1. Airpower:End of WW I Through WW II

2. Overview • Background—The 1920s • General Mitchell’s Crusade • The Air Corps Act of 1926 • Air Corps Tactical School • WWII Begins • The Battle of Britain • The United States Prepares for War • The Army Air Forces

3. Overview (cont’d) • The US Enters the Second World War • America and its Allies Plan Strategy • The United States on the Offensive • US Strategic Bombing Effort Against Germany • The Air War Against Japan • Tactical Airpower in the Pacific • Strategic Airpower in the Pacific • The End of the Second World War • Review CFD Model

4. The Interwar Years

5. Forming the Army Air Force (AAF) • Army Air Corps and GHQ Air Force merged in June 1941 to form AAF • Merger resulted from decentralization of the War Department General Staff begun by General George Marshall in 1940 • General Hap Arnold named commander • One step from full independence as a separate service

6. The United States Enters WW II • Relations between the United States and Germany deteriorate—USS Reuben Jamessunk in October 1941 • Relations with Japan worsened in 1941 • Japan continues Asian aggression • July 1941—Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in U.S. and halts all American trade with Japan • 7 Dec 1941—Japan attacks Pearl Harbor

7. Allied Strategy for Winning World War II • Priority One: Safeguard Britain and United States • Priority Two: Fight a decisive air offensive against the Axis powers in Europe and fight defensively in Asia • Priority Three: Sustained air offensive against Japan after the Axis powers weredefeated in Europe • Use land forces when, and if, necessary I + II + III = Victory

8. First US Offensive Action of WW II—North Africa • First use of US Ground forces against the Germans • Provided valuable combat experience for ground and air forces • Opportunity for British and US to fight a combined arms campaign • First defeat of the German forces since 1930

9. North Africa (cont’d) • United States learned valuable lessons concerning the employment of airpower in tactical situations • Initial problems experienced by the Allies • Air units were split among ground units • Ground commanders didn’t share aircraft • Airpower used defensively • Airpower employment fragmented and inflexible

10. North Africa (cont’d) • Allied airpower reorganized in 1942 • Command of the air forces went to Airmen • The air officer decided the missions and allocated forces • Missions became offensive in nature • Flexibility of Allied airpower was restored and air superiority was attained • Tactical missions followedand techniques refined • Allies achieve victory in North Africa in May 1943

11. North Africa (cont’d) • “Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage against modern European troops, under the same handicaps and with the same chances of success.” • ~ Field Marshal Erwin Rommell

12. US Strategic Bombing of Germany • Heavily influenced by ACTS and bomber advocates • Some felt strategic bombing alone would defeat Germany • Others believed strategic bombing would weaken Germany and a ground invasion would be required for her surrender

13. US Bombing Strategy • United States committed to high-altitude, daylight precision bombing • Believed heavy bombers, flying in formation, could fight their way to the target and back • Fighter escorts not necessary • Targets identified by AWPD-1 best hit in day time • US strategy ignored weather conditions, target obstruction, fighter opposition, and antiaircraft artillery

14. Strategic Bombing of Germany—Early Efforts • Strategic bombing of Europe was Eighth Air Force responsibility • First raids were against marshaling yards in France—little effect • Late 1942 and early 1943: Eighth AF attacked small targets in Europe—good experience, little effect

15. Strategic Bombing Becomes a Major Objective • Casablanca Conference (Jan 1943) established strategic bombing as a major objective • Destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system • Undermining of morale of the German people • German aircraft industry was the top priority target • The ball bearing industry was a complementary target • Destruction of enemy aircraft industry would help achieve Air Superiority

16. Strategic Bombing of Schweinfurt Germany • Eighth AF bombs the ball bearing plants at Schweinfurt in Summer 1943 • Aug 1943—Eighth AF inflicts heavy damage but loses 36 B-17s and 360 crewmen • Oct 1943—AAF loses 60 bombers and has 138 aircraft damaged and 600 men lost • Losses were unacceptable • No fighter escorts left bombers vulnerable to enemy fighters and antiaircraft artillery

17. Strategic Bombing of Ploesti • Aug 1943—AAF launches attacks against oil refineries at Ploesti, Romania • 180 aircraft launched—55 lost • Raids were costly but needed to shorten the war • Attacks were designed to reduce Germany’s oil and lubricant production • Generally ineffective and deliveries increased until attacks were resumed in 1944

18. Strategic Bombing in Europe (cont’d) • Long-range fighter escorts arrived in theater December 1943 • Took significant toll on German aircraft and their experienced pilot force • Eighth AF resumed raids into Germany in February 1944 • Launched a 1000-plane raid by end of February 1944 • Attacked Berlin in March 1944 • German POL production was reduced to 25% capacity by September 1944

19. European Strategic Bombing: Lessons Learned • Target list was not what it should have been • Attacks on sub pens and ball bearing plants were ineffective • Best targets were the POL production facilities and sources of electrical power • Terror bombing of civilians was ineffective and did little to lower morale • Bombers needed fighter escorts to and from the target

20. Davis Video