html5-img
1 / 8

Bus Regulation in Europe and Around the World – What Seems to Work?

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit. Bus Regulation in Europe and Around the World – What Seems to Work? . John Preston Transport Studies Unit University of Oxford Presentation to IPPR Seminar on Bus Regulation Outside of London 29 June 2004. Case Study (I): Copenhagen.

tassos
Télécharger la présentation

Bus Regulation in Europe and Around the World – What Seems to Work?

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Transport Studies Unit Bus Regulation in Europe and Around the World – What Seems to Work? John Preston Transport Studies Unit University of Oxford Presentation to IPPR Seminar on Bus Regulation Outside of London 29 June 2004.

  2. Case Study (I): Copenhagen Contract lengths of six years. Combined bids limited to a maximum of three packages. Bids assessed using a value analysis model. Quality measuring system based on 10 attributes, 9 of which are based on passenger perceptions derived from a survey of 30,000 customers per year. Malus/bonus scheme plus an inspection system.

  3. Case Study (II): The Netherlands Bids in terms of amount of service given a budget constraint. Amersfoort - 60% increase in service hours. South Holland - 10.5% increase in service hours and a 6% reduction in subsidy . North West Utrecht - an 18% increase in service hours.

  4. Case Study (III): Helsingborg/Sundsvall Helsingborg: in 1994 operator given responsibility for service and fare planning, subject to authority controls concerning minimum levels of frequency and network density. In 1997 net cost tendering and quality targets were introduced, with the operator getting an extra payment of 5% of revenues if the targets are met. Sundsvall: since 1999 the operator is required to increase patronage by 4% per year. If this fails, the operator has to spend 4% of the net reimbursement per year on marketing.

  5. Case Study (IV): Adelaide/Perth Adelaide: initial area tendering was cautious with only modest cost reductions, some service improvements and no strong evidence of changes in patronage. A more ambitious revenue incentive-based regime has since been introduced which has seen service levels increase by 15%, unit costs reduce by 38% and patronage increase by 8%. Perth: tendering has led to an increase in service levels of 32%, unit cost reductions of 22% and a patronage increase of 26%.

  6. Other Hybrids Regulated models: corporatisation (Dublin, Toronto), yardstick competition (Oslo, Sydney). Limited competition models: performance based contracts (Bergen). Deregulated models: patronage funding scheme (Auckland, Christchurch). Key issue: Improving network design (service structure and levels, service quality, fare structure and levels).

More Related